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ABSTRACT
This Article scrutinizes varying interpretive methodologies
used by different tribunals of the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID") in relation to Article
XI of the US-Argentina bilateral investment treaty ("BIT"), which,
in different degrees, had referred to the customary doctrine of
"necessity" to derive Article XI's substantive meaning and legal
effects. Neither Sempra v. Argentina, LG&E v. Argentina, CMS Gas v.
Argentina, nor most recently in 2008, Cont'l Cas. Ins. Co. v.
Argentina, evince a demonstrably adequate interpretive
methodology within the framework of Articles 31 and 32 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ("VCLT"). Accordingly,
this Article proposes a return to these fundamental rules of treaty
interpretation. Given conceptual and methodological
incompatibilities between the customary doctrine of "necessity"
and Article XI, this Article holds that the customary doctrine has
no interpretive utility for Article XI. Rather, treaty appliers of
Article XI (and other similarly-worded treaty clauses on non-
precluded measures) should abide by the components of the
unitary system of interpretation under the VCLT, particularly the
treaty text and context. A State invoking an Article XI-type Non-
Precluded Measure ("NPM") utilizes Article XI to address
* LL.M 2008-2009, Yale Law School; incoming J.S.D. (Class of 2014), Yale Law
School; LL.B cum laude, University of the Philippines; B.S. Economics summa cum
laude University of the Philippines; Law Reform Specialist, Institute of
International Legal Studies, University of the Philippines; Professorial Lecturer
(Legal History, Agency & Partnership), University of the Philippines College of
Law; Professorial Lecturer (Public International Law, Administrative Law),
Lyceum of the Philippines College of Law; Member, Philippine Bar. With deep
gratitude to Professors W. Michael Reisman and Guillermo Aguilar-Alvarez for
inspiring comments, valuable guidance, and penetrating critique in finalizing this
work. All errors and omissions are solely mine.
U. Pa. J. Int'l. L.
potential international responsibility vis-a-vis the other State Party
to the BIT, and cannot use Article XI to remove its lex specialis
substantive duties under the BIT to that State Party's investors.
Finally, this Article recommends that treaty appliers should
privilege a holistic reading of the lex specialis as the governing law
whenever the host State claims an economic emergency to plead
outright exculpation from substantive obligations in bilateral
investment treaties.
1. INTRODUCTION
All interpretation pursues meaning within a penumbra of
discursive formations.1  With respect to the interpretation of
treaties, modern international law has substantially settled its
interpretive rules and accepted methodology through the 1969
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Due to the VCLT's
modalities of interpretation, treaty appliers do not have an
unlimited universe of sources, texts, symbols, and significations
from which to elicit the meaning intended by State parties to a
treaty. Article 31(1) of the VCLT provides the definitive general
formulation for treaty interpretation to be "in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of
the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose." 2 Context, according to Article 31(2) of the VCLT, can be
composed of: (1) "the text [of the treaty], including its preamble
and annexes;" (2) "any agreement relating to the treaty which was
made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of
the treaty;" and (3) "any instrument which was made by one or
more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and
accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the
treaty." 3  Other phenomena that may be taken into account
together with context include: (1) "any subsequent agreement
between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the
application of its provisions;" (2) "any subsequent practice in the
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the
1 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 23-70 (A.M.
Sheridan Smith trans.) (1972); see also ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, THE
INTERPRETATION OF ACTS AND RULES IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 285-392 (2008)
(evaluating the conceptual aspects of interpretation).
2 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
3 Id. art. 31(2).
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parties regarding its interpretation;" and (3) "any relevant rules of
international law applicable in the relations between the parties." 4
If it is established that the parties intended so, a special meaning
will be given to a term.5 Article 31 of the VCLT has thus been
understood to refer to a unitary system or rule of interpretation,
such that those undertaking the task of treaty interpretation must
collectively consider "the text, its context, and the object and
purpose of the treaty." 6 As the International Law Commission
("ILC") stressed, Article 27 of the Draft Articles on the Law of
Treaties (now Article 31 of the VCLT) makes text, context,
subsequent agreement regarding the interpretation, subsequent
practice establishing the understanding of the parties regarding the
interpretation, and relevant rules of international law, as being all
"of an obligatory character and by their very nature could not be
considered to be norms of interpretation in any way inferior to
those which precede them [in the logical progression of Article
27].-7
On the other hand, Article 32 of the VCLT permits
supplementary means of interpretation for two alternative
purposes: (1) to confirm the meaning resulting from the application
of Article 31; or (2) to determine meaning when the Article 31
interpretation "leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure" or
"leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable."8
Supplementary means include, but are not limited to, the travaux
preparatoires and the "circumstances of its conclusion." The travaux
preparatoires is generally "understood to include written material,
such as successive drafts of the treaty, conference records,
explanatory statements by an expert consultant at a codification
conference, uncontested interpretative statements by the chairman
of a drafting committee and ILC Commentaries," whose value
depends on several factors, particularly "authenticity,
completeness and availability." 9  Other "supplementary"
techniques of treaty interpretation are based on domestic legal
4 Id. art. 31(3).
5 Id. art. 31(4).
6 ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACrICE 234 (2d ed. 2007).
7 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with
Commentaries, [1966] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 220, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/190
[hereinafter ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties].
8 Vienna Convention, supra note 2 art. 32.
9 AUST, supra note 6, at 246.
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orders' principles on statutory construction (e.g. ejusdem generis,
expression unius est exclusio alterius, lex posterior derogat legi priori, lex
specialis derogat legi generali, to name a few).'O Clearly, Articles 31
and 32 of the VCLT both provide reasonable delineations for a
treaty applier. The International Court of Justice has declared both
of these norms as likewise bearing the status of customary
international law.1
Despite the relative clarity of Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT,
however, treaty appliers' liberal methodologies could still subvert
the unitary system of treaty interpretation. 2 In the September 5,
2008 Award in Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Argentina,13 the International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID") Tribunal
had occasion to again interpret Article XI of the Treaty Between the
United States and Argentina concerning the Reciprocal
Encouragement and Protection of Investment ("U.S.-Argentina
BIT"). Article XI, in its entirety, states: "This Treaty shall not
preclude the application by either Party of measures necessary for
the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its obligations
with respect to maintenance or restoration of international peace or
security, or the Protection of its own essential security interests." 14
10 JAN KLABBERS, THE CONCEPT OF TREATY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 38-39 (1996).
11 Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indon. v. Malay.),
Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 645 (Dec. 17).
12 See Ole Kristian Fauchald, The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals-An
Empirical Analysis, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 301, 358-59 (2008):
While it has been argued convincingly that 'the dispute resolution
system devised by [the international] society must make available both
centralized and decentralized mechanisms for attending to the social
needs of [the] evolving structure [of the international society]', it is the
opinion of this author that international tribunals' approaches to
interpretive issues should to a significant degree be 'centralized'. The
way in which ICSID tribunals use interpretive arguments in practice is often
quite far removed from the structures set out in Articles 31-32 of the VCLT.
Id. (emphasis added).
13 Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9 (Sep. 5, 2008). See
also Damon Vis-Dunbar, Continental Casualty Company moves to annul award
favourable to Argentina, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS, Jan. 16, 2009,
http://www.investmenttreatynews.org/cms/news/archive/2009
/ 01/16/continental-casualty-company-moves-to-annul-award-favourable-to-
argentina.aspx (explaining that the tribunal held that Argentina had successfully
applied the essential security provision found in the U.S.-Argentina BIT).
14 Treaty Between United States of America and Argentina Concerning the
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment [hereinafter U.S.-
Argentina BIT], art. XI, Nov. 14, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 124.
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Argentina invoked Article XI, specifically its "essential security
interests," to deny liability for a series of legislated economic
measures imposed during the Argentine financial crisis from 2000-
2002 (the "Capital Control Regime"), that had unilaterally pesified
(converted to pesos) formerly dollar-denominated contracts, frozen
bank deposits and prohibited the transfer of funds abroad,
terminated peso convertibility and pegged the U.S. dollar at a fixed
one-to-one exchange rate, rescheduled term deposits and reduced
interest rates, and defaulted on and unilaterally rescheduled
government debt. In interpreting the scope of "essential security
interests," the Tribunal in Continental declared that it would not
use the customary law doctrine of necessity, as codified in Article
25 of the International Law Commission's Articles on State
Responsibility. Instead, the Tribunal explored GATT and WTO
case law to determine the scope of "essential security interests" as
contemplated in the U.S.-Argentina BIT:
For the reasons stated above relating to the different role of
Art. XI and of the defense of necessity in customary
international law, the Tribunal does not share the opinion
that "the treaty thus becomes inseparable from the
customary law standard insofar as to the conditions for the
operation of the state of necessity are concerned," as stated
in the Enron Case and submitted also by the Claimant.
Since the text of Art. XI derives from the parallel model
clause of the U.S. FCN treaties and these treaties in turn
reflect the formulation of Art. XX of GATT 1947, the
Tribunal finds it more appropriate to refer to the GATT and
WTO case law which has extensively dealt with the concept
and requirements of necessity in the context of economic
measures derogating to the obligations contained in GATT,
rather than to refer to the requirement of necessity under
customary international law. '5
Despite the foregoing declaration, the Tribunal's reasoning in
Continental ultimately used the concept of necessity under
customary international law as a supplementary means of
interpreting Article XI. Apart from this supplementary reference,
the Tribunal also uniquely expanded the sources of possible
interpretation of Article XI to import doctrines from completely
15 Cont'l Cas. Co., para. 192.
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distinct legal regimes such as the GATT and the WTO.
Inexplicably, the Tribunal as treaty applier broadened its reach of
interpretive sources in a manner seemingly inconsistent with the
clear delimitations prescribed in Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT.
The Tribunal's construction of "essential security interests"
within the framework of Article XI of the US-Argentina BIT sets a
troubling precedent for the interpretation of analogously-worded
provisions on NPM in other bilateral investment treaties.
According to a recent survey, NPMs are present in over two
hundred bilateral investment treaties. 16
Considering the increasing proliferation of similarly-worded
NPMs in investment treaty regimes, treaty appliers are challenged
to construe a lex specialis treaty term- "essential security
interests" -with utmost fidelity to the settled interpretive rules in
Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT. As this Article shows, there are
conceptual and methodological problems in using the customary
norm of necessity as a supplementary means of interpreting the lex
specialis treaty term of "essential security interests," whether to
confirm a meaning reached under the system of interpretation in
Article 31 of the VCLT, or to itself provide basis to determine treaty
meaning permitted in Article 32 of the VCLT. Conceptually, the
content of "necessity" as a norm precluding wrongfulness under
customary international law vastly differs from the content of
"essential security interests" as lex specialis in Article XI of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT. The legal consequences flowing from each type of
norm, (and as corollaries, the duties assumed by the host State
under each norm), are also separate and distinct.
Methodologically, "necessity" under customary international law
also envisions a more restrictive range of state action than
"essential security interests" in the lex specialis of Article XI. The
16 William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in
Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures
Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. INT'L. L. 307, 318-20 (2008)
(detailing the presence of non-precluded measures in bilateral investment
treaties). NPMs have also been built into multilateral treaty regimes. For
example, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ("ASEAN") Framework
Agreement on Investment Area, Member States are not prevented from adopting
or enforcing measures "necessary to protect national security and public morals,"
or to take "necessary safeguard measures" when a Member State "suffers or is
threatened with any serious injury or threat," which is the "result of the
implementation of the liberalization programme under this Agreement."
Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area arts. 13, 14, Oct. 7, 1998,
http://www.aseansec.org/7994.pdf.
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inherent incompatibility between the customary law doctrine of
"necessity" and "essential security interests" in the lex specialis of
Article XI ought to militate against any use of "necessity" as a
supplementary means of interpretation of non-precluded measures
in bilateral investment treaties. The interpretive havoc wrought by
using "necessity" as a supplementary means of interpretation to lex
specialis NPMs thus poses serious policy consequences for the
stability of the international legal investment regime, and raises
serious moral hazards that incentivizes higher-risk economic and
investment policy-setting by host States.
Dissociating Article XI from the customary norm of necessity,
however, does not reduce Article XI to a non liquet situation of
norm-inoperability. Instead, the brief text of Article XI should be
contextually viewed from its limited understanding within the
framework of the international obligations subsisting between the
states parties to the BIT. Given the text of Article XI in relation to
the structural design of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, this analysis
proposes an interpretive bifurcation of the duties of a host State
vis-a-vis investors under the U.S.-Argentina BIT, from the
international obligations that give rise to state responsibility
between the United States and Argentina as treaty parties.17 A
State invoking an Article XI-type NPM utilizes Article XI to
address potential international responsibility vis-a-vis the other
State Party to the BIT, and cannot use Article XI to remove its lex
specialis substantive duties under the BIT to that State Party's
investors. This crucial point of differentiation should result in a
better-nuanced appreciation of international legal consequences in
an Article XI-type situation (e.g. when a host State asserts that it is
"not precluded from taking a measure necessary to 'essential
security interests"') that does not violate the unitary system of
interpretation under the VCLT.
17 See MOHAMMED M. GOMAA, SUSPENSION OR TERMINATION OF TREATIES ON
GROUNDS OF BREACH 62-65 (1996).
International responsibility is independent of the reaction a wronged
party may take. Even if that party decides to waive its right to react to
the wrongful act for any reason, the defaulting party is not relieved from
its responsibility.... The injured party has to be one to whom an
international obligation arising from the treaty is due. If not, it may not
bring a claim in respect of the breach.
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Section 1 of this Article scrutinizes the methodology and
reasoning employed in various ICSID decisions on the
interpretation of "essential security interests" of Article XI of the
U.S.-Argentina BIT, culminating with the latest September 5, 2008
Award in Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Argentina. A comparative examination
of the interpretive methodologies reached in these decisions by
separate ICSID Tribunals shows that "essential security interests"
have been parsed within an entire spectrum of meanings, from the
most restrictive to the most expansive reading in Continental.
Section 2 then examines conceptual and methodological problems
arising within the framework of Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT
when the customary norm of necessity is used as a
"supplementary" means of interpreting the lex specialis of Article XI
of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, more so in the context of the Continental
award. Section 3 sets forth a distinct choice of law proposal for
future cases, favoring exclusive use of the lex specialis and
abandoning the confusing "supplementary" use of necessity under
customary international law to explicate the meaning of "essential
security interests," except in the circumscribed instance that the
parties to a treaty textually provide the customary norm to be a
"relevant rule of international law applicable in the relations
between the parties" within the contemplation of Article 31(3) of
the VCLT. This deliberate choice of law in favor of the lex specialis
should more predictably affect how future Tribunals appreciate the
duties of the host State; assess the standards of reasonability,
proportionality, fair and equitable treatment; exact the quantum of
evidence to prove the existence of a situation warranting non-
precluded measures under the lex specialis; and evaluate the host
State's subsequent conduct in situations of possible mitigation
and/or contribution to situations implicating "essential security
interests." To complete interpretive scrutiny of Article XI, Section
3 also proposes a reading of Article XI that reconciles the expressed
intent of the States Parties to the U.S.-Argentina BIT within the
structure, policy, and design of the treaty. In the Conclusion, this
Article outlines various inimical policy consequences from using
the customary norm of "necessity" as a supplementary means of
interpretation of lex specialis non-precluded measures, including
threats to the rule of law and the reciprocity of stable expectations
between host States and investors, increased volatility in the
international legal regime for investment, and provoking moral
[Vol. 31:3
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hazards that incentivize higher-risk economic policy-setting of host
States.18
2. "ESSENTIAL SECURITY INTERESTS" IN ARTICLE XI OF THE U.S.-
ARGENTINA BIT VIS-A-VIS THE CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
DOCTRINE OF "NECESSITY" IN ICSID JURISPRUDENCE: FROM SEMPRA,
CMS GAS, LG&E TO CONTINENTAL
Prior to Continental, no ICSID Tribunal had ever treated the
2001-2002 Argentine financial crisis, and the measures undertaken
by the Argentine government during this period, as a legitimate
basis to claim exculpation from liability to a broad range of foreign
investors.1 9 As will be shown in this section, Continental would not
just be a singular triumph for Argentina, but it would also mark a
deliberate departure from the interpretive practice of previous
ICSID Tribunals in three cases likewise involving the same plea of
economic emergency: (1) Sempra Energy International v. Argentina;20
(2) CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentina;21 and (3) LG&E
Energy Corporation v. Argentina.22  Before proceeding to a
comparative analysis with the Tribunal's latest interpretive
methodology in Continental, the following subsections briefly
discuss the relevant facts and legal reasoning for each of these
three cases.
18 See William E. Scheuerman, The Economic State of Emergency, 21 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1869 (2000) (expounding upon the dangers inherent in the reliance upon
economic emergency powers as a basis for regulation).
19 See William W. Burke-White, The Argentine Financial Crisis: State Liability
Under BITs and the Legitimacy of the ICSID System, 3 ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH
L. & PoL'Y 199 (2008) (presenting an argument on the position that the ICSID
Tribunals' narrow interpretation of Article XI has made the latter "essentially
unavailable to any state," prior to Continental).
20 Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argentina, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction,
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16 (May 11, 2005); Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argentina,
Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16 (Sept. 28,2007).
21 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, Decision on Objections to
Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8 (July 17, 2003); CMS Gas Transmission
Co. v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8 (May 11, 2005); CMS Gas
Transmission Co. v. Argentina, Decision on Request for Stay of Enforcement of
Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8 (Sept. 1, 2006); CMS Gas Transmission Co. v.
Argentina, Decision of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Application for Annulment
of the Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8 (Sept. 25, 2007).
22 LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentina, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction,
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1 (Apr. 30, 2004); LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentina,
Decision on Liability, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1 (Oct. 3, 2006); LG&E Energy
Corp. v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1 (July 25, 2007).
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1.1. Sempra
Sempra Energy International, a company established in
California, brought suit against Argentina as a 43.09% shareholder
of two companies (Sodigas Sur S.A. and Sodigas Pampeana S.A.),
with another company, Camuzzi, owning the remaining 56.91% of
shares in both companies. These two companies in turn owned the
majority shares in two Argentine natural gas distribution
companies (Sodigas Sur S.A. held 90% of shares in Camuzzi Gas
del Sur S.A., while Sodigas Pampeana held 86.09% of shares in
Camuzzi Gas Pampeana S.A.). 23 Both natural gas distribution
companies held licenses from Argentina to supply and distribute
natural gas in seven provinces in Argentina.
Argentina raised the following objections: (1) there was no
legal dispute; (2) the measures in question were not directly related
to an investment; (3) no national of another contracting State to the
U.S.-Argentina BIT was directly harmed; (4) the claim is
premature; (5) Sempra had no jus standi as it was not qualified to
bring suit as a mere minority shareholder in Sodigas Sur and
Sodigas Pampinea; and (6) the dispute had already been submitted
to other tribunals.
Applying only the requirements of Article 25 of the ICSID
Convention and the U.S.-Argentina BIT in order to reach a
determination on jurisdiction, the Tribunal rejected each of
Argentina's objections. The Tribunal held that Sempra could
submit a claim as a national of the U.S., insofar as it meets the
requirements laid down in the ICSID Convention and the U.S.-
Argentina BIT. Sodigas also had the option "to complain as a
company incorporated in Argentina, if it is established that this
company is under foreign control, and through it, the licensee
companies too."24 The Tribunal clarified that the second sentence
of Article 25(2)(b) of the Convention,25 as well as Article VII(8) of
23 Sempra Energy Int'l, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, para. 19.
24 Id. para. 42.
25 The Tribunal explained that "Nationals of another Contracting State"
means:
(b) any juridical person which had the nationality of a Contracting State
other than the State party to the dispute on the date on which the parties
consented to submit such dispute to conciliation or arbitration and any
juridical person which had the nationality of the Contracting State party
to the dispute on that date and which, because of foreign control, the
parties have agreed should be treated as a national of another
Contracting State for purposes of this Convention.
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the U.S.-Argentina BIT,26 merely "provides an additional or
different alternative which does not in this case prevent an investor
from opting to act under the first sentence of the Convention article
if it meets the pertinent requirements." 27 Even if the second
sentence were to be applied, Sempra would still have the requisite
nationality to bring suit, since, as the Tribunal noted, both Sempra
and Camuzzi exercised joint control and management of Sodigas
Sur and Sodigas Pampinea pursuant to their respective
shareholders' agreements and company by-laws.28
The Tribunal further held that there was a legal dispute which
arose directly from Sempra's investment. The Tribunal adopted
the standard in the Gami case 29 to conclude that the extent that the
treaty on which the protection or guarantee is based provides the
shareholder with the possibility to resort to arbitration, where
direct or indirect ownership is considered and a broad definition of
investment is made under Article I(1)(a) of the U.S.-Argentina
BIT.30 The Tribunal characterized Sempra's claim as founded on
ICSID Conventions Rules and Regulations, art. 25 2.
26 U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 14, art. 7, 8.
For purposes of an arbitration held under paragraph 3 of this Article, any
company legally constituted under the applicable laws and regulations
of a Party or a political subdivision thereof but that, immediately before
the occurrence of the event or events giving rise to the dispute, was an
investment of nationals or companies of the other Party, shall be treated
as a national or company of such other Party in accordance with Article
25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention.
Id.
27 Sempra Energy Int'l, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, para. 45.
28 Id. paras. 54-57.
29 GAMI Invs. Inc. v. Mexico, Final Award (Nov. 15, 2004), 13 ICSID (W.
Bank) 147.
30 1. For purposes of this Treaty,
(a) 'investment' means every kind of investment in the territory of one
Party owned or controlled directly or indirectly by nationals or
companies of the other Party, such as equity, debt, and service and
investment contracts, and includes without limitation
(i) tangible and intangible property, including rights, such as mortgages,
liens and pledges;
(ii) a company or shares of stock or other interests in a company or interests in
the assets thereof,
(iii) a claim to money or a claim to performance having economic value
and directly related to an investment;
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both contract and the U.S.-Argentina BIT, holding that the dispute
"arises from how the violation of the contractual commitments
with the licensees, expressed in the license and other acts, impacts
the rights the investor claims to have in the light of the provisions
of the Treaty and the guarantees on the basis of which it made the
protected investment."31
Finally, the Tribunal disposed of the other objections to
jurisdiction by holding that: (1) the pendency of renegotiation
proceedings between Argentina and its foreign investors was not a
basis for deferment of the arbitration; (2) the determination and
quantification of losses is an issue for the merits phase of the
arbitration; (3) Sempra's evidence shows that it is a foreign
investor; and (4) the pendency of disputes before national courts
would not prevent the Tribunal from exercising jurisdiction over
claims arising from alleged breaches of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.
Significantly, in ascertaining whether Argentina had expressed its
consent to submit to arbitration under the U.S.-Argentina BIT, the
Tribunal affirmed Article 31 of the VCLT as the "principal means
of interpretation" of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, describing the U.S.-
Argentina BIT as having been concluded by the parties in order to
provide "full protection to investors." 32
The Tribunal's Award in the Merits phase on September 9,
200733 was issued in Sempra's favor. The Tribunal concluded that
Argentina had breached its obligations to accord the investor fair
and equitable treatment guaranteed under Article II(2)(a) of the
U.S.-Argentina BIT and to observe the obligations entered into
with regard to the investment as guaranteed in Article 11(2)(c) of
the same treaty. It ordered Argentina to pay Sempra compensation
in the amount of $128,250,462 (USD), with semi-annually
(iv) intellectual property which includes, inter alia, rights relating to:
literary and artistic works, including sound recordings, inventions in all
fields of human endeavour, industrial designs, semiconductor mask
works, trade secrets, know-how, and confidential business information,
and trademarks, service marks, and trade names; and
(v) any right conferred by law or contract, and any licenses and permits
pursuant to law.
U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 14, art. I(1)(a) (emphasis added).
31 Sempra Energy Int'l, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/16, para. 100.
32 Id. para. 142.
33 Sempra Energy Int'l, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16.
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compounded interest at the six month successive LIBOR rate plus
two percent for each year, from January 1, 2002 until the date of the
Award.
Sempra had argued that various measures undertaken by the
Argentine government from 2000 to 2002 abrogated and
repudiated most of the rights Sempra had under the regulatory
framework and the terms of the licenses issued to Camuzzi Gas
Pampeana and Camuzzi Gas del Sur. Sempra's decision to invest
in these companies relied specifically on the conditions offered by
such legislative and regulatory enactments, which included
conditions that: (1) licenses would be for a term of thirty-five years,
with a possible ten-year extension; (2) calculation of tariffs would
be made in U.S. dollars and their semi-annual adjustment would
be made according to changes in the U.S. Producer Price Index
("PPI"); (3) there would be no price freeze applicable to the tariff
system, and if one was imposed, the licensee had the right to
compensation; (4) the license would not be amended by the
Argentine government, without the prior consent of the licensee;
(5) the Argentine government committed not to withdraw the
license except in case of specific breaches; and (6) the principle of
indifference would operate with respect to subsidies granted by
the Argentine government so that the distributor's income would
not be altered. 34
Argentina argued its defense of emergency from three separate
legal streams: (1) Argentine law and jurisprudence which
supposedly contemplates the rebalancing of contracts during a
state of economic emergency; (2) general international law which
includes the customary norm on the state of necessity as codified
under Article 25 of the International Law Commission's Draft
Articles on State Responsibility; and (3) Articles IV(3) and XI of the
US-Argentina BIT.35
The Tribunal initially examined the allegations of breach of the
U.S.-Argentina BIT. The Tribunal held that Argentina's measures
did not breach Article IV(1) (no expropriation);36 Article II(2)(b) (no
arbitrariness or discrimination);37 and Article II(2)(a) (there being
no specific allegation of failure to provide full protection and
34 Id. paras. 85, 93.
35 Id. paras. 98, 338, 356.
36 Id. para. 286.
37 Id. paras. 311-14.
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security to the investment).38 However, the Tribunal held that
Argentina's emergency measures breached Article II(2)(a) by
failing to provide fair and equitable treatment to investors,
reasoning that:
The measures in question in this case have beyond any
doubt substantially changed the legal and business
framework under which the investment was decided and
implemented. Where there was business certainty and
stability, there is now the opposite. The tariff regime
speaks for itself in this respect. A long-term business
outlook has been transformed into a day-to-day discussion
about what is next to come. The guarantees given are no
longer available. 39
The violation of this specific treaty obligation also triggered a
breach of the umbrella clause in Article II(2)(c) of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT.40
The Tribunal then proceeded to consider, and in turn reject, the
defense of emergency as asserted by Argentina from the
standpoint of Argentine law and jurisprudence, general
international law, and the U.S.-Argentina BIT. With respect to
Argentine law, the Tribunal adopted the standard that emergency
restrictions on the normal exercise of patrimonial rights must be
"reasonable, limited in time, and constitute a remedy and not a
mutation in the substance or essence of the right acquired by
judicial decision or contract." 4' Argentina's emergency measures
failed to meet the temporality requirement when it extended the
emergency legislation beyond the period. of the financial crisis.42
The emergency measures also caused an essential mutation of the
rights under the licenses, to the point that "in reality.., the rights
granted under the License shall be permanently eliminated, at least
insofar as the calculation of tariffs in U.S. dollars and their PPI
adjustment are concerned." According to the Tribunal, this result
could not be permitted, since the "natural outcome of the operation
of 'emergency' is not... a legal exemption from liability." 43
38 Id. paras. 321-24.
39 Id. para. 303 (citation omitted).
40 Id. paras. 311-14.
41 Id. para. 247.
42 Id. paras. 251-52.
43 Id. para. 254.
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Finally, Argentina's unilateral determination of tariff
adjustments, undertaken outside the adjustment mechanisms
provided under the terms of the licenses themselves, proved
Argentina's measures to be inconsistent with the requirement of
reasonableness.44 In the words of the Tribunal:
[T]he real issue in the instant case is whether the
constitutional order and the survival of the State were
imperiled by the crises, or instead whether the Government
still had many tools at its disposal to cope with the
situation. The Tribunal believes that the constitutional
order was not on the verge of collapse as evidenced by,
among many examples, the orderly constitutional transition
that carried the country through five different Presidencies
in a few days' time, followed by elections and the
reestablishment of public order. Even if emergency
legislation became necessary in this context, legitimately
acquired rights could still have been accommodated by
means of temporary measures and renegotiation.45
The Tribunal also rejected the defense of necessity under
customary international law (reflected by Article 25 of the Articles
of State Responsibility), questioning the alleged existence of a
grave and imminent peril that could threaten the essential interest.
According to the Tribunal, while there was "no doubt that there
was a severe crisis, and that, in such a context, it was unlikely that
business could have continued as usual," the argument that:
[S]uch a situation compromised the very existence of the
State and its independence, and thereby qualified as one
involving an essential State interest, is not convincing.
Questions of public order and social unrest could have been
handled, as in fact they were, just as questions of political
stabilization were handled under the constitutional
arrangements in force.46
The Tribunal was careful to point out that it was not its task to
substitute its view of what the Argentine government's choice
ought to have been among various economic options, but that for
44 Id. paras. 255-61.
45 Id. para. 332.
46 Id. para. 348.
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purposes of Article 25, the Tribunal's duty is "only to determine
whether the choice made was the only one available." 47
Turning to the U.S.-Argentina BIT, the Tribunal first clarified
the scope of Article IV(3), one of the treaty pillars of Argentina's
emergency defense. Article IV(3) states in its entirety:
Nationals or companies of either Party whose investments
suffer losses in the territory of the other Party owing to war
or other armed conflict, revolution, state of national
emergency, insurrection, civil disturbance or other similar
events shall be accorded treatment by such other Party no
less favourable than that accorded to its own nationals or
companies of any third country, whichever is the more
favourable treatment, as regards any measures it adopts in
relation to such losses.48
This provision, according to the Tribunal, was only intended to
refer to corrective measures, or the "minimum level of treatment
for foreign investments that suffer losses in the host country by the
simultaneous interplay of national and most favored nation
treatments, and then only in respect of measures which the State
'adopts in relation to such losses.'" 49 The Tribunal categorically
emphasized that Article IV(3) could not be read as a "general
escape clause from treaty obligations," and "consequently does not
result in the exclusion of wrongfulness, liability and eventual
compensation."5 0
Moving on to Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT as the crux of
the interpretive controversy, the Tribunal held at the outset that:
[Tihe object and purpose of the Treaty is, as a general
proposition, for it to be applicable in situations of economic
difficulty and hardship that require the protection of the
internationally guaranteed rights of its beneficiaries. To
this extent, any interpretation resulting in an escape route
from defined obligations cannot be easily reconciled with
that object and purpose.51
47 Id. para. 351.
48 U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 14, art. IV(3).
49 Id. para. 362 (quotations omitted).
50 Id. para. 363.
51 Id. para. 373.
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The Tribunal then accepted the inclusion of economic emergencies
as reasonably within the standard of "essential security interests"
in Article XI.
The interpretive problem commences with the Tribunal's use of
Article 25 of the Articles of State Responsibility to provide the
content of "essential security interests" in Article XI of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT:
In addition, in view of the fact that the Treaty does not
define what it is to be understood by an "essential security
interest," the requirements for a state of necessity under
customary international law, as outlined above in
connection with their expression in Article 25 of the Articles
on State Responsibility, become relevant to the matter of
establishing whether the necessary conditions have been
met for its invocation under the Treaty. Different might
have been the case if the Treaty had defined this concept
and the conditions for its exercise, but this was not the case.
The Tribunal notes that in the view of Dean Slaughter and
Professor Burke-White, which the Respondent shares, the
CMS award was mistaken in that it discussed Article XI in
connection with necessity under customary law. This
Tribunal believes, however, that the Treaty provision is
inseparable from the customary law standard insofar as the
definition of necessity and the conditions for its operation
are concerned, given that it is under customary law that
such elements have been defined. Similarly, the Treaty
does not contain a definition concerning either the
maintenance of international peace and security, or the
conditions for its operation. Reference is instead made to
the Charter of the United Nations in Article 6 of the
Protocol to the Treaty.5 2
The Tribunal did not cite any legal authority to support its
decision to use Article 25 to provide substantive content for the
clause on "essential security interests" in Article XI. While it
conceded that the treaty regime as lex specialis prevails over general
customary international law, the Tribunal summarily concluded
that the absence of specified legal elements to determine the
52 Id. paras. 375-76 (citation omitted).
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invocation of "essential security interests" in Article XI of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT simply warranted the infusion of the legal elements
under Article 25 of the Articles of State Responsibility.53
Significantly, the Tribunal made no reference whatsoever to the
unitary interpretive system of Article 31, much less the interpretive
rules on the use of supplementary means under Article 32 of the
VCLT.
After reviewing the competing evidence on the nature of
Article XI (and noting some reference to Articles 31 and 32 of the
VCLT),54 the Tribunal held that Article XI was not intended by the
parties to be self-judging. It reiterated that:
[Because] the crisis invoked does not meet the customary
law requirements of Article 25 of the Articles of State
Responsibility, [the Tribunal] concludes that necessity or
emergency is not conducive in this case to the preclusion of
wrongfulness, and that there is no need to undertake a
further judicial review under Article XI given that this
Article does not set out conditions different from customary
law in such regard.55
With the defense of emergency and/or necessity rejected for all
three legal streams (Argentine law and jurisprudence, customary
53 Id. para. 378.
It is no doubt correct to conclude that a treaty regime specifically dealing
with a given matter will prevail over more general rules of customary
law. The problem here, however, is that the Treaty itself did not deal
with the legal elements necessary for the legitimate invocation of a state
of necessity. The rule governing such questions will thus be found under
customary law. As concluded above, such requirements and conditions
have not been fully met in this case. Moreover, the view of the
Respondent's legal expert, as expressed at the hearing, contradicts the
Respondent's argument that the Treaty standards are not more
favourable than those of customary law, and at the most should be
equated with the international minimum standard. The Tribunal does
not believe that the intention of the parties can be described in the terms
which the expert has used, as there is no indication that such was the
case. Nor does the Tribunal believe that because Article XI did not make
an express reference to customary law, this source of rights and
obligations becomes inapplicable. International law is not a fragmented
body of law as far as basic principles are concerned and necessity is no
doubt one such basic principle.
Id.
54 Id. para. 381.
55 Id. para. 388.
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international law, and Articles IV(3) and XI of the U.S.-Argentina
BIT), the Tribunal held that Argentina had a duty to compensate
for its breaches of Articles II(2)(a) and (c) of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.
While recognizing that Article IV of the U.S.-Argentina BIT
constituted the legal standard for compensation,56 the Tribunal
nevertheless held that it would "take into account the crisis
conditions affecting Argentina when determining the
compensation due for the liability found in connection with the
breach of the Treaty standards."57 The Tribunal ordered Argentina
to compensate Sempra in the total amount of $128,250,462 (USD),
an aggregate amount that represented the sum of Sempra's equity
value loss, its loss on a December 2001 loan, unpaid PPI
adjustments, and nonpayment of subsidies within the terms of the
Licenses.
1.2. The LG&E Cases
The three LG&E corporations who filed a claim against
Argentina in LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., and LG&E
International Inc. (collectively "the LG&E Group") are all
corporations organized under the laws of the United States. The
LG&E Group has shareholdings in three local gas distribution
companies in Argentina (45.9% in Distribuidora de Gas del Centro,
14.4% in Distribuidora de Gas Cuyana S.A., and 19.6% in Gas
Natural BAN S.A.).58 The LG&E Group participated in Argentina's
privatization process, where foreign investors were:
[Elncouraged to purchase shares with guarantees, such as
tariffs calculated in U.S. dollars, automatic and periodic
adjustments to the tariffs based on the PPI, a clear legal
framework that could not be unilaterally modified, and the
granting of "licenses" instead of "concessions" with a view
56 Article IV(1) states:
Compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of the
expropriated investment immediately before the expropriatory action
was taken or became known, whichever is earlier; be paid without delay;
include interest at a commercially reasonable rate from the date of
expropriation; be fully realizable; and be freely transferable at the
prevailing market rate of exchange on the date of expropriation."
U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 14, at VII(8).
57 Sempra Energy Int'l, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, para. 397.
58 LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp, and LG&E Int'l Inc. v.
Argentina, Decision on Liability, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, para. 52 (2006).
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to offering the highest degree of protection to prospective
investors.5 9
Following the Argentine economic and financial crisis, the
Argentine government announced the mandatory renegotiation of
all public service contracts, without offering to restore the legal
guarantees that were eliminated by the 2002 Emergency Law and
other governmental measures. In its request for arbitration, the
LG&E Group asserted Argentina's breach of the following U.S.-
Argentina BIT obligations: Article II(2)(c) (umbrella clause); Article
II(2)(a) (failure to accord fair and equitable treatment); Article
II(2)(b) (taking arbitrary and discriminatory measures that impair
the use and enjoyment of the Claimants' investment; and Article
JV(1) (indirect expropriation). The LG&E Group filed a claim
against Argentina for $248 million or, in the event the Tribunal
concludes that there was expropriation, $268 million.
The Tribunal rejected all of Argentina's jurisdictional objections
in its April 30, 2004 Decision on Objections on Jurisdiction.60 The
Tribunal held that the LG&E Group had jus standi as foreign
investors, even if they did not directly operate the investment in
Argentina.61 It also held that the LG&E Group's claims involved a
dispute of a legal nature arising directly from an investment, since,
at the jurisdictional phase, it was to be presumed that the claims
were based on the alleged breaches of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.62
Argentina also gave its consent to the arbitration through Article
VII(4) of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, while the LG&E Group gave its
consent when it decided to submit their investment disputes to
ICSID jurisdiction.63 Finally, the Tribunal held that LG&E Group's
claims were also not time-barred or precluded by the pendency of
negotiations by license holders with the Argentine government.64
In its Decision on Liability, the Tribunal first established the
applicable law to settle the dispute to be the second part of Article
42(1) of the ICSID Convention-"the law of the Contracting State
59 Id. para. 49.
60 LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., & LG&E Int'l Inc. v. Argentina,
Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, para. 84 (Apr.
30, 2004).
61 Id. para. 63.
62 Id. para. 66.
63 LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentina, Decision on Liability, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/1, para. 22.
64 Id. para. 23.
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party to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) and
such rules of International Law as may be applicable." 65 The
Tribunal laid a hierarchy of applicable laws to the dispute: 1) the
U.S.-Argentina BIT; 2) "in the absence of explicit provisions" in the
U.S.-Argentina BIT, general international law; and 3) Argentine
domestic law.66
The Tribunal's Decision on Liability began its analysis on the
LG&E Group's claims of breaches of the U.S.-Argentina BIT. With
respect to Article 11(2)(a) (fair and equitable treatment), the
Tribunal initially examined the nature of Argentina's guarantees to
investors, particularly in the gas industry, and concluded that
Argentina's legislative acts and the terms of the licenses had made
four specific guarantees to investors in the gas transport and
distribution centers: tariffs would be calculated in U.S. dollars
before conversion into pesos; tariffs would be subject to semi-
annual adjustments according to the PPI; tariffs were to provide an
income sufficient to cover all costs and a reasonable rate of return;
and the tariff system would not be subject to freezing or price
controls without compensation. 67 Considering the impact of these
industry-specific guarantees in generating investor expectations,
the Tribunal held that Argentina violated Article II(2)(a) of the
U.S.-Argentina BIT by failing to accord fair and equitable treatment
to investors when it unilaterally abrogated such guarantees. 68
65 Id. para. 82.
66 Id. para. 99.
67 Id. para. 119.
68 Id. para. 133.
Emerging from the economic crisis of the late 1980s, Argentina created
an economic recovery plan mainly dependent upon foreign capital.
Argentina prepared with the investment banks an attractive framework
of laws and regulations that addressed the specific concerns of foreign
investors with respect to the country risks involved in Argentina. In
light of these risks, Claimants relied upon certain key guarantees in the
Gas Law and implementing regulations, such as calculation of the tariffs
in US dollars before their conversion into pesos, the semi-annual PPI
adjustments, tariffs set to provide sufficient revenues to cover all the
costs and a reasonable rate of return, and compensation in the event that
the Government altered the tariff scheme. Having created specific
expectations among investors, Argentina was bound by its obligations
concerning the investment guarantees vis-A-vis public utility licensees,
and in particular, the gas-distribution licensees. The abrogation of these
specific guarantees violates the stability and predictability underlying
the standard of fair and equitable treatment.
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Despite Argentina's economic hardship, the Tribunal insisted that
Argentina "went too far by completely dismantling the very legal
framework constructed to attract investors." 69 As a corollary, the
abrogation of these guarantees under Argentina's statutory
framework also breached the umbrella clause under Article II(2)(c)
of the U.S.-Argentina BIT. In the words of the Tribunal, the
abrogation of guarantees gave rise to corresponding violations of
Argentina's obligations to the LG&E Group's investments:
Argentina made these specific obligations to foreign
investors, such as LG&E, by enacting the Gas Law and
other regulations, and then advertising these guarantees in
the Offering Memorandum to induce the entry of foreign
capital to fund the privatization program in its public
service sector. These laws and regulations became
obligations within the meaning of Article II(2)(c), by virtue
of targeting foreign investors and applying specifically to
their investments .... 70
On the other hand, the Tribunal ruled that Argentina did not
breach Article II(2)(b) (discriminatory and arbitrary treatment).
Noting that the U.S.-Argentina BIT did not define the term
"arbitrary," the Tribunal located its meaning between the plain
meaning of the term under international law ("a willful disregard
of due process of law")71 and the apparent intent of the parties in
the preambular clause of the U.S.-Argentina BIT ("consideration of
the effect of a measure on foreign investments and a balance of the
interests of the State with any burden imposed on such
investments"), 72 to conclude that Argentina's measures were not
"arbitrary or discriminatory" because they were "the result of
reasoned judgment rather than simple disregard of the rule of
law."73
The Tribunal also rejected the LG&E Group's claim of indirect
expropriation in violation of Article IV(1) of the U.S.-Argentina
BIT. The Tribunal held that Argentina's abrogation of guarantees
"did not deprive the investors of the right to enjoy their
69 Id. para. 139.
70 Id. para. 175.
71 Id. para. 157.
72 Id. para. 158.
73 Id. para. 162.
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investment ... the true interests at stake here are the investment's
asset base."74 Since the LG&E Group retained control of their
shares despite fluctuations in share value, there could not have
been any expropriation. As contemplated by the Tribunal,
expropriation could only have occurred if there was a "permanent,
severe deprivation of LG&E's rights with regard to its investment,
or almost complete deprivation of the value of LG&E's
investment." 75
Having determined the existence of a breach of Articles II(2)(a)
and II(2)(c) of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, the Tribunal then proceeded
to examine Argentina's alternative defense of necessity under
Argentine law, Articles XI and IV(3) of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, as
well as customary international law. Consistent with its earlier
ruling establishing a hierarchy of applicable law to the dispute, the
Tribunal first turned to the claims brought under Articles XI and
IV(3) of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.
The Tribunal first concluded that Article XI was not self-
judging, "[biased on the evidence before the Tribunal regarding
the understanding of the Parties in 1991 at the time the Treaty was
signed ... "76 The Tribunal then made a largely factual analysis to
conclude that Argentina was "excused under Article XI from
liability for any breaches of the Treaty between 1 December 2001
and 26 April 2003," 7 characterizing Argentina's measures of
suspending the calculation of tariffs in U.S. dollars and the PPI
adjustment of tariffs, as well as the enactment of its Emergency
Law as a "legitimate way of protecting its social and economic
system."78 Without clarifying the precise content of Article XI (or
its substantive authority for interpreting "essential security
interests"), the Tribunal simply rejected the LG&E's narrow
interpretation of "essential security interests" to circumstances
amounting to military action and war.79 Without citing any legal
authority, the Tribunal tautologically concluded that "Article XI
refers to situations in which a State has no choice but to act. A
State may have several responses at its disposal to maintain public
74 Id. para. 198.
75 Id. paras. 199-200.
76 Id. para. 212.
77 Id. para. 229.
78 Id. para. 239.
79 Id. para. 238.
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order or protect its essential security interests."80 With respect to
Article IV(3) of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, the Tribunal's interpretive
emphasis was likewise largely factual:
Article IV(3) of the Treaty confirms that the States Party to
the Bilateral Treaty contemplated the state of national
emergency as a separate category of exceptional
circumstances. That is in line with the Tribunal's
interpretation of Article XI of the Treaty. Furthermore, the
Tribunal has determined, as a factual matter that the grave
crisis in Argentina lasted from 1 December 2001 until 26
April 2003. It has not been shown convincingly to the
Tribunal that during that period the provisions of Article
IV(3) of the Treaty have been violated by Argentina. On the
contrary, during that period, the measures taken by
Argentina were "across the board."8'
At this juncture, it is noteworthy that the Tribunal had simply
accepted Argentina's plea that its economic emergency could
verily be subsumed under the "essential security interests"
standard in Article XI, or the "state of national emergency"
standard in Article IV(3). The Tribunal did not cite any legal
authority for this interpretation, nor did it provide a legal standard
for the effect of the applicability of Article XI, other than the
Tribunal's own conclusion that this "excused" Argentina from
liability for breaches under the Treaty. This conclusion as to the
effect of the applicability of Article XI (e.g., to excuse a party from
liability for breach) is found nowhere in the text of Article XI, much
less the rest of the provisions of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.
Compounding the paucity of clear explanation on the
interpretive methodology and seemingly "legal" standards used
by the Tribunal in relation to Article XI and Article IV(3) of the
U.S.-Argentina BIT, the Tribunal still proceeded to refer to the
customary law doctrine of necessity represented by Article 25 of
the Articles on State Responsibility in a "supportive" 82 sense:
80 Id. para. 239.
81 Id. para. 244.
82 See id. para. 245.
In the previous analysis, the Tribunal has determined that the conditions
in Argentina from 1 December 2001 until 26 April 2003 were such that
Argentina is excused from liability for the alleged violation of its Treaty
obligations due to the responsive measures it enacted. The concept of
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The essential interests of the Argentine State were
threatened in December 2001. It faced an extremely serious
threat to its existence, its political and economic survival, to
the possibility of maintaining its essential services in
operation, and to the preservation of its internal peace.
There is no serious evidence in the record that Argentina
contributed to the crisis resulting in the state of necessity.
In this (sic) circumstances, an economic recovery package
was the only means to respond to the crisis. Although
there may have been a number of ways to draft the
economic recovery plan, the evidence before the Tribunal
demonstrates that an across-the-board response was
necessary, and the tariffs on public utilities had to be
addressed. It cannot be said that any other State's rights
were seriously impaired by the measures taken by
Argentina during the crisis. Finally, as addressed above,
Article XI of the Treaty exempts Argentina of responsibility
for measures enacted during the state of necessity.
While this analysis concerning Article 25 of the Draft
Articles on State Responsibility alone does not establish
Argentina's defense, it supports the Tribunal's analysis with
regard to the meaning of Article Xl's requirement that the
measures implemented by Argentina had to have been
necessary either for the maintenance of public order or the
protection of its own essential security interests.8 3
Clearly, the Tribunal had already conflated the substantive
content of Article 25 of the Articles on State Responsibility towards
a supplementary means of interpretation of Article XI of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT. Noting the duty to compensate under Article 27 of
the Articles on State Responsibility, the Tribunal stated that it:
excusing a State for the responsibility for violation of its international
obligations during what is called a 'state of necessity' or 'state of
emergency' also exists in international law. While the Tribunal considers
that the protections afforded by Article XI have been triggered in this
case, and are sufficient to excuse Argentina's liability, the Tribunal
recognizes that satisfaction of the state of necessity standard as it exists in
international law (reflected in Article 25 of the ILC's Draft Articles on State
Responsibility) supports the Tribunal's conclusion.
Id. (emphasis added).
83 Id. paras. 256-58 (emphasis added).
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.. considers that Article XI establishes the state of necessity
as a ground for exclusion from wrongfulness of an act of
the State, and therefore, the State is exempted from liability.
This exception is appropriate only in emergency situations;
and once the situation has been overcome, i.e. certain
degree of stability has been recovered; the State is no longer
exempted from responsibility for any violation of its
obligations under the international law and shall reassume
them immediately. 84
The effects of the Tribunal's finding of the existence of a state of
necessity were threefold. First, the Tribunal held that "[a]ll
measures adopted by Argentina in breach of the Treaty before and
after the period during which the state of necessity prevailed, shall
have all their effects and shall be taken into account by the
Tribunal to estimate the damages."85 The Tribunal also introduced
distinctions on the scope and reckoning point for determining
compensation. Damages suffered during the state of necessity
"should be borne by the investor."86 However, once the state of
necessity was over on April 26, 2003, Argentina "should have re-
established the tariff scheme offered to LG&E or, at least, it should
have compensated Claimants for the losses incurred on account of
the measures adopted before and after the state of necessity." 87
The dispositive portion of the Tribunal's Decision on Liability
thus introduced a temporal dichotomy to the determination of
Argentina's liability. Argentina would be exempt from the
payment of compensation for damages incurred from the period of
December 1, 2001 to April 26, 2003, when Argentina was in a state
of necessity. However, it would be liable for damages for
violations occurring outside the period of necessity.
The amount of compensation Argentina owed to the LG&E
Group was finally determined in the Tribunal's July 25, 2007
Award. 88 The LG&E Group had claimed full compensation for
damages sustained in the amount of either $268 million (USD) or
84 Id. para. 261.
85 Id. para. 263.
86 Id. para. 264.
87 Id. para. 265.
88 LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1 (July
25, 2007).
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$248 million (USD),89 including: the full market value of their loss,
pre- and post-Award compound interest at a reasonable
commercial rate, and the costs and expenses associated with the
arbitration proceedings.90 Argentina opposed the LG&E Group's
valuation, citing the inadequacy of the methods used, the
arbitrariness of the choice of valuation dates, the unjust enrichment
of the LG&E Group, and the effect of the country risk premium in
excluding compensation for the LG&E Group.91
The Tribunal held that the applicable standard for reparation is
"full reparation" as set out in the Chorz6w Factory case and Article
31 of the Articles on State Responsibility. 92 The Tribunal rejected
the fair market value standard in Article IV of the U.S.-Argentina
BIT as inapplicable to the breach of other treaty standards.93
Instead, it adopted the standard of "actual loss" incurred "as a
result" of the wrongful acts as the appropriate measure of
compensation-or the amount of dividends that the LG&E Group
would have received but for the abrogation of the specific
guarantees. 94 Using this metric, the Tribunal awarded $57.4
million (USD) to the LG&E Group "for the damages suffered as a
result of Respondent's continuing breach of its Treaty obligations
between 18 August 2000 and 28 February 2005, including interest
up until the date of the Award." 95
1.3. The CMS Gas Cases
CMS Gas Transmission Company ("CMS") is another
American company that pursued claims against Argentina for its
suspension of the tariff adjustment formula for gas transportation.
CMS is a 29.42% shareholder of Transportadora de Gas del Norte
(TGN), an Argentine company with a license for gas
transportation. CMS alleged that beginning in late 1999, the
Argentine government had taken measures which had an adverse
impact on CMS's business and breached the guarantees which
protected CMS's investment in TGN, and that such measures
subsequently led to the devaluation of the currency and the
89 Id. para. 15.
90 Id. para. 10.
91 Id. para. 22.
92 Id. para. 31.
93 Id. para. 37.
94 Id. paras. 41-53.
95 Id. para. 109.
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adoption of additional financial and administrative measures also
alleged to have an adverse impact on the investor.96
In its Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, the Tribunal
clarified the threshold of its review, stating that "it does not have
jurisdiction over measures of general economic policy adopted by
the Republic of Argentina and cannot pass judgment on whether
they are right or wrong." 97 The Tribunal also concludes, however,
that it "has jurisdiction to examine whether specific measures
affecting the Claimant's investment or measures of general
economic policy having a direct bearing on such investment have
been adopted in violation of legally binding commitments made to
the investor in treaties, legislation or contracts."98 The Tribunal
then rejected each of Argentina's objections to jurisdiction, stating
that: (1) CMS has jus standi as a foreign investor, there being "no
bar in current international law to the concept of allowing claims
by shareholders independently from those of the corporation
concerned, not even if those shareholders are minority or non-
controlling shareholders," 99 and that "[wihether the protected
investor is in addition a party to a concession agreement or a
license agreement with the host State is immaterial for the purpose
of finding jurisdiction [under the U.S.-Argentina BIT], since there is
a direct right of action of shareholders;"100 (2) the dispute arises
directly from an investment made, because the rights of CMS "can
be asserted independently from the rights of TGN and those
relating to the License, and because [CMS] has a separate cause of
action under the Treaty in connection with the protected
investment;" 1' 1 (3) "the clauses in the License or its Terms referring
certain kinds of disputes to the local courts of the Republic of
Argentina are not a bar to the assertion of jurisdiction by an ICSID
tribunal under the Treaty, as the functions of these various
instruments are different," 102 and in this connection, "contractual
claims are different from treaty claims even if there had been or
there currently was a recourse to the local courts for breach of
96 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, Decision on Objections to
Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, para. 20 (July 17, 2003).
97 Id. para. 33.
98 Id.
99 Id. para. 48.
100 Id. para. 65.
101 Id. para. 68.
102 Id. para. 76.
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contract, this would not have prevented submission of the treaty
claims to arbitration;" 103 and (4) the pendency of negotiations
between the Argentine government and various classes of
investors would not prevent the arbitration from proceeding.104
In the merits phase, CMS advanced similar legal arguments as
those in the LG&E cases. CMS maintained that the Argentine
government's measures violated commitments made to foreign
investors in the offering memoranda, relevant laws and
regulations, and the terms of License, which commitments include:
(1) the calculation of tariffs in U.S. dollars; (2) the semi-annual
adjustment in accordance with the U.S. PPI and the general
adjustment of tariffs every five years; and (3) the Argentine
government's express agreement not to freeze the tariff structure
or subject it to further regulation or price controls, and the duty to
compensate in the event such price controls were introduced. 105
The collective and continuous violation of these commitments,
according to CMS, breached the following provisions of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT: Article IV (wrongful expropriation), Article II(2)(a)
(fair and equitable treatment standard), Article II(2)(b) (prohibition
against arbitrary and discriminatory measures), and Article 11(2)(c)
(umbrella clause). As compensation, CMS claimed $261.1 million
(USD) for breaches of the U.S.-Argentina BIT plus interests and
costs.
In turn, Argentina raised the following factual defenses: (1) the
license and its concomitant legal and regulatory framework only
provide for the right of a licensee to a fair and reasonable tariff, but
did not contain guarantees of convertibility, currency devaluation,
and the risk inherent to the investment;106 (2) CMS should bear the
consequences of its own investment strategies; 107 and (3) the tariff
structure already carried a premium (and, higher profits) for the
added risk of investing in an unstable economy, and because the
103 Id. para. 80.
104 See id. para. 86 ("The Centre had made efforts to avoid a multiplicity of
tribunals and jurisdictions, but that it was not possible to foreclose rights that
different investors might have under different arrangements.").
105 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/8, paras. 84-88 (May 12, 2005).
106 See id. paras. 91-94 (enumerating the Argentine government's defenses to
CSM's claims).
107 See id. para. 92 ("The Respondent is of the view that any consequences
arising from CMS's decision to rely on the report of private consultants for its
investment strategies cannot be assigned to the Government.").
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contractual regime was incomplete (the licenses did not
contemplate the possibility of convertibility being abandoned),
Argentina's domestic market pesification and external market
dollarization allowed consumers to continue to pay for gas and
prevented a collapse in demand.1 08 Given this legal and regulatory
context, there could not be any violation of the U.S.-Argentina BIT,
since the "guarantees invoked by CMS are not the property of the
company protected under the Treaty and TGN continues to
operate normally."10 9 As an alternative ground, Argentina invoked
the existence of a national emergency as a ground for exemption
from liability under international law and the U.S.-Argentina BIT.
Using Argentine law, the U.S.-Argentina BIT, and principles of
international law as the applicable law to the dispute, the Tribunal
commenced its analysis by establishing CMS' rights: 1) the right to
a tariff calculated in dollars and converted into pesos at the time of
billing;110 2) the right to adjustment of tariffs in accordance with the
U.S. PPI;"' and 3) the right to stabilization mechanisms as
provided under the terms of the License.112 According to the
Tribunal:
[T]he legal framework and the License, particularly in the
context of the privatization, was to guarantee the stability
of the tariff structure and the role the calculation in dollars
and the US PPI adjustment played therein. Devaluation
could of course happen at some point, but then the tariff
structure would remain intact within the framework of
stability envisaged as it would adjust automatically to the
new level of the exchange rate. 13
The Tribunal initially considered the defense of state of
necessity under the Argentine legal system, and concluded that
"the state of necessity under domestic law does not offer an excuse
if the result of the measures in question is to alter the substance or
108 See id. paras. 95-96 ("[Tlhe Respondent filled in by means of the
pesification in the domestic market and dollarization in the external market,
thereby allowing consumers to continue to pay for gas and avoiding the collapse
of demand.").
109 Id. para. 98.
110 Id. paras. 127-38.
111 Id. paras. 139-44.
112 Id. paras. 145-51.
113 Id. para. 161.
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the essence of contractually acquired rights. This is particularly so
if the application of such measures extends beyond a strictly
temporary period."114 The Tribunal noted that any rebalancing of
the contractual commitments due to Argentina's economic
circumstances "were available under [Argentine] law and the
License. The necessary adjustments could be accommodated
within the structure of the guarantees offered to the Claimant." 15
After the foregoing clarification, the Tribunal then separately
discussed the alleged breaches of the U.S.-Argentina BIT. It held
that there was no violation of Article IV(1) (indirect or creeping
expropriation), because Argentina's acts did not amount to a
substantial deprivation of CMS' investment in TGN." 6 Likewise,
the Tribunal rejected CMS' claim of Argentina's breach of Article
II(2)(b) (prohibition against arbitrariness or discrimination), on the
finding that "there has been no impairment, for example, in respect
of the management and operation of the investment," 117 nor any
discernible discrimination in the context of the gas transportation
and distribution industry." 8 However, the Tribunal found that
Argentina breached Article II(2)(a) (fair and equitable treatment
standard), since "the measures that are complained of did in fact
entirely transform and alter the legal and business environment
under which the investment was decided and made," and that "the
guarantees given in this connection under the legal framework and
its various components were crucial for the investment
decision."" 9 In light of this violation, the Tribunal also declared
Argentina's breach of the umbrella clause under Article 11(2)(c) of
the U.S.-Argentina BIT.
Finding that Argentina breached Articles 11(2)(a) and 11(2)(c) of
the U.S.-Argentina BIT, the Tribunal then turned to Argentina's
alternative defense of necessity. It first examined the defense
under customary international law, as represented by Article 25 of
the Articles of State Responsibility, and held that in the context of
the Argentine crisis, some of its elements were "partially present
here and there but when the various elements, conditions and
limits are examined as a whole it cannot be concluded that all such
114 Id. para. 217.
115 Id. para. 238.
116 Id. para. 262-64.
117 Id. para. 292.
118 Id. para. 293.
119 Id. para. 275.
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elements meet the cumulative test." 20 Considering the strict and
exceptional legal threshold of Article 25, this finding was
uncontroversial.
The more contentious issue arose from the Tribunal's
interpretation of Articles XI and IV(3) of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.
The Tribunal began its reasoning by declaring what it held to be
the "design" of the BIT "to protect investments at a time of
economic difficulties or other circumstances leading to the
adoption of adverse measures by the Government." 121 However,
the Tribunal suddenly imported an element from Article 25 of the
Articles of State Responsibility - "the act does not seriously impair
an essential interest of the State or States towards which the
obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole" -
as intrinsic to furthering the apparent design of the U.S.-Argentina
BIT, which, in the present case, the Tribunal concluded Argentina
had not shown. 22 The Tribunal did not cite any legal authority or
interpretive basis for using this element of Article 25 to interpret
the structural design of the U.S.-Argentina BIT. The Tribunal then
proceeded to conduct a broad interpretation of "essential security
interests" under Article XI to embrace the concept of economic
emergencies. 23 However, it was careful to note that Article XI is
120 Id. para. 331.
121 Id. para. 354.
122 See id. paras. 357-58.
For the purpose of this case, and looking at the Treaty just in the context
of its States parties, the Tribunal concludes that it does not appear that an
essential interest of the State to which the obligation exists has been
impaired, nor have those of the international community as a whole.
Accordingly, the plea of necessity would not be precluded on this count.
Id.
123 See id. paras. 359-60.
While the text of the Article does not refer to economic crises or
difficulties of that particular kind, as concluded above, there is nothing
in the context of customary international law or the object and purpose
of the Treaty that could on its own exclude major economic crises from
the scope of Article XI. It must also be kept in mind that the scope of a
given bilateral treaty, such as this, should normally be understood and
interpreted as attending to the concerns of both parties. If the concept of
essential security interests were to be limited to immediate political and
national security concerns, particularly of an international character, and
were to exclude other interests, for example, major economic
emergencies, it could well result in an unbalanced understanding of
Article XI. Such an approach would not be entirely consistent with the
rules governing the interpretation of treaties.
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not a "self-judging" clause. 24 Notwithstanding the applicability of
Article XI to economic emergencies, the Tribunal still held that
there was a duty to compensate, analogous to (if not predicated on)
Article 27 of the Articles on State Responsibility. 25 In determining
the standard of compensation, the Tribunal then held that "the
cumulative nature of the breaches ... is best dealt with by
resorting to the standard of fair market value."126 Applying a
discounted cash flow methodology, the Tribunal arrived at the
amount of $133.2 million (USD) as compensation for damages and
the loss in value of CMS's shares. Upon Argentina's payment of an
additional $2,148,100 (USD), CMS would also transfer ownership
of its shares in TGN to Argentina. 27
Argentina sought annulment of the Award under Article 52(b)
and (e) of the ICSID Convention, claiming that the Tribunal had
manifestly exceeded its powers and failed to state the reasons on
which the Award was based. 28  Argentina argued that the
Tribunal had manifestly exceeded its powers by transforming the
U.S.-Argentina BIT's "fair and equitable treatment" clause and
"umbrella" clause into strict liability provisions, by failing to give
effect to Article XI of the US-Argentina BIT, and by rejecting
Argentina's defense of necessity under customary international
law.129
Id.
124 See id. para. 373.
In light of this discussion, the Tribunal concludes first that the clause of
Article XI of the Treaty is not a self-judging clause. Quite evidently, in
the context of what a State believes to be an emergency, it will most
certainly adopt the measures it considers appropriate without requesting
the views of any court. However, if the legitimacy of such measures is
challenged before an international tribunal, it is not for the State in
question but for the international jurisdiction to determine whether the
plea of necessity may exclude wrongfulness. It must also be noted that
clauses dealing with investments and commerce do not generally affect
security as much as military events do and, therefore, would normally
fall outside the scope of such dramatic events.
Id.
125 Id. paras. 383-94.
126 Id. para. 410.
127 See id. paras. 468-69 (providing the amount of compensation for damages
and value of the shares).
128 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, Decision of the Ad Hoc
Committee on the Application for Annulment of Argentina, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/8, Sept. 25, 2007.
129 Id. para. 48.
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The Ad Hoc Committee dismissed all of Argentina's claims,
except for one. The Ad Hoc Committee annulled the first sub-
paragraph of the Award, which provided that "The Respondent
[Argentina] breached its obligations... to observe the obligations
entered into with regard to the investment guaranteed in Article
II(2)(c) [umbrella clause] of the Treaty." 130 The Committee found
that there were "major difficulties with [the Tribunal's] broad
interpretation of Article II(2)(c)," since, as the Committee clarified,
"[tihe obligation of the State covered by Article II(2)(c) will often be
a bilateral obligation, or will be intrinsically linked to obligations of
the investment company... if the Tribunal's interpretation is right,
then the mechanism in Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention is
unnecessary whenever there is an umbrella clause." 131 Apart from
annulling this portion of the Award, the Ad Hoc Committee
nonetheless held that the Tribunal's finding of breach of Article
II(2)(a), the fair and equitable treatment standard of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT, was "adequately founded on the applicable law
and the relevant facts," and "the Tribunal evaluated the legality of
the challenged measures in the light of all the circumstances of the
case and did not transform Article 11(2)(a) into a strict liability
clause." 132 The Ad Hoc Committee then reiterated that Argentina
had to accept the transfer of ownership of TGN shares as provided
in the Tribunal's Award. During the pendency of Argentina's
Application for Annulment, ICSID had provisionally stayed
enforcement of the Award, particularly with respect to Argentina's
option to purchase CMS' shares in TGN as provided in
subparagraph 3 of the Award. 133
The Ad Hoc Committee's Decision on the Application for
Annulment was a significant departure from the interpretive
trends in Sempra, LG&E, and the Tribunal's Award in CMS. All of
these prior decisions had, in varying degrees, used the doctrine of
necessity under customary international law (as codified under
Article 25 of the Articles on State Responsibility) as a
supplementary means of interpreting "essential security interests"
130 Id. para. 100 (citing CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, Award,
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, at 139 para. 1).
131 Id. para. 95.
132 Id. para. 85.
133 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, Decision on Argentina's Request
for a Continued Stay of Enforcement of the Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8,
Sept. 1, 2006.
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in Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT. In contrast, however, the
Ad Hoc Committee's Decision attempted to set out specific
distinctions between Article XI and Article 25 as to substantive
content, operation, and effects:
The Committee observes first that there is some analogy in
the language used in Article XI of the BIT and in Article 25
of the ILC's Articles on State Responsibility. The first text
mentions "necessary" measures and the second relates to
the "state of necessity". However Article XI specifies the
conditions under which the Treaty may be applied,
whereas Article 25 is drafted in a negative way: it excludes
the application of the state of necessity on the merits, unless
certain stringent conditions are met. Moreover, Article XI is a
threshold requirement: if it applies, the substantive obligations
under the Treaty do not apply. By contrast, Article 25 is an
excuse which is only relevant once it has been decided that
there has otherwise been a breach of those substantive
obligations.134
Furthermore Article XI and Article 25 are substantively
different. The first covers measures necessary for the maintenance
of public order or the protection of each Party's own essential
security interests, without qualifying such measures. The second
subordinates the state of necessity to four conditions. It requires
for instance that the action taken "does not seriously impair an
essential interest of the State or States towards which the obligation
exists, or of the international community as a whole," a condition
which is foreign to Article XI. In other terms, the requirements
under Article XI are not the same as those under customary
international law as codified by Article 25, as the Parties in fact
recognized during the hearing before the Committee. On that
point, the Tribunal made a manifest error of law.
Those two texts having a different operation and content, it
was necessary for the Tribunal to take a position on their
relationship and to decide whether they were both applicable in
the present case. The Tribunal did not enter into such an analysis,
134 CMS Gas Transmission Co., Decision on the Ad Hoc Committee on the
Application for Annulment of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, para. 129
(emphasis added).
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simply assuming that Article XI and Article 25 are on the same
footing.
In doing so the Tribunal made another error of law. One could
wonder whether state of necessity in customary international law
goes to the issue of wrongfulness or that of responsibility. But in
any case, the excuse based on customary international law could
only be subsidiary to the exclusion based on Article XI.
If state of necessity means that there has not been even a prima
facie breach of the BIT, it would be a primary rule of international
law. But this is also the case with Article XI. In other terms, and to
take the words of the International Court of Justice in a comparable
case,1 35 if the Tribunal was satisfied by the arguments based on
Article XI, it should have held that there had been "no breach" of
the BIT. Article XI and Article 25 thus construed would cover the
same field and the Tribunal should have applied Article XI as the
lex specialis governing the matter and not Article 25.
If, on the contrary, the state of necessity in customary
international law goes to the issue of responsibility, it would be a
secondary rule of international law -this was the position taken by
the ILC. In this case, the Tribunal would have been under an
obligation to consider first whether there had been any breach of
the BIT and whether such a breach was excluded by Article XI.
Only if it concluded that there was conduct not in conformity with
the Treaty would it have had to consider whether Argentina's
responsibility could be precluded in whole or in part under
customary international law.
These two errors made by the Tribunal could have had a
decisive impact on the operative part of the Award. As admitted
by CMS, the Tribunal gave an erroneous interpretation to Article
XI. In fact, it did not examine whether the conditions laid down by
Article XI were fulfilled and whether, as a consequence, the
measures taken by Argentina were capable of constituting, even
prima facie, a breach of the BIT. If the Committee was acting as a
court of appeal, it would have to reconsider the Award on this
ground.
The Committee recalls, once more, that it has only a limited
jurisdiction under Article 52 of the ICSID Convention. Under the
circumstances, the Committee cannot simply substitute its own
view of the law and its own appreciation of the facts for those of
135 Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.) (Merits), 2003 I.C.J. (Nov. 6), para. 34.
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the Tribunal. Notwithstanding the identified errors and lacunas in
the Award, in the end the Tribunal applied Article XI of the Treaty.
Although applying it cryptically and defectively, it applied it.
Accordingly, there is no manifest excess of powers."136
The foregoing excerpt shows that the Ad Hoc Committee
envisaged a clear line of demarcation between Article XI and
Article 25 as to their respective substantive requirements, so much so
that the CMS Tribunal made a "manifest error of law" in conflating
the requirements under each norm to interpret "essential security
interests" under Article XI.137 According to the Ad Hoc Committee,
the Tribunal's failure to "examine whether the conditions laid
down by Article XI were fulfilled" generated the erroneous
interpretation of Article XI.138 The Tribunal's assumption that
Article 25 and Article XI "were on the same footing" was thus
"another error in law." 139
However, the Ad Hoc Committee fell short of giving a definitive
position on what interpretive relationship Article 25 could have
with Article XI. Instead, it laid out two possible alternative
scenarios for construing Article 25 in relation to Article XI. First,
Article 25 could be seen as a "primary rule of international law,"
where a state of necessity would mean that there is no prima facie
breach of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.140 Both Article 25 and Article XI
would operate as norms of exclusion, or norms that would prevent a
breach of international obligation from arising in the first instance.
According to the Ad Hoc Committee, in this scenario, Article XI
should be applied as lex specialis. The effect of applying Article XI,
however, would be to construe the "necessity" measure as
incapable of giving rise to any breach of obligation under the U.S.-
Argentina BIT.
136 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, Decision on the Ad Hoc
Committee on the Application for Annulment of Argentina, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/8, paras. 129-26 (emphasis added).
137 See id. paras. 130-31 ("On that point, the Tribunal made a manifest error of
law.... The Tribunal did not enter into such an analysis [discerning the
relationship between Article XI and Article 25 and their relative applicability to
the case], simply assuming that Article XI and Article 25 are on the same
footing.").
138 Id. para. 135.
139 Id. paras. 131-32.
140 Id. para. 133.
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The second scenario treats Article 25 as a "secondary rule of
international law" that pertains to responsibility.'4 ' Under this
formulation, according to the Ad Hoc Committee, the Tribunal
would have to follow this sequence: (1) determine the existence of
any breach of the U.S.-Argentina BIT; (2) if there is a breach,
determine if the breach is "excluded" by Article XI of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT; and (3) if there is any remaining breach that cannot
be excluded under the terms of Article XI, determine if the state's
responsibility for the breach can be precluded under Article 25.142
It should be emphasized that the Ad Hoc Committee avoided a
choice between either scenario, justifying its reticence through the
Committee's limited mandate under Article 52 of the ICSID
Convention. As will be shown later, however, this very same
hesitation to settle the interpretive relationship between Article 25
and Article XI would foment further interpretive confusion in the 5
September 2008 Award in Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Argentina. Further
confusion would be engendered by the Ad Hoc Committee's
interpretation (and without citing any authority) that "if [Article
XI] applies, the substantive obligations under the [U.S.-Argentina
BIT] do not apply." 43 As will be shown in the next section, these
gaps in the interpretive methodology used for Article XI of the
U.S.-Argentina BIT would resurface in a doubly problematic
manner in the Continental Award.
1.4. Continental Casualty Company v. Argentine Republic: Synthesis
and Critique
As of this writing, the Tribunal's Award in Cont'l Cas. Co. v.
Argentina'44  ("Continental") is the latest ICSID decision
interpreting Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT in relation to the
doctrine of necessity under customary international law.
Continental contains the most controversial interpretive
methodology to date on Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.
141 Id. para. 134.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 129.
144 Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Sept. 5,
2008.
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1.4.1. Synthesis
Continental Casualty Company is an American corporation, a
subsidiary of another American corporation, CNA Financial Inc.,
and is the 99.9995% owner of CNA ART; an Argentine corporation
that provides workers' compensation insurance services in
Argentina. CNA ART maintained a portfolio of investment
securities consisting mainly of cash deposits, treasury bills, and
government bonds. Prior to March 2001, these assets were
denominated in Argentine pesos which were then fully convertible
1:1 into U.S. dollars. After March 2001, CNA ART invested in low-
risk U.S.-denominated assets for a total value of $100,998,000
(USD). Argentinean regulations of CNA ART's insurance
operations generally required investment of all capital within
Argentina. Starting December 2001, however, Argentina enacted a
series of measures collectively known as the Capital Control
Regime145 that, according to Continental, "destroyed the legal
security of the assets" and frustrated CNA ART's ability to hedge
against the risk of peso devaluation.146 Continental claims that
CNA ART suffered an absolute loss in value of its assets of
$46,412,000 (USD) due to the Capital Control Regime. 147 Thus,
when Continental brought its claim against Argentina before
ICSID, Continental asserted four violations of the U.S.-Argentina
BIT: (1) the umbrella clause, or the requirement to observe
obligations under Article II(2)(c); (2) the requirement to provide
treatment in accordance with international law (fair and equitable
treatment, full protection of security, most favoured nation clause)
145 Id. para. 137. According to the Tribunal, measures could be grouped
among the following: (1) measures that blocked deposits (temporary bank freeze),
severely curtailing the right to withdraw money (Decree 1570/Corralito); (2)
measures that prohibited the transfer of funds abroad and their exchange in freely
convertible and transferable currencies (Decree 1570/Corralito); (3) measures that
terminated the peso convertibility and its pegging to the U.S. dollar at the fixed
exchange rate 1:1 (Emergency Law 25,561 and Decree 260/02) - replaced by a
dual exchange system based on 1.4 pesos to 1 U.S. dollar, later permitted
devaluation to almost 4 pesos to 1 U.S. dollar; (4) measures that rescheduled term
deposits and reduced interest rates (Resolution 6/Corralon); (5) pesification
(forced conversion) of outstanding dollar-denominated contracts and private or
governmental debt, at a rate of 1.40 pesos for each nominal US dollar as to the
latter and financial deposits, while in all other cases conversion occurred at par
(Decree 214, Decree 471, Decree 644); and (6) default on and unilateral
rescheduling of governmental debt (Resolution 73).
146 Id. para. 19.
147 Id.
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under Articles 11(2)(b) and II(2)(a); (3) the requirement to permit all
investment-related transfers without delay under Article V; and (4)
the requirement to pay compensation upon acts of expropriation
under Article W.148
Argentina's theory of defenses in its Counter-Memorial refuted
each of the foregoing asserted violations. First, Argentina insisted
that there was no violation of the umbrella clause, since the latter
does not apply to contracts entered into between CNA and
Argentina. "The umbrella clause is intended to protect the
commitments assumed by Argentina towards foreign investors
protected by the BIT, not contractual obligations." 149 Second,
Argentina argued that there was no violation of the fair and
equitable treatment standard, since the standard must be applied
"considering especially the circumstances under which [the Capital
Control Regime] measures were adopted." 15°  According to
Argentina, "fair and equitable treatment is the minimum
international treatment"-a standard meaning "reasonability,
proportionality, and no discrimination." 151 It claimed the Capital
Control Regime measures were proportional, reasonable, and not
inconsistent as they re-established "a balance among all the
economic agents" and "re-adapted the circumstances to the
prevailing economic situation."152 Third, Argentina claimed that
there was no violation of the requirement to permit all investment-
related transfers, because at all times Argentina allowed all such
transfers. During a short interval within the Argentine financial
crisis, authorization was required for transfers, "but neither
Continental nor CNA ART ever asked for such authorization." 153
Fourth, Argentina argued that there could not be any
expropriation as contemplated in Article IV of the BIT because
none of the Capital Control Regime measures affected
Continental's investment value in CNA ART. Under this
reasoning, Continental cannot claim for alleged damages to CNA
ART's investments, but only for damages in relation to
Continental's shareholdings in CNA.54
148 Id. para. 20
149 Id. para. 295.
150 Id. para. 56 (citation omitted).
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id. para. 54.
154 Id. para. 55.
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Finally, in the event that the Tribunal would find a breach of
any of the foregoing U.S.-Argentina BIT provisions, Argentina
reasserted its alternative defenses based on Articles XI and IV(3) of
the U.S.-Argentina BIT. To recall, the full text of these provisions
state:
This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either
Party of measures necessary for the maintenance of public
order, the fulfilment of its obligations with respect to
maintenance or restoration of international peace or
security, or the Protection of its own essential security
interests.
Nationals or companies of either Party whose investments
suffer losses in the territory of the other Party owing to war
or other armed conflict, revolution, state of national
emergency, insurrection, civil disturbance or other similar
events shall be accorded treatment by such other Party no
less favourable than that accorded to its own nationals or
companies or to nationals or companies of any third
country, whichever is the more favourable treatment, as
regards any measures it adopts in relation to such losses.,55
After a copious discussion of the factual background on the
Argentine economy and the development of the Argentine
financial crisis, the Tribunal proceeded to resolve Continental's
claims on the merits by beginning with a discussion of Article XI in
relation to the doctrine of state of necessity under customary
international law as codified under Article 25 of the Articles on
State Responsibility. In paragraph 164 of the Award, the Tribunal
reiterated the Ad Hoc Committee's position in the CMS Gas
Decision on the Application for Annulment, which characterized
Article XI as a norm of exclusion that operates to prevent
substantive obligations under the U.S.-Argentina BIT from
becoming applicable:
The ordinary meaning of the language used, together with
the object and purpose of the provision (as here highlighted
and interpreted under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties) clearly indicates that either party
155 U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 14, art. XI & IV(3).
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would not be in breach of its BIT obligations if any measure
has been properly taken because it was necessary, as far as
relevant here, either "for the maintenance of the public
order' or for 'the protection of essential security interests"
of the party adopting such measures. The consequence
would be that, under Art. XI, such measures would lie
outside the scope of the Treaty so that the party taking it
would not be in breach of the relevant BIT provision ...
Art. XI restricts or derogates from the substantial
obligations undertaken by the parties to the BIT in so far as
the conditions of its invocation are met. [Footnote 236
indicates: "This Tribunal is thus minded to accept the
position of the Ad Hoc Annulment Committee in the ICSID
case CMS v. Argentina, where it states: 'Article XI is a
threshold requirement: if it applies, the substantive
obligations under the Treaty do not apply. By contrast,
Article 25 is an excuse which is only relevant once it has
been decided that there has otherwise been a breach of
those substantive obligations.' On the one hand, if Art. XI
is applicable because the measure at issue was necessary in
order to safeguard essential security interest, then the treaty
is inapplicable to such measure. On the other hand, if a
State is forced by necessity to resort to a measure in breach
of an international obligation but complying with the
requirements listed in Art. 25 ILC, the State escapes from
the responsibility that would otherwise derive from that
breach."] In fact, Art. XI has been defined as a safeguard
clause; it has been said that it recognizes "reserved rights",
or that it contemplates "non-precluded" measures to which
a contracting state party can resort.156
After taking this doctrinal position, the Tribunal stressed that
there are conceptual "links" between Article XI and Article 25, in
that "both intend to provide flexibility in the application of
international obligations, recognizing that necessity to protect
national interests of a paramount importance may justify setting
aside or suspending an obligation, or preventing liability from its
156 Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Sept. 5,
2008, para. 164 (emphasis added).
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breach."15 7  The Tribunal noted that "the practical result of
applying [Art. XI rather than Art. 25] may be the same: condoning
conduct that would otherwise be unlawful and thus removing the
responsibility of the State."158
The Tribunal thus made its resolution on the merits by initially
applying Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT. The Tribunal then
interpreted the text of Article XI as encompassing Argentina's
Capital Control Regime measures, as they involved the
"maintenance of public order" and/or the protection of
Argentina's "essential security interests." 159  The Tribunal
construed "public order" as a "broad synonym for 'public peace'"
(orden pfiblico in the Spanish text of the U.S.-Argentina BIT,
corresponding to the French ordre public).16° Under this denotative
rubric:
[A]ctions properly necessary by the central government to
preserve or to restore civil peace and the normal life of
society.., to prevent and repress illegal actions and
disturbances that may infringe such civil peace and
potentially threaten the legal order, even when due to
significant economic and social difficulties, do fall within
the application under Art. XI.161
On the other hand, the Tribunal's interpretation of "essential
security interests" under Article XI proved demonstrably
convoluted. While the Tribunal recognized conceptual distinctions
between Article 25 and Article XI,162 the flow of reasoning in the
award indicates that the Tribunal apparently still used the
customary international law doctrine on state of necessity as an
interpretive foil to broadly define the motivation and content of
"essential security interests" under Article XI.163 "Essential
157 Id. para. 168.
158 Id. para. 168
159 Id. paras. 174-75.
160 Id. para 174.
161 Id.
162 Id. para. 164-65.
163 See id. paras. 175, 190-91 ("[The ILC commentary to Art. 25] ought to be
considered not only as a more precise explanation of the term 'necessary' with
regard to invocation of the defense of necessity under customary international
law, but also as a standard applicable in interpreting Art. XI of the BIT.").
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security interests," according to the Tribunal, could be construed
within the same acceptation of "wide variety of interests" under
Article 25 of the Articles on State Responsibility. However, unlike
the high threshold of "grave and imminent peril" under Article 25,
the Tribunal imposed a lower threshold for measures that are
covered by essential security interests under Article XI:
The protection of essential security interests recognized by
Art. XI does not require that "total collapse" of the country
or that a "catastrophic situation" has already occurred
before responsible national authorities may have recourse
to its protection. The invocation of the clause does not
require that the situation has already degenerated into one
that calls for the suspension of constitutional guarantees
and fundamental liberties.164
It is also of considerable interest that the Tribunal used a
plethora of legal sources to interpret Article XI of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT. While initially pointing out that Article XI derives
from the U.S. Model BIT and the U.S. Friendship Commerce and
Navigation (FCN) treaties, 165 the Tribunal suddenly drew on the
U.S. FCN treaties' supposed derivation from Article XX of GATT
1947 to justify reference to GATT and WTO case law:
The Tribunal is thus faced with the task of determining the
content of the concept of necessity in Art. XI, in order to
As to "essential security interests", it is necessary to recall that
international law is not blind to the requirement that States should be
able to exercise their sovereignty in the interest of their population free
from internal as well as external threats to their security and the
maintenance of a peaceful domestic order. It is well known that the
concept of international security of States in the Post World War II
international order was intended to cover not only political and military
security but also the economic security of States and of their population.
The Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations and, even more
relevant for the present case, that of the International Monetary Fund
support this approach. As noted by the International Law Commission,
States have invoked necessity "to protect a wide variety of interests, including
safeguarding the environment, preserving the very existence of the State and its
people in time of public emergency, or ensuring the safety of a civilian
population."
Id. para. 175 (citing Article 25 of the ILC Commentary to the Draft Articles on
State Responsibility) (emphasis added).
164 Id. para. 180 (citations omitted).
165 Id. para. 176.
[Vol. 31:3
NON-PRECLUDED MEASURES IN BITs
decide whether the various Measures challenged by the
Claimant were indeed necessary, as a matter of causation.
With regard to the necessity test required for the
application of the BIT, for the reasons stated above relating
to the different role of Art. XI and of the defense of
necessity in customary international law, the Tribunal does
not share the opinion that "the treaty thus becomes
inseparable from the customary law standard insofar as to
the conditions for the operation of the state of necessity are
concerned", as stated in the Enron Case and submitted also
by the Claimant. Since the text of Art. XI derives from the
parallel model clause of the U.S. FCN treaties and these treaties
in turn reflect the formulation of Art. XX of GATT 1947, the
Tribunal finds it more appropriate to refer to the GATT and
TATO case law which has extensively dealt with the concept and
requirements of necessity in the context of economic measures
derogating to the obligations contained in the GATT, rather than
to refer to the requirement of necessity under customary
international law.166
The Tribunal then cited GATT and WTO case law to justify its
methodology for interpreting "necessary measures" under Article
XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT. It determined the standard of
"necessary" under a context of "assess[ing] whether the [Capital
Control Regime] Measures contributed materially to the realization
of their legitimate aims under Art. XI of the BIT, namely the
protection of the essential security interests of Argentina in the
economic and social crisis it was facing." 167 In applying the
standard, the Tribunal advanced an interest- and value-driven test
for determining the necessity of a measure:
The necessity of a measure should be determined through
"a process of weighing and balancing of factors" which
usually includes the assessment of the following three
factors: the relative importance of interests or values
furthered by the challenged measures, the contribution of
the measure to the realization of the ends pursued by it and
166 Id. para. 192 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
167 Id. para. 196.
20101
U. Pa. J. Int'l. L.
the restrictive impact of the measure on international
commerce.
168
Under this broader concept of necessity, the Tribunal then
concluded that the Capital Control Regime measures were "in part
inevitable, or unavoidable," that they were "in part indispensable"
and that they were "in any case material or decisive in order to
react positively to the crisis, to prevent the complete break-down of
the financial system, the implosion of the economy and the
growing threat to the fabric of Argentinean society and generally
to assist in overcoming the crisis."1 69 While the Tribunal held that
Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT is not self-judging, the
Tribunal's review of the Capital Control Regime measures yielded
the conclusion that Argentina could properly invoke Article XI to
justify virtually all of the measures. The only measure held outside
the ambit of Article XI was the Argentine government's
restructuring of the LETEs (treasury bills), which involved a swap
offering at a later date, with a reduced percentage of the original
value of the debt, and onerously conditioned on the waiver of any
other rights of the security holder/ investor.170
Having determined the applicability of Article XI to almost all
of the Capital Control Regime measures, the Tribunal then
proceeded to determine the existence of any breach of the BIT as
alleged by Continental. Significantly, the Tribunal rejected each of
the breaches alleged by Continental, largely upon factual grounds
pertaining to Continental and CNA ART. The Tribunal held that
Argentina did not breach Article V (freedom of transfer),171 since
the type of transfer which Continental claimed had been barred
was, in reality, "merely a change of type, location and currency of
part of an investor's existing investment, namely a part of the
freely disposable funds, held short term at its banks by CNA
[ART] .... 172
With respect to Continental's claim of breach of Article II(2)(a)
(fair and equitable treatment), the Tribunal examined various
operative facts to ascertain the existence of a breach: 1) specificity
168 Id. para. 194 (quoting Appellate Body Report, Korea - Measures Affecting
Imports of Fresh, Chilled, and Frozen Beef, para. 164, WT/DS161/AB/R,
WT/DS169/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000)).
169 Id. para. 197.
170 Id. para. 221.
171 Id. para. 244.
172 Id. para. 241.
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of the undertaking allegedly relied upon; 2) general legislative
statements which engender reduced expectations, especially with
competent major international investors in a context where the
political risk is high; 3) unilateral modification of contractual
undertakings by governments; 4) centrality to the protected
investment and impact of the changes on the operation of the
foreign-owned business in general including its profitability.173
Focusing on these operative facts, the Tribunal held that
Continental could not invoke legitimate expectations as to the
change of the convertibility regime, and ought to have maintained
reduced trust in the Intangibility Law under the circumstances in
which it was passed by the Argentine Legislature. 74 (It should be
noted that the Intangibility Law was a general legislative measure,
not directed to any particular industry or sector, but made
applicable to all citizens and businesses during the Argentine
financial crisis as a means of forestalling bank runs and capital
flight.) Nevertheless, "[a]s far as the de-dollarization and its
specific modalities could be considered contrary to any fair and
equitable treatment standard in light of [Argentina's] previous
assurances" and the Intangibility Law, the Tribunal held that
Argentina could avail of a necessity defence under Article XI of the
U.S.-Argentina BIT.175 However, with respect to the LETEs worth
$2.8 million (USD), the Tribunal held that Argentina could not
invoke the Article XI defense to exculpate itself from liability.
Similarly drawing on factual investigation of the nature of the
measures relative to Continental and CNA ART's circumstances,
the Tribunal held that Argentina did not breach Article IV
(prohibition of direct and indirect expropriation) of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT. The Tribunal characterized the Capital Control
Regime measures as non-compensable, or measures that do not
require indemnification, as they are
... limitations to the use of property in the public interest
that fall within typical government regulations of property
entailing mostly inevitable limitations imposed in order to
ensure the right of others or of the general public ....
These restrictions do not impede the basic, typical use of a
given asset and do not impose an unreasonable burden on
173 Id. para. 261.
174 Id. para. 262.
175 Id.
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the owner... [and] are not therefore considered a form of
expropriation and do not require indemnification.176
Finally, the Tribunal also rejected Continental's claim of breach
of Article II(2)(c) (the umbrella clause), because the clause does not
come into play when the breach complains of "concerns [mere]
general obligations arising from the law of the host State." 177
On this reasoning, the Tribunal ruled that Continental was only
entitled to payment of compensation in the principal sum of $2.8
million (USD), representing the principal value of the LETEs at 6
months LIBOR plus 2 percent compounded annually until
payment. The Tribunal rejected Continental's all other claims
amounting to approximately $112 million (USD).
1.4.2. Critique
The Continental award sets a rather precarious precedent for the
development of international investment law. Much of the
Tribunal's reasoning on the factual circumstances specific to
Continental and CNA ART shows that a similar outcome could
have been reached without the Tribunal's forced interpretation of
Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT. Unlike the LG&E, CMS Gas,
and Sempra cases, which involved industry-specific guarantees and
license-specific contractual terms and arrangements, Continental
did not have any such assurances at the time that it made its
investments in CNA ART. Even during the Argentine financial
crisis, when Continental and CNA ART were making business
decisions on whether to maintain their investments in Argentina or
to transfer them elsewhere, Continental and CNA ART appear to
have relied only on general political statements by Argentine
governmental leaders, and a general legislative measure (the
Intangibility Law). These types of assurances were not at all
determinative of the initial investment decision (as in the LG&E,
CMS Gas, and Sempra cases), and as such, cannot be so easily
deserving of protection under various provisions of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT. As the Tribunal ultimately found in its extensive
factual examination of the Capital Control Regime measures in
relation to Continental's own actuations, the risk of loss in value of
Continental's investment during the Argentine financial crisis was
not entirely unforeseeable. Continental's failure to act prudently to
176 Id. para. 276.
177 Id. para. 300 (citation omitted).
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preserve the value of its investment, especially given the widely-
known economic climate in the three-year period before and
during the Argentine financial crisis, cannot translate to
Argentina's breach of the U.S.-Argentina BIT. On the factual
analysis conducted by the Tribunal, Continental's claims could
have been similarly rejected without even reaching a decision on
the interpretation of Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.
Instead, the Tribunal's interpretation of Article XI created two
sources of conceptual-methodological problems. First, the
Tribunal problematically interpreted Article XI of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT in a way that automatically takes out the "necessary
measure" from the scope and coverage of the U.S.-Argentina BIT,
including the duty to compensate. Under this interpretation,
whenever Article XI is found applicable, there would be no duty to
compensate since none of the substantive obligations of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT would ever come into force with respect to the
"necessary measure" in question. As will be shown below, textual
reasons, structural design, and policy motivations animating the
U.S.-Argentina BIT militate against adopting this "exclusionary"
interpretation of Article XI.
Second, the Tribunal summarily imported "necessity" concepts
in distinct legal regimes such as international trade law to
purposely reach a lower threshold of necessity. The following
subsection will also show that not only was it functionally and
legally inappropriate to cull this standard from international trade
law, but that the Tribunal also overlooked salient aspects of the
WTO Appellate Body Report on the Korea-Beef case which the
Tribunal had cited as its main authoritative basis in support of a
lower threshold of necessity. Had the Korea-Beef decision been
examined more closely in its entirety, however, the Tribunal could
not have avoided concluding that even under GATT and WTO
law, the concept of "necessity" is already circumscribed by various
contextual qualifications and textual limitations. In any case, given
the vastly different respective natures, objects, and purposes of the
U.S.-Argentina BIT and GATT 1947, the Tribunal ought to have
been constrained by the unitary system of treaty interpretation
under Article 31 of the VCLT from using Article XX of GATT 1947
as an interpretive tool to define the substantive content of
"essential security interests" and "necessary measures" in Article
XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.
Both these conceptual-methodological problems need not have
been incurred in the first place. Their presence in the Continental
2010]
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award carries unsettling consequences for the proper
interpretation of the treaty
1.4.2. Does Article XI Prevent any Breach of the U.S.-Argentina
BIT from Arising?
To reiterate, Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT states in its
entirety:
This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either
Party of measures necessary for the maintenance of public
order, the fulfilment of its obligations with respect to the
maintenance or restoration of international peace or
security, or the Protection of its own essential security
interests.178
The precise wording of Article XI is crucial. According to the
Tribunal's interpretation in the Continental award (and based on an
earlier view stated by the Ad Hoc Committee in its Decision on the
Application for Annulment in the CMS Gas case), measures
embraced under Article XI "would lie outside the scope of the
Treaty so that the party taking it would not be in breach of the
relevant BIT provision." 179 This effect, however, is nowhere seen in
the actual wording of Article XI. Textually, all that Article XI refers
to are measures which are not precluded from application by the
Treaty ("This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either
Party of measures. . ."). To "preclude" means to "close," "rule out in
advance," or "make impossible by necessary consequence."180
Denotatively, therefore, all that Article XI provides for is that the
U.S.-Argentina BIT does not "close", "rule out in advance", or
"make impossible by necessary consequence" a party's application
of measures that are necessary for: (1) "the maintenance of public
order"; (2) "fulfilment of its obligations with respect to the
maintenance or restoration of international peace or security"; or
(3) "the protection of [the Party's] own essential security
interests." 181 In no case does the text of Article XI even indicate
what consequences arise when a Party applies such measures. As
178 U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 14, art. XI.
179 Cont'l Cas. Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9 para. 164.
180 Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com
/dictionary /preclude (emphasis added).
181 U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 14, art. XI.
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seen from the very same phraseology of Article XI itself, there is no
textual support for the Continental Tribunal's asserted effect of
Article XI.
Furthermore, without citing any of the travaux prparatoires of
the U.S.-Argentina BIT in support of its position, the Continental
Tribunal simply infers that the effect of Article XI is to prevent the
U.S.-Argentina BIT's substantive obligations from ever attaching to
a party whenever it applies the "necessary measures"
contemplated under Article XI. A structural analysis of various
provisions of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, however, reveals that the
state parties to this treaty expressly provided for exceptional
circumstances when the treaty protections would not apply.
Article 1(2) states the parties' specific intent to deny the
protections and/or advantages of the U.S.-Argentina BIT in strictly
limited circumstances:
Each party reserves the right to deny to any company of the
other Party the advantages of this Treaty if (a) nationals of
any third country, or nationals of such Party, control such
company and the company has no substantial business
activities in the territory of the other Party, or (b) the
company is controlled by nationals of a third country with
which the denying Party does not maintain normal
economic relations.182
Article II(1) reserves the right of each party to expressly create
exceptions to the U.S.-Argentina BIT's standard of treatment,
under an agreed and transparent procedure:
Each Party shall permit and treat investment, and activities
associated therewith, on a basis no less favourable than that
accorded in like situations to investment or associated
activities of its own nationals or companies, or of nationals
or companies of any third country, whichever is the more
favorable, subject to the right of each Party to make or
maintain exceptions falling within one of the sectors or
matters listed in the Protocol to this Treaty. Each Party
agrees to notify the other Party before or on the date of
entry into force of this Treaty of all such laws and
regulations of which it is aware concerning the sectors or
182 Id. art. 1(2).
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matters listed in the Protocol. Moreover, each Party agrees
to notify the other of any future exception with respect to
the sectors or matters listed in the Protocol, and to limit
such exceptions to a minimum. Any future exception by
either Party shall not apply to investment existing in that
sector or matter at the time the exception becomes effective.
The treatment accorded pursuant to any exceptions shall,
unless specified otherwise in the Protocol, be not less
favorable than that accorded in like situations to
investments and associated activities of nationals or
companies of any third country.183
Article 11(9) explicitly indicates the denial of application of the
U.S.-Argentina BIT's most favored nation ("MFN") provisions to
certain benefits conferred under existing regional or institutional
arrangements:
The most favored nation provisions of this Article shall not
apply to advantages accorded by either Party to nationals
or companies of any third country by virtue of that Party's
binding obligations that derive from full membership in a
regional customs union or free trade area, whether such an
arrangement is designated as a customs union, free trade
area, common market or otherwise. 84
Article 1V(3) illustrates the state parties' intent to avoid a
situation of denying substantive protection even for investment
losses arising from "national emergencies," by instead mandating
states parties to provide for non-discriminatory treatment: 8 5
Nationals or companies of either Party whose investments
suffer losses in the territory of the other Party owing to war
or other armed conflict, revolution, state of national
emergency, insurrection, civil disturbance or other similar
events shall be accorded treatment by such other Party no
less favorable than that accorded to its own nationals or
183 Id. art. 11(1).
184 Id. art. 11(9).
185 For conclusions reached under a similarly-worded provision in the United
Kingdom-Argentina Bilateral Investment Treaty, see BG Group PLC v. Argentina
(U.K. v. Arg.), Final Award, paras. 381-84 (Dec. 24, 2007) (discussing national
treatment and most favored nation requirements under a provision of the U.K.-
Argentina Bilateral Investment Treaty).
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companies or to nationals or companies of any third
country, whichever is the more favorable treatment, as
regards any measures it adopts in relation to such losses.186
Article IX specifies the inapplicability of Articles VII and VIII of
the U.S.-Argentina BIT for certain classes of disputes:
The provisions of Article VII and VIII shall not apply to a
dispute arising (a) under the export credit, guarantee or
insurance programs of the Export-Import Bank of the
United States or (b) under other official credit, guarantee or
insurance arrangements pursuant to which the Parties have
agreed to other means of settling disputes. 87
The foregoing provisions show that the parties to the U.S.-
Argentina BIT contemplated departures from the substantive
obligations provided for in the treaty as an exceptional
circumstance, and one that requires specification in the language of
the treaty itself. The failure to provide for a clause stipulating the
effect of a party's application of measures under Article XI raises a
justifiable implication that neither of the parties to the U.S.-
Argentina BIT envisaged a situation where the treaty would be
completely inappropriate, so as to prevent any of its substantive
protections from taking effect. Had the parties to the U.S.-
Argentina BIT intended otherwise, the text of Article XI should
have been explicitly worded to provide for the effect of treaty
inapplicability. This is reasonably consonant with the posture
taken by both treaty parties, who had-in the afore-cited treaty
provisions-so meticulously specified the limitations and
parameters of exemption from the applicability of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT's substantive obligations.
Significantly, the Protocol to the U.S.-Argentina BIT is likewise
silent on the effect of a party's application of measures under
Article XI. Paragraph 6 of the Protocol clarifies the substantive
content of a clause in Article XI, but does not indicate the effect of
the application of any such measure under Article XI: "The Parties
understand that, with respect to rights reserved in Article XI of the
Treaty, 'obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration
186 U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 14, art. IV(3).
187 Id. art. IX.
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of international peace or security' means obligations under the
Charter of the United Nations." 188
The fact that the parties purposely chose not to indicate in the
Protocol any effect of a party's application of a measure under
Article XI can be contradistinguished from the first five clauses of
the Protocol, which refer expressly to the parties' respective
reservation of rights to create exceptions from substantive
obligations under the U.S.-Argentina BIT.189 The treaty parties'
failure to provide for the effect of a host state's application of
measures under Article XI should therefore be seen as the treaty
parties' rejection of the absolute inapplicability of the treaty with
respect to measures embraced by Article XI. Doubt as to the intent
of the treaty parties should be construed in favor of the
interpretation which better upholds the "object and purpose" of
the treaty, and does not thwart its substantive application.190 It is
reasonable to conclude that parties to a treaty intended its
application, unless deliberately excluded as seen in the afore-cited
provisions of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.
188 Id. protocol para. 6.
189 See Protocol to the U.S.-Argentina BIT:
During dispute settlement proceedings pursuant to Article VII, a party
may be required to produce evidence of ownership or control consistent
with Article l(1)(a).
With reference to Article I, paragraph 1, the United States reserves the right
to make or maintain limited exceptions to national treatment in the following
sectors...
With reference to Article II, paragraph 1, the United States reserves the right
to make or maintain limited exceptions to national treatment with respect to
certain programs involving government grants, loans, and insurance.
With reference to Article II, paragraph 1, the United States reserves the right
to make or maintain limited exceptions to national and most favoured nation
treatment in the following sectors, with respect to which the treatment
will be based on reciprocity...
With reference to Article II, paragraph 1, Argentina reserves the right to
make or maintain limited exceptions to national treatment in the following
sectors ....
U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 14, protocol paras. 1-5 (emphasis added).
190 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331; see also MARTrI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE
STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 474-562 (2006); see generally Gerald
Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: Treaty
Interpretation and Certain Other Treaty Points, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L. L. 1 (1951)
(discussing theories of treaty interpretation).
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Finally, attention must also be directed to Article III of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT:
This Treaty shall not preclude either Party from prescribing
laws and regulations in connection with the admission of
investments made in its territory by nationals or companies
of the other Party or with the conduct of associated
activities, provided, however, that such laws and
regulations shall not impair the substance of any of the
rights set forth in the Treaty.191
The foregoing provision is the only other provision in the U.S.-
Argentina BIT that, like Article XI, indicates acts which are not
precluded by the treaty. As the phraseology of Article III makes
clear, non-preclusion does not mean that the U.S.-Argentina BIT
does not apply to certain acts of a treaty party. Rather, non-
preclusion merely connotes that a treaty party is not prevented
from committing certain acts even within the operative duration of
the treaty. Article III's proviso ("provided, however, that such laws
and regulations shall not impair the substance of any of the rights set
forth in the Treaty"), however, expressly restricts the effects of a
party's acts against impairment of substantive rights under the
treaty. While this proviso is not present in the wording of Article
XI, all that the absence implies is that the measures contemplated
under Article XI could conceivably impair substantive rights under
the U.S.-Argentina BIT. However, it cannot extend to an
implication (which the Tribunal in the Continental Award
problematically made) that a treaty party's application of measures
under Article XI automatically removes the right to compensation
under various provisions of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.
Clearly, textual and structural analysis of the U.S.-Argentina
BIT does not support the Continental Tribunal's broad
interpretation of Article XI to prevent a breach from ever arising
when a host State implements "necessary measures," to the point
that the host State would never have any duty to compensate for
such measures when they impair substantive rights under the
treaty. As will be further shown in Section 2 and Section 3, a
rigorous application of the lex specialis under Article XI in relation
to other substantive provisions of the U.S.-Argentina BIT should
still militate in favour of maintaining the right to compensation as
191 U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 14, art. III (emphasis added).
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manifest from the treaty's text, structural design, and policy
motivations.
1.4.3. Are GATT and IT0 Law and Jurisprudence Legally
Relevant in Determining the Substantive Content of Article
XI?
The Continental Tribunal justified its reference to GATT and
WTO case law on the claim that "the text of Article XI derives from
the parallel model clause of the U.S. FCN treaties and these treaties
in turn reflect the formulation of Art. XX of GATT 1947."192 The
Tribunal then primarily relied on the WTO Appellate Body Report
on the Korea-Beef case, to infer a lower threshold of necessity under
Article XI to mean "whether the [Capital Control Regime]
Measures contributed materially to the realization of their
legitimate aims under Article XI of the BIT,"193 and "whether
Argentina had reasonably available alternatives, less in conflict or
more compliant with its international obligations, while providing
an equivalent contribution to the achievement of the objective
pursued."'194
The sudden resort to GATT and WTO case law is
unprecedented, not having been referred to at all by previous
ICSID tribunals in the Sempra, LG & E, and CMS Gas cases that also
interpreted Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT. As reflected from
the Continental Tribunal's own proferred justification, Article XI
only remotely derives from Article XX of GATT 1947 through the
parallel model clause of the US FCN treaties. However, nowhere
in the Continental Award did the Tribunal show that Article XX of
GATT 1947 had formed part of the travaux preparatoires of the
parties to the U.S.-Argentina BIT, and if so, the precise degree in
which Article XX of GATT 1947 had been relied upon during the
negotiation and drafting of Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.
More importantly, the textual nexus between Article XX of
GATT 1947 and Article XI appears more imagined than real. The
full text of Article XX of GATT 1947 states, in full:
192 Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, para. 192
(Sept. 5, 2008).
193 Id. para. 196.
194 Id. para. 198 (citation omitted).
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Article XX: General Exceptions
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not
applied in a manner which would constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international trade, nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or
enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
a) necessary to protect public morals;
b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health;
c) relating to the importations or exportations of gold
or silver;
d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or
regulations which are not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Agreement, including those
relating to customs enforcement, the enforcement of
monopolies operated under paragraph 4 of Article II
and Article XVII, the protection of patents,
trademarks and copyrights, and the prevention of
deceptive practices;
e) relating to the products of prison labour;
f) imposed for the protection of national treasures of
artistic, historic or archaeological value;
g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources if such measures are made effective in
conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption;
h) undertaken in pursuance of obligations under any
intergovernmental commodity agreement which
conforms to criteria submitted to the Contracting
Parties and not disapproved by them or which is
itself so submitted and not so disapproved;
i) involving restrictions on exports of domestic
materials necessary to ensure essential quantities of
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such materials to a domestic processing industry
during periods when the domestic price of such
materials is held below the world price as part of a
governmental stabilization plan; provided that such
restrictions shall not operate to increase the exports
of or the protection afforded to such domestic
industry, and shall not depart from the provisions of
this Agreement relating to non-discrimination;
j) essential to the acquisition or distribution of
products in general or local short supply; provided
that any such measures shall be consistent with the
principle that all contracting parties are entitled to
an equitable share of the international supply of
such products, and that any such measures, which
are inconsistent with the other provisions of the
Agreement shall be discontinued as soon as the
conditions giving rise to them have ceased to exist.
The Contracting Parties shall review the need for
this sub-paragraph not later than 30 June 1960.195
Nowhere in the text of Article XX of GATT 1947 is there
language that reproduces Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.
Article XI's "This Treaty shall not preclude...." is in no way a
denotative equivalent for Article XX's "nothing in this Agreement
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
contracting party of measures.. .. " Mere "non-preclusion" in
Article XI is not conceptually tantamount or analogous to "non-
construction to prevent adoption or enforcement" under Article
XX.
Obviously, the two-tiered structure of Article XX in its chapeau
("Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in
a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international
trade .... ") and the ten items enumerated from (a) to (j) is facially
absent from the actual wording of Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina
195 General Agreement on Tariff and Trade art. XX, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S.
194 [hereinafter GATT 1947], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs e
/legal_e/gatt47_O2_e.htm#articleXX.
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BIT.196 Raj Bhala describes Article XX's drafting history to have
been motivated by the desire to meet particular conditions existing
in specific countries in construing exceptions from multilateral
trade obligations under the GATT.97 The chapeau is intended to
guard against the abusive interpretation of any of the itemized
exceptions:
The chapeau is animated by the principle that while the
exceptions of Article XX may be invoked as a matter of
legal right, they should not be so applied as to frustrate or
defeat the legal obligations of the holder of the right under
the substantive rule of the General Agreement. If those
exceptions are not to be abused or misused, in other words,
the measures falling within the particular exceptions must
be applied reasonably, with due regard both to the legal
duties of the party claiming the exception and the legal
rights of the other parties concerned. 198
196 Id.
197 RAj BHALA, MODERN GATr LAW: A TREATISE ON THE GENERAL AGREEMENTS
ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 531-33 (2005).
All GATT obligations are subject to a set of 10 general exceptions set
forth in Article XX. This 'laundry list,' albeit incomplete, generates some
of the most hotly and frequently debated problems in the multilateral
trading system .... Conceptually, it is a folly to think a single theory
underpins these seven exceptions, much less all 10 of them .... Indeed,
in the 1946 London and 1947 Geneva Preparatory Conferences, no effort
was made to develop a coherent theoretical basis unifying the items on
Article XX .... Rather, self-interested expediency mattered to the
drafters of GATT, as Professor Jackson observes: 'Naturally, the
tendency of the drafting sessions [of both Articles XX and XXI], as was
the case for other articles, was to add to the list of general exceptions in
order to meet the particular conditions existing in specific countries.'
.... Pessimism aside, the starting point for the international trade
lawyer and scholar needing to come to terms with Article XX is the
language of the text. Despite the lack of a unifying theory, there is one
unifying aspect to that text, namely, its introductory clause, known as the
chapeau .... [Which] concerns not the aim or design of a measure, but
rather the way in which a measure is applied. Simply put, the purpose
of the chapeau is to prevent the abusive invocation of an itemised
exception. This concern helps make it a unifying force for the 10
itemised exceptions. The purpose of the chapeau is what makes it a
device uniting all 10 exceptions in Article XX, other than the textual fact
it is an introduction to them.
Id.
198 Appellate Body Report, United States - Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, 22, WT/DS2/AB/R, (Apr. 29, 1996), available at
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The particular phraseology of the chapeau in Article XX:
[Ejmbodies the recognition on the part of WTO Members of
the need to maintain a balance of rights and obligations
between the right of a Member to invoke one or another of
the exceptions under Article XX, specified in paragraphs (a)
to 0), on the other hand, and the substantive rights of the
other Members under the GATT 1994, on the other hand. 99
The absence of a textual nexus between Article XX of GATT
1947 and Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT is easily explained by
the disparate design and policy motivation behind the respective
legal regimes. GATT binds Member States to comply with
multilaterally-negotiated rules in the international trade system,
such as those pertaining to tariffs (including schedules, modalities,
and bindings), non-tariff barriers (such as those on limits on and
administration of quantitative restrictions), and customs (including
rules on transit and origin, valuation and fees), among others. A
Member State to the GATT can only invoke Article XX under
narrow circumstances and conditions to justify a measure that is
inconsistent with the State's affirmative obligations under GATT.200
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispue/dispsettlement-cbLe/alslpl
_e.htm.
199 Appellate Body Report, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, 156, WT/DS58/AB/R, (Oct. 12, 1998).
200 PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION 599 (2005).
In general, Article XX is relevant and will be invoked by a Member only
when a measure of that Member has been found to be inconsistent with
another GATT provision. In such a case, Article XX will be invoked to
justify the GATT-inconsistent measure. As the Panel in US-Section 337
noted, the central phrase in the first sentence of Article XX is that
"nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or
enforcement by any Member of measures...." Measures satisfying the
conditions set out in Article XX are thus permitted, even if they are
inconsistent with other provisions of the GAT[ 1994. As noted by the
Panel in US-Section 337, Article XX provides, however, for limited and
conditional exceptions from obligations under other GATT provisions. The
exceptions are "limited" as the list of exceptions in Article XX is
exhaustive. The exceptions are "conditional" in that Article XX only
provides for justification of an otherwise illegal measure when the
conditions set out in Article XX... are fulfilled. While Article XX allows
Members to adopt or maintain measures promoting or protecting other
important societal values, it provides an exception to, or limitation of,
affirmative commitments under GATT 1994. In this light, it is not
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Whenever a Member State's measure is deemed to be GATT-
inconsistent, the GATT's system of dispute settlement under
Articles XXII and XXIII (and later, the WTO's Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes or
DSU) come into play:
Article XXII: Consultation
1) Each contracting party shall accord sympathetic
consideration to, and shall afford adequate
opportunity for consultation regarding, such
representations as may be made by another
contracting party with respect to any matter
affecting the operation of this Agreement.
2) The Contracting Parties may, at the request of a
contracting party, consult with any contracting
party or parties in respect of any matter for which it
has not been possible to find a satisfactory solution
through consultation under paragraph 1.
Article XXIII: Nullification or Impairment
1) If any contracting party should consider that any
benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under this
Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the
attainment of any objective of the Agreement is
being impeded as the result of
(a) The failure of another contracting party to
carry out its obligations under this
Agreement, or
(b) The application by another contracting party
of any measure, whether or not it conflicts
with the provisions of this Agreement, or
(c) The existence of any other situationthe
contracting party may, with a view to the
satisfactory adjustment of the matter, make
surprising that Article XX has played a central role in many GAT7 and
WTO disputes.
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written representations or proposals to the
other contracting party or parties which it
considers to be concerned. Any contracting
party thus approached shall give
sympathetic consideration to the
representations or proposals made to it.
2) If no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the
contracting parties concerned within a reasonable
time, or if the difficulty is of the type described in
paragraph 1(c) of this Article, the matter may be
referred to the Contracting Parties. The Contracting
Parties shall promptly investigate any matter so
referred to them and shall make appropriate
recommendations to the contracting parties which
they consider to be concerned, or give a ruling on
the matter, as appropriate. The Contracting Parties
may consult with contracting parties, with the
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations
and with any appropriate inter-governmental
organization in cases where they consider such
consultation necessary. If the Contracting Parties
consider that the circumstances are serious enough
to justify such action, they may authorize a
contracting party or parties to suspend the
application to any other contracting party or parties
of such concessions or other obligations under this
Agreement as they determine to be appropriate in
the circumstances. If the application to any
contracting party of any concession or other
obligation is in fact suspended, that contracting
party shall then be free, not later than sixty days
after such action is taken, to give written notice to
the Executive Secretary to the Contracting Parties of
its intention to withdraw from this Agreement and
such withdrawal shall take effect upon the sixtieth
day following the day on which such notice is
received by him.201
201 GATT 1947, supra note 195, arts. xxii-xxiii.
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As the foregoing provisions show, the remedy contemplated
under the GATT/WTO dispute settlement system is the
realignment of a Member State's questioned measure (whether
found to constitute a "violation nullification or impairment," or, in
rare instances, a "non-violation nullification or impairment")20 2
back to consistency and compliance with GATT obligations.
Unlike the U.S.-Argentina BIT, the GATT does not provide for
compensation as a remedy for breach of substantive obligations.
Conversely, the U.S.-Argentina BIT does not provide for the
removal of a government measure in the manner followed in the
GATT system.
On the other hand, the parties to the U.S.-Argentina BIT
negotiated and concluded the treaty in order to "maintain a stable
framework for investment and maximum effective use of economic
resources." 203 In the event of direct or indirect expropriation or
nationalization, the treaty regime specifically provided for a duty
to pay "prompt, adequate and effective compensation." 20 4
Compensation was further characterized as that which is
equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated
investment immediately before the expropriatory action
was taken or became known, whichever is earlier; be paid
without delay; include interest at a commercially
reasonable rate from the date of expropriation; be fully
realizable; and be freely transferable at the prevailing
market rate of exchange on the date of expropriation.205
The treaty structure, object and purpose, as well as the policy
animating the GATT vastly differ from that of the U.S.-Argentina
BIT. Textual differences accompany the patent structural disparity
202 KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 190, at 1152-56. A "violation nullification or
impairment" involves a trade measure that, on its face, nullifies or impairs
benefits under the General Agreement. A "non-violation nullification or
impairment," on the other hand, involves a Member State's implementation of a
lawful measure in a manner that denies or disrupts trade benefits of the
complaining Member as negotiated under the GATT. Id. See also C. O'Neal
Taylor, Impossible Cases: Lessons from the First Decade of WATO Dispute Settlement, 28
U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L 309 (2007); Joel P. Trachtman, Regulatory Jurisdiction and the
WTO, 10 J. INT'L ECON. L. 631 (2007); Hal S. Shapiro, The Rules that Swallowed the
Exceptions: The WVTO SPS Agreement and its Relationship to GATT Articles XX and
XXI, 24 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 199 (2007).
203 U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 14, pmbl.
204 Id. art. IV(1).
205 Id.
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between the one-sentence Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, and
the two-tiered structure of chapeau and listed exceptions in Article
XX of GATT 1947. The word "necessary" in Article XX is qualified
by specific objects and/or qualificatory clauses (e.g. "necessary to
protect public morals"; "necessary to protect human, animal or
plant life or health"; "necessary to secure compliance with laws or
regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Agreement") that are not found in the terminology of Article XI of
the U.S.-Argentina BIT (e.g. "necessary for the maintenance of
public order, the fulfilment of its obligations with respect to the
maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or the
Protection of its own essential security interests."). The GATT
provision which might have the closer linkage with the objects of
"maintenance of public order" or "essential security interests" in
Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT is Article XXI of GATT 1947,
entitled "Security Exceptions." Even then, however, the textual
formulation and limited application of Article XXI remains vastly
different from the wording of Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT:
Article XXI: Security Exceptions
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
(a) to require any contracting party to
furnish any information the disclosure of
which it considers contrary to its
essential security interests; or
(b) to prevent any contracting party from
taking any action which it considers
necessary for the protection of its
essential security interests;
i. relating to fissionable materials or the
materials from which they are
derived;
ii. relating to the traffic in arms,
ammunition and implements of war
and to such traffic in other goods and
materials as is carried on directly or
indirectly for the purpose of
supplying a military establishment;
[Vol. 31:3
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iii. taken in time of war or other
emergency in international relations;
or
(c) to prevent any contracting party from
taking any action in pursuance of its
obligations under the United Nations
Charter for the maintenance of
international peace and security.20 6
As seen above, the nature of measures "necessary for
protecting essential security interests" in Article XXI of GATT 1947
is qualified by subparagraphs (b)(i) through b(iii).207 None of these
qualifications are found in the brief language of Article XI.
Finally, it was likewise erroneous and methodologically
inappropriate for the Continental Tribunal to simply lift
jurisprudential tests developed by the WTO Appellate Body in
206 GATT 1947, supra note 195, art. XXI (emphasis added).
207 See Andrew Emmerson, Conceptualizing Security Exceptions: Legal Doctrine
or Political Excuse?, 11 J. INT'L ECON. L. 135, 139-40 (2008).
For this first "occasion," the security exceptions negotiated the politically
charged "discursive space" between the WTO's legal authority and the
retention of sovereign power by members. In this sense, the security
exceptions operate as a dual political excuse. The WTO, as an institution,
is wary that WTO membership "erodes states" control over cross-border
flows' and thus, state sovereignty. A state's participation therefore
became dependent on reserving their sovereign rights of power over
national security. Members essentially seek confirmation that their
security interests supersede trade obligations. This first manifestation is
a sovereign excuse that appears to function "as a description of the
[members'] norm." That is, Realism's view that security is a political
issue solely for state determination.
Secondly, security exceptions operate as a facilitative, institutional excuse.
They allow the WTO and its Agreements to 'walk the fine line between
these two competing concerns' of sovereignty and authority. States are
induced, and justify, entering the regime believing their "essential security
interests", which demand great domestic political responsibility, will be
protected. Conceptually, therefore, security exceptions are the necessary
"escape clause" used to expedite the conclusion of Agreements, while
binding members to their WTO obligations. Pragmatism requires the
appearance of the WTO circumscribing its decision-making authority,
while the states' political power seemingly exists "despite [the]
institution's rules or norms." Therefore, by including security
exceptions, states are encouraged to consent to WTO membership,
underpinning the WTO's negotiated legitimacy.
Id. (emphasis added).
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relation to Article XX of GATT 1947 in order to expand the
substantive content of "essential security interests" or "necessary"
measures under Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT. In particular,
the Continental Tribunal quoted a passage from the Korea-Beef case
as an authoritative principle for the Tribunal to define "necessary
measures" in Article XI as a process of assessing "whether the
[Capital Control Regime] Measures contributed materially to the
realization of their legitimate aims under Art. XI of the BIT, namely
the protection of the essential security interests of Argentina in the
economic and social crisis it was facing." 208 Had the Continental
Tribunal quoted the entire passage from the Korea-Beef decision,
however, it could not have avoided the conclusion that the term
"necessary" in Article XX is context-dependent and cannot simply
be transplanted into Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.209
Given the textual, structural, and policy incompatibilities
between Article XX of GATT 1947 and Article XI of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT, there appears to have been no legal relevance for
the Continental Tribunal to conflate "necessity" concepts as
understood in relation to Article XX with "necessary measures" as
discussed in Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT. The Tribunal did
not cite any travaux preparatoires, prior practice or subsequent
agreement of the parties to the U.S.-Argentina BIT to make Article
XX an authoritative interpretive source for Article XI. Accordingly,
this particular methodology in Continental should not be seen as a
useful adjudicative precedent for the development of international
208 Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, para. 196
(Sep. 5, 2008).
209 In paragraph 193 of the Continental Award, the Tribunal cited an excerpt
from paragraph 161 of the Korea-Beef decision. The entire paragraph is set forth
below:
We believe that, as used in the context of Article XX(d), the reach of the
word "necessary" is not limited to that which is "indispensable" or "of
absolute necessity" or "inevitable." Measures which are indispensable or
of absolute necessity or inevitable to secure compliance certainly fulfil
the requirements of Article XX(d). But other measures, too, may fall
within the ambit of this exception. As used in Article XX(d), the term
"necessary" refers, in our view, to a range of degrees of necessity. At one
end of this continuum lies "necessary" understood as "indispensable"; at
the other, is "necessary" taken to mean as "making a contribution to."
We consider that a "necessary" measure is, in this continuum, located
significantly closer to the pole of "indispensable" than to the opposite
pole of simply "making a contribution to."
Appellate Body Report, Korea-Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled, and
Frozen Beef, para. 161, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000).
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investment law. If followed by other investment arbitration
tribunals, the two conceptual-methodological problems identified
in the preceding Sections are likely to wreak interpretive havoc on
future cases. With many bilateral and multilateral investment
treaties carrying provisions worded similarly to Article XI of the
U.S.-Argentina BIT, a tribunal's inability to thoroughly justify the
choice of interpretive methodology opens the international legal
regime to criticisms of arbitrariness, lack of rule of law, instability
and unpredictability of legal outcomes. Under the Continental
Tribunal's interpretive practice, the importance of text as a key
source of meaning can be negated by extraneous considerations
and policies set by third-party arbitrators. "Context" can be
loosely used to fit every legal standard, from any legal regime
whatsoever, so long as a tribunal deems it "relevant" to defining
the substantive content of a treaty. This interpretive practice
altogether undermines the duty to observe the unitary system of
treaty interpretation under Article 31 of the VCLT.
Ultimately, the source of controversy in the Continental Award
is its interpretive methodology. Based only on its extensive
evaluation of the facts in relation to Argentina's substantive treaty
obligations, the Continental Tribunal could conceivably have
arrived at the same result without complicating the interpretation
of Article XI. The problematic interpretive methodology in
Continental trenches both the concept and consequence of
"necessity" under Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT. It is also a
problem of process-and the extent to which a tribunal or
arbitrator can reach into the spectrum of international legal sources
to set definitive interpretive tools. Section 2 explores these
conceptual-methodological issues further, situating the
controversy to the use of the customary norm of necessity as a
"supplementary" means of interpreting the lex specialis of Article XI
of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.
2. CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IN USING THE
CUSTOMARY NORM OF NECESSITY AS A "SUPPLEMENTARY MEANS OF
INTERPRETATION" OF ARTICLE XI AS THE LEX SPECIALIS
The foregoing analysis of the Sempra, LG & E, CMS Gas, and
Continental cases has shown that the customary norm of necessity
has permeated judicial interpretation of Article XI of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT to varying degrees. Whether considered as part of
the treaty's "context" or a "relevant rule of international law
20101
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applicable in the relations between the parties" under Article 31 of
the VCLT, or as a "supplementary means of interpretation" under
Article 32 of the VCLT, it must first be ascertained whether a legal-
conceptual relationship could even exist between Article XI of the
U.S.-Argentina BIT and the doctrine of necessity in customary
international law (as codified by Article 25 of the ILC Articles on
State Responsibility). As the lex specialis, Article XI takes
precedence as the operative rule in investment controversies
brought under the U.S.-Argentina BIT.210 Any normative weight
attributable to Article 25 could therefore only be in a
supplementary sense to Article XI. As this Section contends,
however, fundamental conceptual and methodological
incompatibilities between Article 25 and Article XI undercut the
former norm's relevance in interpreting the latter norm. The
following subsections juxtapose various aspects of the underlying
incompatibilities between the norms.211 Considering the distinct
210 See Anja Lindroos, Addressing Norm Conflicts in a Fragmented Legal System:
The Doctrine of Lex Specialis, 74 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 27, 30, 39 (2005) (arguing that
although lex specialis may be effective in resolving certain normative conflicts, it
may be less appropriate for dealing with new conflicts created by the
fragmentation of international law); NANCY KoNTou, THE TERMINATION AND
REVISION OF TREATIES IN THE LIGHT OF NEW CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 19-20
(1994).
It is often necessary to decide which of several conflicting rules of
international law deriving from the same or different sources and being
in force at a particular time must apply to a given situation. In the
literature three criteria are used to solve conflicts of this kind: the
normative value of the conflicting rules, their relative degree of
generality, and the chronological order of their generation.
According to these criteria, the rule which has a higher normative value
(lex superior) will prevail. This will be the case when one of the rules
has the character of jus cogens. If the conflicting rules are all expressions
of equal authority, then the rule which is more recent (lex posterior) or
more specific (lex specialis) will prevail. A rule can be regarded as lex
specialis, because it is binding on a few States as opposed to a rule
binding erga omnes (lex specialis ratione personae) or because it "furnishes,
in comparison with the lex generalis, the deeper, more detailed, perhaps
exceptional, regulation of the same subject-matte"' (lex specialis ratione
materiae).
Id.
211 See also W. Michael Reisman, Professor, Yale Law School, Fifteenth Goff:
Arbitration Lecture: National Emergencies and Necessities: Do They and Should
They Relieve States of Their Investment Obligations (Oct. 7, 2008) (discussing
problems of dealing with business disputes through public international law) (on
file with author).
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normative development of the doctrine of "necessity" under
customary international law, the concluding subsection disputes
the presumed existence of a legal-conceptual relationship between
Article XI and Article 25, and argues that Article 25 cannot be
accepted as an interpretive tool for Article XI within the framework
of operative rules in Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT.
2.1. Nature of Measures Contemplated
"Necessity" under Article 25 contemplates a State's
commission of a measure or act that is admittedly "not in
conformity with an international obligation." When a State pleads
necessity, therefore, there is already a situation of extant
wrongfulness arising from the State's act. Necessity functions as
an affirmative defense against the State's responsibility for acting
in breach of an international obligation. Hugo Grotius, credited
with developing the doctrine of necessity, discussed the origin of
this particular affirmative defense from "certain premises of
human impulse and external circumstances [in which] man has
been compelled to resort to certain rules."212 In the Gabikovo-
Nagymaros case, the International Court of Justice adopted the
International Law Commission's characterization of the customary
doctrine of necessity as "deeply rooted in general legal
thinking." 213
The modern concept of necessity under Article 25, however,
does not recognize the existence of "an omnibus category" of State
212 BURLEIGH CUSHING RODICK, THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 7-10 (1928).
We have said that Grotius more than anyone else deserves to be
considered the modem founder of the doctrine of necessity.... It should
not, however, detract from the fact that Machiavelli, writing 115 years
earlier, without aiming at a systematic presentation of the subject matter,
and proceeding from entirely different premises, nevertheless had
arrived at conclusions that bear a startling similarity to those of
Grotius....
In estimating the part played by Machiavelli in developing the doctrine
of necessity it is sufficient to repeat that he antedated Grotius by more
than one hundred years in pointing out that in order to excuse the use of
necessity, there must be a real danger to the life and property of the state
and that the amount of force to be employed should be no greater than is
essential to defend the particular rights in danger.
213 Gabeikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 40 (Sept.
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acts or measures.214 Judicial decisions cited by the International
Law Commission (ILC)215 in which the plea of necessity has been
applied include State measures involving the use of force 216 and its
incidents, 217 provisional prohibitions or restrictions on commercial
activities, 218 and delayed repayment of monetary obligations.219
According to the ILC, state practice and judicial decisions support
the use of the necessity justification for "acts contrary to a broad
range of obligations, whether customary or conventional in
origin," and the doctrine "has been invoked to protect a wide
variety of interests, including safeguarding the environment,
preserving the very existence of the State and its people in time of
public emergency, or ensuring the safety of a civilian
population." 2 0
In contrast to Article 25, the text of Article XI of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT merely specifies the classes of measures
214 See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 448 (6th
ed. 2003) (explaining that while some defenses such as assumption of risk or
contributory negligence are commonly accepted in international tribunals,
necessity may only be pleaded in narrower contexts).
215 Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assemly, Draft
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with
Commentaries, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 80-84 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. Int'l L.
Comm'n 31, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 80-84 [hereinafter ILC, Draft Articles on
Responsibility of States].
216 See id. at 81 (Draft Art. 25, cmt. 5) (discussing the "Caroline" incident of
1837).
217 See id. (Draft Art. 25, cmt. 4) (discussing an Anglo-Portuguese dispute of
1832 involving the appropriation of private property in order to provide
subsistence for certain troop contingents quelling internal disturbances and the
March 1967 bombing of the Liberian oil tanker Torrey Canyon by the British
government to prevent further spillage of large amounts of oil threatening the
English coastline).
218 See id. (Draft Art. 25, cmt. 6) (addressing the Russian Fur Seals
controversy of 1893, where the Russian government issued a decree prohibiting
sealing in an area of the high seas) (citing Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Can.),
1998 I.C.J. 432 (Dec. 4)).
219 See id. (Draft Art. 25, cmt. 7) (discussing the Ottoman Empire's use of
force majeure to justify its delay in payment of debt to Russia); Beate Rudolf and
Nina Htafken, Argentinean State Bonds - Defense of Necessity in Relationship Between
State and Private Debtors - Customary International Law and General Principles of Law,
101 AM. J. INT'L L. 857, 857 (2007) (summarizing the German Federal
Constitutional Court's May 8, 2007 ruling that "no discernible, general rule of
public international law enables a state to invoke the doctrine of necessity as a
justification for suspending the performance of obligations now due and arising
under private law to pay private creditors").
220 ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 215, at 83 (Draft Art.
25, cmt. 14).
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contemplated ("measures necessary for the maintenance of public
order, the fulfilment of its obligations with respect to the
maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or the
Protection of its own essential security interests"),21 without
stating that any of these measures would automatically be in
breach of the treaty, or call for a suspension of treaty obligations.
Applying the ejusdem generis rule of treaty interpretation,222 the
parties to the U.S.-Argentina BIT can only commit such measures
that fall within these limited classes-those which fall within the
same genus as "public order," "international peace or security," or
"essential security interests." The treaty-defined genus appears
more limited than the Article 25 formulation, since Article XI's
specified classes of measures presuppose immediacy, urgency, and
directness in the measures to be applied by a State. This militates
against adopting an Article 25 interpretation that favors a "wide
variety of interests" in construing "necessity." Had the parties to
the U.S.-Argentina BIT desired an Article 2 5-type provision to
cover the kinds of State acts or measures described under Article
XI, there ought to have been more analogous textual formulation to
that effect in the phraseology of Article XI. The absence of Article
25-type language in Article XI weighs against extending Article XI
coverage to every conceivable State act or measure as a
"necessary" measure. 223
221 U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 14, art. XI.
222 See Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K v. Iran), 1952 I.C.J. 93, 110 (July 22)
(discussing when facts forming the subject matter of a dispute may relate to a
treaty); Ambatielos Claim (U.K. v. Greece), 12 R. Int'l Arb. Awards. 83, 106 (Perm.
Ct. Arb. 1956) (debating the interpretation of the most-favored nation clause); ULF
LINDERFALK, ON THE INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES: THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL
LAW EXPRESSED IN THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 303
(2007):
According to many authors in the literature, a treaty shall be interpreted
through application of the principle of ejusdem generis. In my judgment,
this is sufficient reason for us to conclude that the principle is a valid rule
of international law. However, the question is still what the principle
stands for -in the literature, authors seem to think this obvious. The
only real explanation offered by the literature is the following: The
ejusdem generis doctrine is to the effect that general words when
following (or sometimes preceding) special words are limited to the
genus, if any, indicated by the special words.
M See Susan Rose-Ackerman & Benjamin Billa, Treaties and National Security,
40 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 437, 447-48 (2008).
However, in our reading, the status of necessity in customary
international law cannot be broader than the narrowest formulations
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Ultimately, what is of signal importance for a measure to be
deemed "necessary" under Article XI are the three qualifying
classes defined under its common genus of immediacy, urgency,
and directness to State interest in survival: (1) maintenance of
public order; (2) fulfilment of international obligations with respect
to the maintenance of international peace and security; and (3)
essential security interests.224 The parties to the U.S.-Argentina BIT
further defined the second qualifying class in the Protocol to the
treaty as:
"The Parties understand that, with respect to rights reserved in
Article XI of the Treaty, 'obligations with respect to the
maintenance or restoration of international peace or security'
means obligations under the Charter of the United Nations." 225
Two observations can be made from the parties' deliberate
specification of meaning for this class of obligations. The first is
that the parties intended that the genus of Article XI "necessary"
measures should approximate states' interests of fundamental
importance such as obligations under the UN Charter. The second
is that the parties' silence on the definition of the first and third
qualifying classes should lean towards an interpretation that is not
only comparable to the importance with which parties view UN
Charter obligations, but also, that silence should be interpreted
towards the option least restrictive of rights provided for under the
treaty. Simply stated, the parties' omission in the Protocol to
correspondingly clarify what "maintenance of public order" or
"essential security interests" mean should not be construed against
the parties' expressed will of giving effect to the substantive
obligations in the treaty.226  Both observations argue against
included in explicit treaty language, and these are clearly neither open-
ended nor entirely self-judging. On the general proposition that drafters
do not include meaningless language in treaties, permissive wording
would be included in a treaty only if it were thought necessary to
overcome a background presumption against a broad interpretation of
the doctrine.
Id.
224 U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 14, art. XI.
22 Protocol to the Treaty Between The United States of America and The
Argentine Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of
Investment, para. 6, U.S.-Arg., Nov. 14, 1991, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-2 (emphasis
added).
226 See David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41
UCLA L. REV. 953, 970 (1994) (explaining that treaty interpretation should reflect
the intent of the parties); 74 AM. JuR. 2d Treaties § 31 (2001) (requring that in
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applying an Article 25-type expansive reading of measures
(involving a "wide variety of interests") to the carefully-phrased
language of Article XI. As will be shown in Section 2.3., this
conceptual divide will likewise affect the respective remedial
consequences available under Article 25 and Article XI.
2.2. Conditions for Application
Article 25 sets distinct and conjugated conditions before a
State's measure could be justified under "necessity" as a ground
precluding wrongfulness. For a State to be able to properly invoke
"necessity", Article 25(1) imposes two positive conditions both of
which must be fulfilled: (1) the State's act or measure is "the only
way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave
and imminent peril"; and (2) that such act or measure "does not
seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards
which the obligation exists, or of the international community as a
whole." 227
As to the first condition, the International Law Commission
("ILC") expounds that
The extent to which a given interest is "essential" depends
on all the circumstances, and cannot be prejudged. It
extends to particular interests of the State and its people, as
well as of the international community as a whole.
Whatever the interest may be, however, it is only when it is
threatened by a grave and imminent peril that this
condition is satisfied. The peril has to be objectively
established and not merely apprehended as possible. In
addition to being grave, the peril has to be imminent in the
sense of proximate....
interpreting a treaty, words "be given their natural and ordinary significance"
unless the words are ambiguous or obscure). For a proposal of a clear statement
rule that avoids implying a remedy unless parties express an unmistakable intent
to provide for such remedy in the treaty, see Ryan D. Newman, Treaty Rights and
Remedies: The Virtues of A Clear Statement Rule, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 419, 447
(2007); see also SHABTAI ROSENNE, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES 1945-1986
60 (1989) ("ITihe exact language of the treaty provision in question must always
be carefully scrutinized and analysed before the conclusion is reached that the
provision is truly mandatory and not merely exhortatory or optative.").
227 ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 215, at 80 (Draft Art.
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The word "way'a in paragraph 1 (a) is not limited to
unilateral action but may also comprise other forms of
conduct available through cooperative action with other
States or through international organizations (for example,
the conservation measures for a fishery taken through the
competent regional fisheries agency). Moreover, the
requirement of necessity is inherent in the plea: any
conduct going beyond what is strictly necessary for the
purpose will not be covered.228
Broad categories of "essential interests" considered by the ILC
in varying degrees include, among others, the existence of the
state, political or economic survival, continued functioning of the
state's essential services, maintenance of internal peace, survival of
a sector of the state's population, and the preservation of the
environment of the state's territory or a part thereof.229
As to the second condition, the ILC emphasized that "the
interest relied on must outweigh all other considerations, not
merely from the point of view of the acting State but on a
reasonable assessment of the competing interests, whether these
are individual or collective." 230 This condition underscores the
higher relative weight of the interest being served by the State act
or measure in question, as opposed to all other interests existing at
the point in time that the act or measure is devised and
implemented.
The joint effect of the positive conditions under Article 25(1) is
to create potentially the most difficult standard for a State to
exculpate itself from responsibility on the ground of necessity.
(Indeed, in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project decision, the
International Court of Justice held that Hungary's claimed concern
for potential ecological impacts arising from the project did not
meet the high objective standard of a "grave and imminent peril"
under Article 25.231 Apart from these positive conditions, however,
Article 25(2) further imposes two separate negative conditions.
2m Id. at 83 (Draft Art. 25, cmt. 15).
229 See Andreas Laursen, The Use of Force and (the State of) Necessity, 37 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 485, 502-03 (2004) (discussing the difficulty the ILC had in trying
to "spell out" and "lay down pre-established categories of interests).
230 ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 215, at 84 (Draft Art.
25, cmt. 17).
231 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.) 1997 I.C.J. 7, 42 (Sept. 25).
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Neither of these conditions should prevail, otherwise, the State
cannot avail of the necessity defense: (1) "the international
obligation in question excludes the possibility of invoking
necessity"; or (2) "the State has contributed to the situation of
necessity." 232
The cumulative result of the above positive and negative
conditions to Article 25 is to make the necessity defence only
narrowly or exceptionally available to States. This was purposely
intended by the ILC when it codified the customary normative
status of necessity in the Draft Articles of State Responsibility,
precisely in order to delimit and prevent the norm from following
the loose contours of the ancient maxim necessitas non habet legem
("Necessity knows no law"), on which States' opposition to the
norm had been based.233 The final "limit" that the ILC set to the
use of necessity defence is found in Article 26 of the Draft Articles
on State Responsibility, which stresses that "[n]othing in this
chapter precludes the wrongfulness of any act of a State which is
not in conformity with an obligation arising under a peremptory
norm of general international law."234
In contrast, however, no such similar conditions can be found
in the one-sentence terminology of Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina
BIT. This implies that the conditions for a treaty party's
application of Article XI are already substantively contained in the
limited classes defined as "necessary" measures (e.g.,
"maintenance of public order", "fulfilment of obligations with
respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or
security", or the "protection of essential security interests"), and
232 ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 215, at 80 (Draft Art.
25).
233 Id. at 80, 83 (Draft Art. 25(2)(a), cmt. 20). The maxim has been ascribed to
a long-standing legal tradition in the English common law, dating back to the
monk Gratian's Decretals of 1140. See also Sarah F. Hill, The 'Necessity Defense' and
the Emerging Arbitral Conflict in its Application to the US-Argentina Bilateral
Investment Treaty, 13 LAW & Bus. REV. AM. 547, 550-57 (2007) (examining the
history and application of the necessity defense). The necessity norm's
application to domestic legal orders (especially criminal law) has also been
attributed to 17th century Western legal philosophers such as Pufendorf and
Antonius Matthius, see Khalid Ghanayim, Excused Necessity in Western Legal
Philosophy, 19 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 31, 35-39 (2006).
234 ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 215, at 84 (Draft Art.
26). For the theory that peremptory norms can also have an 'excusing' effect
when the essential interest of the State involves the protection of peremptory
norms, see Jorge E. Vifiuales, State of Necessity and Peremptory Norms in
International Investment Law, 14 L. & Bus. REV. AM. 79 (2008).
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are thus apparently triggered ipso facto when the State invokes
Article XI. Where a State's act or measure can be subsumed under
any of these categories, all that Article XI indicates is that the State
is "not precluded" by the U.S.-Argentina BIT.
Clearly, there is a gulf between a State's restricted ability to
apply Article 25 to its measure, as opposed to the seemingly more
open capacity of a State to apply Article XI. This difference will
likewise bear upon the effects of, and remedies available, under
each norm.
2.3. Effects and Remedial Consequences
As previously discussed in Section 1, Article 25 characterizes
necessity as a "ground for precluding wrongfulness." The ILC
clarifies that State acts or measures justified under this ground
belong to "those exceptional cases where the only way a State can
safeguard an essential interest threatened by a grave and imminent
peril is, for the time being, not to perform some other international
obligation of lesser weight or urgency."235 In this sense, Article 25
only has a suspensive effect, and one dependent on the relative
weight of the underlying interest served by the State's act or
measure, in relation to other international obligations which a State
has the duty to perform. This view is consistent with Article 27 of
the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, which explicitly states:
The invocation of a circumstance precluding wrongfulness
in accordance with this chapter is without prejudice to:
(a) Compliance with the obligation in question, if and
to the extent that the circumstance precluding
wrongfulness no longer exists;
(b) The question of compensation for any material loss
caused by the act in question.236
The ILC describes Article 27 as a "without prejudice" clause,
where the circumstance precluding wrongfulness "do[es] not as
such affect the underlying obligation, so that if the circumstance no
235 ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 215, at 80 (Draft Art.
25, cmt. 1) (emphasis added).
236 Id. at 85 (Draft Art. 27).
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longer exists the obligation regains full force and effect."2 37 It also
provides for compensation for material loss, so long as "the effect
of the facts which disclose a circumstance precluding wrongfulness
[does not] also give rise to the termination of the [underlying]
obligation." Material loss has been described as a "narrower"
concept than damage, one that "concerns only the adjustment of
losses that may occur when a party relies on a circumstance
covered by chapter V."23
More importantly, the ILC has expressly declared that the plea
of necessity under Article 25 is "not intended to cover conduct
which is in principle regulated by the primary obligations,"
specifically such rules on the use of force and military necessity.
Where a State's conduct is covered by primary obligations,
considerations similar to those underlying Article 25 may be
"taken into account in the context of the formulation and
interpretation of the primary obligations." 239 Thus, in both the
body of its commentary to Article 27 as well as its citation of
authorities (footnotes 406 to 409), the ILC explicitly limited the
237 Id. at 86 (Draft Art. 27, cmt 1). But see Chusei Yamada, Revisiting the
International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility, in
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF TODAY: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF OSCAR SCHACHTER
117,123 (Mauricio Ragazzi ed., 2005).
Draft Article 27 is a "without prejudice" clause and does not give any
answer to the question of compensation. What is the circumstance that
would preclude wrongfulness of a conduct but would not relieve a State
from its responsibility to compensate for the material loss caused by its
conduct? Self-defence would preclude responsibility. Necessity might
not.
Id. (emphasis added).
238 ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 215, at 86 (Draft Art.
27, cmt. 4). See IAN BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: STATE
RESPONSIBILITY, PART 1199 (1983).
Compensation [is] used to describe reparation in the narrow sense of the
payment of money as a "valuation" of the wrong done. Confusion arises
in the case where compensation is paid for a breach of duty which is
actionable without proof of particular items of financial loss, for example
the violation of diplomatic or consular immunities, trespass in the
territorial sea, or illegal arrest of a vessel on the high seas. The award of
compensation for such illegal acts is sometimes described as "moral" or
"political" reparation, terms connected with concepts of "moral" and
"political' injury 
....
Id.
239 ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 215, at 84 (Draft Art.
25, cmt. 20).
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consideration of Article 25 to primary obligations on the use of
force and military necessity.
The burden to prove the applicability of necessity as a ground
precluding wrongfulness thus falls on the State making the
invocation in order to justify an act or measure that patently
breaches other international obligations.240 In any case, the effect of
applying Article 25 is simply to suspend the effectivity of other
international obligations in relation to the questioned act or
measure. When the facts giving rise to the circumstance of
necessity have ceased to exist, the State has the duty to resume
compliance with such other obligations. At any rate, the State is
liable to compensate material losses suffered by any other State
due to the former's non-compliance.
On the other hand, the one-sentence phraseology of Article XI
of the U.S.-Argentina BIT does not contain any definitive text on
the effects of applying Article XI. Other than the clause "[tihis
Treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of measures
necessary... " Article XI does not specify any consequential effect
to "necessary measures" implemented by a treaty party under this
provision. As discussed in Section 1, it was erroneous (and
nowhere borne in the language of Article XI) for the Continental
Tribunal to impute an overriding effect of non-applicability of any
of the substantive obligations of the U.S.-Argentina BIT when
Article XI operates in relation to a State's act or measure. Had the
treaty parties intended this effect, there would have been language
reflecting such intent in the text of Article XI itself, or Item No. 6 of
the Protocol to the U.S.-Argentina BIT which clarified the meaning
to "obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of
international peace or security" under Article XI.241 None of the cases
interpreting Article XI (Sempra, the LG&E cases, the CMS Gas cases,
and Continental) cite any authority or travaux preparatoires to the
U.S.-Argentina BIT supporting the position that Article XI meant
non-applicability of any of the U.S.-Argentina BIT's substantive
obligations, or that "no breach" of a BIT obligation would ever
arise when Article XI was invoked.
Moreover, Article X(b) and X(c) of the U.S.-Argentina BIT
categorically declares that the "Treaty shall not derogate from ... (b)
international legal obligations; or (c) obligations assumed by either
240 See id. at 86 (Draft Art. 27, cmt. 2).
241 U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 14, art. XI.
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Party... "242 A harmonious interpretation of these provisions in
relation to Article XI should militate against reading Article XI as a
blanket 'exception' or 'opt-out' clause to international legal
obligations contained in the U.S.-Argentina BIT. This is consistent
with the presumed binding force of the U.S.-Argentina BIT on both
treaty parties, and their respective duties to perform obligations
contained therein under the general principle of pacta sunt
servanda.243 Derogations for which a party can exclude certain
provisions of a treaty from application for a particular period are
expressly specified in the language of the treaty itself, and are not
to be easily inferred.244
Nor can Article XI be read as authority for suspension of the
operation of the U.S.-Argentina BIT. Article 57 of the VCLT
provides that operation of a treaty may be suspended with respect
to a particular party in two circumstances: (1) "in conformity with
the provisions of the treaty"; or (2) "at any time by consent of all
the parties after consultation with the other contracting States."245
In either case, the party invoking suspension of the treaty's
operation has the express duty to "notify other parties of its claim"
under the procedures set forth in Article 65 of the VCLT.246 The
language of Article XI belies any attempt to construe this provision
as authority for suspension of the U.S.-Argentina BIT. It lacks any
language indicating suspension of the operation of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT, and does not provide for a duty to notify the other
treaty party of such suspension.
Finally, Article XI cannot be read as a reservation to the
substantive obligations of the U.S.-Argentina BIT. Article 2(1)(d) of
the VCLT defines a reservation as "a unilateral statement, however
phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying,
accepting, approving, or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports
to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the
242 U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 14, art. X.
243 See Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 26 ("Every treaty in force is
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed in good faith.").
244 See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 4(3), Dec.
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (requiring States Parties to immediately report
derogations); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 15, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (derogations limited to "to the
extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such
measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law").
245 Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art 57.
246 Id. art. 65.
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treaty in their application to that State." 247 As discussed in Section
1, both the United States and Argentina made their respective
specific reservations to substantive obligations of the treaty in the
Protocol, but did not make any comparable reservations with
respect to "necessary" measures referred to under Article XI of the
U.S.-Argentina BIT. More importantly, extrapolating Article XI as
some form of treaty "reservation" would not meet the test of
compatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty. 248
Permitting the wholesale and indefinite exclusion of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT from applicability with respect to the classes of
"necessary" measures in Article XI would certainly defeat the
treaty's stated purpose of "maintain[ing] a stable framework for
investment and maximum effective use of economic resources."249
Since the language of Article XI cannot be read as a suspension
of, or derogation from, the applicability of the U.S.-Argentina BIT,
nor as a reservation to the latter's substantive obligations, the law
of treaties does not support the Continental Tribunal's
interpretation that Article XI prevents the U.S.-Argentina BIT's
substantive obligations from ever applying to the classes of State
measures indicated in Article XI. Extending the argument further,
it is thus also unwarranted under the law of treaties for the
Continental Tribunal to conclude that where Article XI applies, no
breach of a substantive obligation under the U.S.-Argentina BIT
could ever arise, and consequently, no duty to compensate would
be implicated in the first instance.
2.4. Article 25's Disqualification from Article XI's Range of
Interpretive Sources within Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT
If the treaty applier cannot read into Article XI any authority to
indefinitely suspend, unilaterally modify, impliedly reserve, or
derogate from substantive obligations under the U.S.-Argentina
BIT, what is the legal effect of Article XI? In view of the
interpretive rules under Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT and the
247 Id. art. 2(1)(d).
248 See AUST, supra note 6, at 136-38; Edward T. Swaine, Reserving, 31 YALE J.
INT'L L. 307, 316-17 (2006) (discussing "permissibility" and "opposability"
approaches to state reservations to treaties).
249 U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 14, pmbl. On the trend towards more
concrete intent expressed through bilateral treaties, see Gabriella Blum,
Bilateralism, Multilateralism, and the Architecture of International Law, 49 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 323 (2008) (analyzing preference for bilateral treaties as perceived method of
protecting sovereignty).
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primary mandate to interpret treaties "in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty," 250 the interpretation of Article XI must be contextually-
calibrated with other obligations under the U.S.-Argentina BIT to
give the fullest possible effect to all of its provisions. It has not
been shown in any of the ICSID cases interpreting Article XI that
the United States and Argentina intended a "special meaning" to
the clause, "[tihis Treaty shall not preclude. .. ," as to render the
latter the functional equivalent of non-applicability of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT ("[tihis Treaty shall not apply when...") as the
Continental Tribunal erroneously concluded. The ordinary
meaning of Article XI, coupled with the mandate to give full force
and effect to the entirety of the U.S.-Argentina BIT and interpret
the same in good faith, requires the treaty applier to harmonize
provisions, rather than loosely imputing or assigning textually-
absent legal effects to Article XI such as suspension, modification,
reservation, or derogation from substantive obligations under the
U.S.-Argentina BIT.251
Considering the text of Article XI alongside the structural
design of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, it is proposed that the States
Parties to the U.S.-Argentina BIT could only invoke Article XI
against each other for state responsibility claims deriving from a
breach of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, not to reject the host State's lex
specialis duties spelled out in the U.S.-Argentina BIT as specifically
owed to foreign investors. This differentiated approach adheres to
the classical dichotomy between the "law of the instrument"
(norms and consequences set forth in the treaty terms, to which the
VCLT applies) and the "law of obligation" (obligations created
under the treaty terms as between the state arties, as distinguished
from obligations created under the treaty terms as between the
host state and the investor from the counterpart state party in the
BIT, to which the Articles on State Responsibility and other
applicable norms of general international law apply).2 2 Thus,
when a host State commits a "measure necessary for.., the
Protection of its own essential security interests" under Article XI
250 Vienna Convention, supra note 2, arts. 31-32.
251 See Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.1
(1966), reprinted in [1966] Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 220, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1966 (discussing general principles of treaty interpretation).
252 See SHABTAI ROSENNE, BREACH OF TREATY 3-8 (1985) (developing "law of
the instrument" and "law of obligation" framework).
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of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, it remains liable to observe specific
substantive duties to investors (e.g. the duty to pay compensation
in the event of direct or indirect expropriations defined under
Article IV). However, the host State can invoke Article XI as a
defense against the counterpart State Party's claim of state
responsibility due to any "internationally wrongful acts" that
separately arise in the process of breaching BIT obligations.253
Given the foregoing differentiation, a State party is not
precluded by the U.S.-Argentina BIT from implementing
"necessary measures" as defined under Article XI. However, for
purposes of defending its international responsibility to the other
State Party in the U.S.-Argentina BIT, the extent and duration by
which the host State's measures infringe substantive obligations
would be balanced, on a case-to-case basis, in determining the
qualitative content of compliance that could be reasonably
expected from the host State applying the "necessary measures" in
opposition to such substantive obligations under the
circumstances. In no case, however, would the measure's apparent
infringement or breach of a substantive obligation eliminate lex
specialis duties to investors protected by the BIT, such as the duty
to pay compensation and to comply with BIT obligations. When a
host State implements an NPM under Article XI, it effectively
pleads an adjustment of expectations with respect to the
international obligations owed to the other State Party in the U.S.-
Argentina BIT. It cannot, however, cause exculpation from specific
liability for compensation owed to the foreign investor. This
interpretation appears more consonant with the precise wording of
Article XI.
253 ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 215, at 55 (Draft Art.
12, cmt. 3-4).
It is unnecessary to spell out these possibilities in article 12, since the
responsibility of a State is engaged by the breach of an international
obligation whatever the particular origin of the obligation concerned...
Obligations may arise for a State by a treaty and by a rule of customary
international law or by a treaty and a unilateral act. Moreover, these
various grounds of obligation interact with each other, as practice clearly
shows. Treaties, especially multilateral treaties, can contribute to the
formation of general international law; customary law may assist in the
interpretation of treaties; an obligation contained in a treaty may be
applicable to a State by reason of its unilateral act, and so on.
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This primarily-textualist approach to interpreting the U.S.-
Argentina BIT accords with the unitary system of interpretation
under Article 31 of the VCLT. The formative history of the VCLT
shows that VLCT drafters expressly rejected a proposal (advanced
by U.S. Chief Delegate Myres McDougal) that would vest treaty
interpreters with more discretion to weigh treaty text versus other
extrinsic sources. 254  As the International Court of Justice
previously declared, "the first duty of a tribunal which is called
upon to interpret and apply the provisions of a treaty is to
endeavour to give effect to them in their natural and ordinary
meaning in the context of which they occur." 2 5 The International
Law Commission's 1966 Draft Commentaries to the VCLT also
supports the view that text is the fundamental referent of the treaty
applier, before context and other phenomena that must be taken
together with context.256
To what extent, therefore, could the Article 25 "necessity"
defense be relevant to the interpretation of Article XI? As stated in
Section 1, Article 25 is already textually different from the specific
formulation of Article XI. The preceding subsections in Section 2.
have also shown that there are conceptual-methodological
incongruities and incompatibilities between Article 25 and Article
XI. Article 25 must therefore be ruled out from interpretive
consideration given the unitary system of interpretation in Article
31 of the VCLT. The "necessity" defense under Article 25 cannot
be admitted within the text of the U.S.-Argentina BIT. Nor can it
form part of the context of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, since Article 25
of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility is not an "agreement
relating to the treaty which was made by one or more of the parties
254 Conference on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, Austria, Mar. 26-May 24, 1968,
Official Records, First Session, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/11 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna
Conference 1]; Conference on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, Austria, Apr. 9-May 22,
1969, Official Records, Second Session, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/11/Add.1 (1970).
255 Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the
United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 4,8 (Mar. 3).
256 ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, supra note 7, at 220 (emphasis
added).
Once it is established-and on this point the Commission was
unanimous-that the starting point of interpretation is the meaning of
the text, logic indicates that 'the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose' should be the first element to be mentioned.
Id. (emphasis added).
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in connection with the conclusion of the treaty." 257 Nor is Article
25 an "instrument which was made by one or more parties in
connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the
other parties as an instrument related to the treaty."25 8 For obvious
reasons, the ILC's Draft Articles on State Responsibility cannot be
treated as a "subsequent agreement" by the United States and
Argentina regarding the interpretation or application of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT. 259
At best, Article 25 can only be accepted as an interpretive tool
under Article 31 of the VCLT as a "relevant rule of international
law." Given the previously-discussed incongruities between
Article 25 and Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, however, the
precise 'relevance' of Article 25 to interpreting Article XI is highly
doubtful. Admitting Article 25 as a "relevant rule of international
law" for interpreting Article XI, notwithstanding the conceptual-
methodological incongruities between these norms, still would not
bolster the Continental Tribunal's interpretive conclusions on the
legal consequences of Article XI. If anything, admitting Article 25
as a "relevant rule of international law" would have the opposite
effect. Article 25 is textually and historically a more exacting and
stringent normative standard than Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina
BIT. And yet, Article 27 (in relation to Article 25) of the Draft
Articles on State Responsibility still recognizes that the State
invoking the circumstance precluding wrongfulness has the duty
of compliance upon cessation of the facts giving rise to the
circumstance, as well as the duty to pay compensation for material
losses suffered by other States. If the stricter standard (Article 25)
already imposes these duties upon the State invoking such
standard, it is not unlikely that similar concomitant duties can
likewise be imposed in relation to a less rigorously-formulated
standard (Article XI). Under this syllogism, the Continental
Tribunal's conclusion that there is no duty to compensate when
Article XI applies should fail.
Before Article 25 can be taken as a "relevant rule of
international law" to interpreting Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina
BIT, however, Article 31(3) of the VCLT requires that this rule be
257 Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 31(a).
258 Id. art. 31(2)(b).
259 See Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United State Relating to
International Law, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 873, 887 (2001) (discussing U.S. position on
subsequent agreements in international trade litigation).
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"taken together with the context." 260 This implies that there should
be a separate showing of a linkage or nexus between Article 25 of
the Draft Articles on State Responsibility and the context of the
treaty (composed of the text of the treaty, agreements made by the
parties in connection with its conclusion, or instruments made by
the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty) in
determining the relevance of a rule of international law as part of
the unitary system of interpretation under Article 31 of the
VCLT.261 As previously discussed, no such linkage or nexus can be
seen from the text of Article XI, the Protocol to the U.S.-Argentina
BIT, or the drafting history of the U.S.-Argentina BIT. Considering
that the text of Article XI appears silent on any supposed intent of
the parties to consider Article 25, and the earlier-demonstrated
conceptual-methodological incompatibilities between Article 25
and Article XI, it is plausible to conclude that Article 25 does not
constitute a "relevant rule of international law" under Article 31(3)
of the VCLT, for purposes of interpreting Article XI of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT.
Short of a clearly expressed intent of the parties to the U.S.-
Argentina BIT to include Article 25 within the range of interpretive
sources collectively regarded by the treaty applier in the unitary
system of interpretation of Article 31 of the VCLT, can Article 25
nevertheless serve as a "supplementary means of interpretation"
under Article 32 of the VCLT? To recall, despite the Continental
Tribunal's insistence that it regarded Article XI disjunctively from
Article 25, the Tribunal's flow of reasoning in the Continental
Award still evinced a pattern of treating Article 25 as a
supplementary means of interpreting Article XI.262
The supplementary reference to Article 25 in interpreting
Article XI, however, should still abide by the rules for
supplementary means of interpretation under Article 32 of the
VCLT. It was not shown in the Continental Award that the
requisites of Article 32 of the VCLT had been met. In the first
place, Article 25 cannot be used as a supplementary means of
interpretation because it cannot "confirm the meaning resulting
from the application of Article 31 [of the VCLT]." The conceptual-
260 Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 31(3).
261 IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 118, 130-
38 (2d ed. 1984).
262 Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9 paras. 175, 190-
91 (Sept. 5, 2008).
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methodological incongruities between Article 25 and Article XI
negate Article 25's capacity to confirm meaning resulting from the
application of text, context, and other phenomena (such as
subsequent practice or agreement, and relevant rules of
international law) relating to Article XI.
Second, Article 25 cannot be used as a supplementary means of
interpretation under Article 32 in the determinative sense, since it
has not been shown that an interpretation of Article XI under the
unitary system of Article 31 of the VCLT (text, context, other
phenomena) "leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure," or
"leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable." 263
In fact, the stark flaw in the Continental Award stems from the
Tribunal's imputation of legal consequences (e.g. suspension or
modification of, or derogation from, substantive obligations of the
U.S.-Argentina BIT) that were not found in the text of Article XI or
elsewhere in the U.S.-Argentina BIT. The Continental Tribunal did
not show that the systematic consideration of Article XI's text,
context, subsequent agreement or practice of the United States and
Argentina, or relevant rules of international law, resulted in
ambiguity, obscurity, or manifestly absurd or unreasonable results.
As the treaty applier making use of Article 25 as a supplementary
means of interpretation, the Continental Tribunal failed to meet the
threshold requirements of Article 32 of the VCLT.
The "necessity" defense under Article 25 of the Draft Articles of
State Responsibility does not furnish a useful interpretive tool for
Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT. Article 25 bears no textual
linkage to Article XI, and there is no evidence that the parties to the
U.S.-Argentina BIT and its Protocol ever intended for the language
of Article XI to reflect the customary international law necessity
defense. In this sense, while it has been argued that Article 31(3) of
the VCLT gives room for a narrow proposition that the evolution
and development of law can be taken into account in interpreting a
treaty, it must first be shown that the "very nature [of the terms of
the treaty are] expressed in such general terms as to lend
themselves to an evolutionary approach."264 There is no such
showing in Article XI.
Nor has it been shown that the "necessity" defense under
customary international law was operationalized in other
263 Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 32.
264 TASLIM 0. ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES 140 (1974).
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contextual phenomena such as agreements or instruments relating
to the U.S.-Argentina BIT. Finally, it has not been shown among
the travaux preparatoires to the U.S.-Argentina BIT that the parties
even contemplated the "necessity" defense under customary
international law when they formulated the precise phraseology of
Article XI. Clearly, the varying degrees of conflation of Article 25
and Article XI across the ICSID awards in Sempra, LG & E, CMS
Gas, and most recently, Continental, are superfluous to the process
of decision-making. Article 25 unduly complicates, and does not
illuminate, the discursive formulation of Article XI.
3. ARTICLE XI (LEX SPECIALIS) AS THE EXCLUSIVE CHOICE OF LAW,
UNLESS OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN THE TREATY TEXT
The Sempra, LG&E, CMS Gas and Continental cases illustrate a
threshold problem for the treaty applier: sin determining meaning
under Article XI, to what extent is it acceptable to refer to sources
external to the treaty text? And if referring to external sources,
what internal criteria makes these particular sources controlling for
the treaty applier? Sempra represents one end of the spectrum of
choices, where the Tribunal as treaty applier completely relied on
Article 25 as the controlling external source to interpret Article
XI.265 The LG&E Tribunal referred to Article 25 only to support its
a priori analysis of Article XI's meaning. 266 The Tribunal in the
CMS Gas Tribunal did not accept all elements of Article 25, but
instead, only imported one element of the concept of "necessity"
under Article 25 to characterize the supposed structural design of
the U.S.-Argentina BIT, and ultimately to draw a broad
interpretation of Article XI that includes the concept of economic
emergencies. 267 The other end of the spectrum (where the treaty
applier chose not to rely on Article 25 as a controlling external
source to interpret Article XI) could be seen from the Ad Hoc
Committee's Decision on Application for Annulment in CMS Gas.
In CMS Gas, however, while the Ad Hoc Committee noted
conceptual distinctions between Article 25 and Article XI as to
substantive content, operation, and effects, the Committee was also
265 Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, paras.
375-76 (Sept. 28, 2007).
266 LG&E Energy Corporation v. Argentina, Decision on Liability, ICSID Case
No. ARB/02/1, para. 245 (Oct. 3, 2006).
267 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/8, paras. 357-60 (May 11, 2005).
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the first to make the problematic interpretation- without citing
any legal authorities -that the U.S.-Argentina BIT's substantive
obligations could not apply alongside Article XI if the latter is
properly invoked. Simply put, for the Ad Hoc Committee, the
applicability of Article XI removes the questioned act or measure
of a State from the scope of substantive obligations throughout the
rest of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.268
Under its more controversial methodology, the Continental
Award treads both ends of the spectrum of choices available to the
treaty applier. While the Continental Tribunal acknowledged the
conceptual distinctions between Article 25 and Article XI explained
by the Ad Hoc Committee in CMS Gas, the Tribunal nevertheless
latently referred to Article 25 in a "supplementary" sense to
support its choice of a broad definition of "essential security
interests" in Article XI.269 The Continental Tribunal then adopted a
Sempra-like approach by completely relying on external sources
from different legal regimes, as when it introduced WTO and
GATT law as 'controlling' legal authorities for infusing substantive
meaning to Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.270
As Section l's critical survey has shown, the tribunals as treaty
appliers in the Sempra, LG&E, CMS Gas, and Continental cases faced
the threshold question on the use of external sources without
explaining how their respective methodologies could be justified
under the system of unitary interpretation in Article 31 of the
VCLT, or the rules on supplementary means of interpretation
under Article 32 of the VCLT. All of the Tribunals in these cases
made choices on the extent to which they would rely on an
external source (Article 25), based on another legal regime
(customary law as codified by the Draft Articles on State
Responsibility), without an adequate explanation for these choices
in the reasoning of each respective Award. Instead, what appears
implicit from the manner by which the Tribunals disposed of their
methodological choices is that the "necessity" defense under
Article 25 was already assumed to have some form of relationship
or nexus to Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT. All of the Awards
268 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, Decision on
Annulment, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, paras. 129-136 (Sept. 25, 2007).
269 Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, paras.
164, 175, 180, 190-91 (Sept. 5, 2008).
270 Id. para. 192.
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interpreting Article XI to date have carried this assumption in
varying degrees, without sufficiently explaining why.
Clearly, there is a need to return to fundamental dynamics
under the law of treaties. To avoid the criticism that treaty
appliers' problematic choices of law (and their accompanying
interpretive methodologies) thwart the stability of decisionmaking
and the rule of law in the international legal order, 271 it is
imperative that future tribunals interpreting Article XI (or other
similarly-worded BIT clauses) make a clear preliminary statement
of their choice of law that explains the tribunal's internal criteria on
how it employs external sources to derive treaty meanings. Unless
there is clear textual support in the treaty language that
incorporates the customary doctrine of "necessity" under Article
25, the choice of law should exclusively be the treaty provision
stipulating non-precluded measures (e.g., Article XI in the U.S.-
Argentina BIT) in relation to the elements of the unitary system of
interpretation found in Article 31 of the VCLT. Regarding the
specific case of Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, however, the
inevitable choice of law should purely be Article XI. Based on
Section 2's discussion of conceptual-methodological
incompatibilities between Article 25 and Article XI, Sections 1 and
2 have shown that Article XI's textual formulation does not show
that the parties to the U.S.-Argentina BIT intended to incorporate
the customary doctrine of "necessity." However, the text of other
BIT clauses on similar non-precluded measures could foreseeably
provide this nexus. For these cases, treaty appliers must therefore
make methodological choices within the framework of Articles 31
and 32 of VCLT, and refer to the customary doctrine of "necessity"
only when the treaty text indicates the parties' intent to incorporate
this customary norm.
The following two subsections of this Article show that the
normative choices involving Article 25 and Article XI inherently
constitute a basic conflict of norms for the treaty applier. As a
corollary to this basic conflicts, the manner in which treaty appliers
resolve this conflict will frame their view of the duties of a host
State invoking Article XI both at the time of investment as well as
subsequent to the implementation of the act or measure under
271 A recent empirical survey of ICSID decisions observes that ICSID
tribunals make interpretive arguments in a manner "that is quite far removed
from the structures set out in Articles 31-32 of the VCLT." Fauchald, supra note
12, at 358-59.
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Article XI, the quantum of evidence they will require from a host
State to prove Article XI's applicability to the host State's act or
measure, and to what degree the host State has a margin of
appreciation in determining "essential security interests" under
Article XI, and the extent to which the host State's act or measure
appears "reasonable" or "proportional" in relation to adjusting
compensation claims brought under the U.S.-Argentina BIT.
Section 3.1 looks to the treaty applier's theoretical considerations in
resolving the conflict of norms, while Section 3.2 applies the
theoretical considerations to tentatively propose functional
guideposts to interpreting Article XI (and other similarly-worded
treaty clauses) in the future. By returning to the fundamental
interpretive rules in Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT, the author
hopes that future decision-making on Article XI-type clauses will
become more methodologically-transparent and outcome-
predictive.
3.1. Article XI as Lex Specialis vis-a-vis Article 25
At first glance, the treaty applier's interpretive choices on
Article XI and Article 25 do not appear to represent a real
normative conflict. The traditional formulation of a conflict is
captured by Wilfred Jenks' classical 1953 treatise: "A conflict in the
strict sense of direct incompatibility arises only where a party to a
treaty cannot simultaneously comply with its obligations under
both treaties."272
The foregoing definition implies that "the norms are mutually
exclusive; they cannot coexist in a legal order. Compliance with
one norm entails non-compliance with the other."273 Under this
formulation, there does not appear to be a direct conflict between
Article XI and Article 25. A State's ipso facto implementation of an
act or measure encompassed by the classes of "necessary"
measures under Article XI will not, on its face, breach Article 25.
Rather, as discussed in Section 2, the conceptual-methodological
incompatibilities between Article XI and Article 25 make the case
for separating one norm from the other. The applicability of
Article XI can thus be conceptually divided from the issue of
compliance with Article 25. A further point that favors conceptual
272 Wilfred Jenks, The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 401,
426 (1953).
273 SEYED ALI SADAT AKHAVI, METHODS OF RESOLVING CoNFLicTS BETWEEN
TREATIES 5 (2003).
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separation is the language of Article XI ("This Treaty shall not
preclude the application by either Party of measures
necessary..."), which appears permissive, rather than prohibitory,
of certain types of State actions or measures. It does not appear
that conduct permitted under Article XI is conversely prohibited
under Article 25.274
However, as the Sempra, LG&E, CMS Gas, and Continental cases
have shown there is an interpretive conflict between an exclusive
consideration of Article XI within the confines of conventional law
and a blended interpretation of Article XI involving the customary
doctrine of "necessity" in Article 25. In its 2006 report, the
International Law Commission's Study Group on the
Fragmentation of International Law defined a "relationship of
interpretation" as the case "where one norm assists in the
interpretation of another. A norm may assist in the interpretation
of another norm for example as an application, clarification,
updating, or modification of the latter. In such a situation, both
norms are applied in conjunction."275 Considering the conceptual-
methodological incompatibilities between Article 25 and Article XI
discussed in Section 2, it cannot be said that the customary doctrine
of "necessity" codified under Article 25 could bear such a
"relationship of interpretation" to Article XI, more so where the
text and drafting history of Article XI do not show that the parties
to the U.S.-Argentina BIT intended such a relationship. As such,
what subsists for the treaty applier in considering Article XI vis-A-
vis Article 25 is a "relationship of conflict," defined by the ILC as
the case "where two norms that are both valid and applicable point
to incompatible decisions so that a choice must be made between
them. The basic rules concerning the resolution of normative
conflicts are to be found in the VCLT." 276 The ILC stresses the
importance of following the framework of treaty interpretation
under Articles 31-33 of the VCLT, and states that harmonization is
274 See Erich Vranes, The Definition of 'Norm Conflict' in International Law and
Legal Theory, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 395, 404-05 (2006) (questioning narrow definition of
normative conflicts).
275 Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly,
Conclusions of the Work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law:
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, U.N.
Doc. A/61/10, reprinted in [2006] 2 Y.B. Intl' L. Comrnm'n, U.N. Doc. A/61/10,
available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft
%20articles/1_9_2006.pdf [hereinafter ILC, Conclusions].
276 Id. § 1(2).
20101
U. Pa. J. Int'l. L.
a "generally accepted principle" where, "when several norms bear
on a single issue they should, to the extent possible, be interpreted
so as to give rise to a single set of compatible obligations." 277
The interpretive issue for the treaty applier in regard to Article
XI, therefore, is one of priority between the lex specialis standard
(Article XI) and a customary norm (the defense of "necessity"
codified under Article 25). Under the maxim lex specialis derogat
legi generali, priority among norms dealing with the same subject
matter should be given to the norm that is more specific, even
where the norms involve treaty and non-treaty standards (such as
custom, in this case).278 According to the ILC, the rationale for this
principle is that the special law, "being more concrete, often takes
better account of the particular features of the context in which it is
to be applied than any applicable general law. Its application may
also often create a more equitable result and it may often better
reflect the intent of the legal subjects."279
The same may be said of Article XI. Treaty appliers of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT are better advised to first examine the entire text
and structural design of the U.S.-Argentina BIT and the obligations
contained therein when they endeavor to derive the meaning and
legal consequences to Article XI, instead of immediately reaching
for external sources (such as the doctrine of "necessity" codified
under Article 25, or, in the Continental Award, GATT and WTO
jurisprudence relating to Article XX of GATT 1947) that do not
appear to have been foremost (if ever) in the consideration of the
treaty drafters. Straining to infuse substantive content to Article
XI, when the treaty drafting history or travaux preparatoires do not
indicate consideration of the customary doctrine of "necessity" in
the first place, is a precipitate exercise that creates the appearance
of arbitrariness in international decision-making. Regrettably, the
Sempra, LG&E, CMS Gas, or Continental awards did not pay
thorough attention to the full text and structural design of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT in interpreting Article XI. While it is certainly
arguable that the majority of these decisions reached the correct
result (more on factual grounds), treaty appliers' interpretive
methodologies should not be masked in obscurity.
It is also important to consider that the entirety of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT constitutes a "special regime" that is itself lex
277 Id. § 1(4).
278 AKHAVI, supra note 273, at 101-03.
279 ILC, Conclusions, supra note 275, § 2(7).
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specialis. The ILC defines a "special regime" as a "group of rules
and principles concerned with a particular subject matter [that]
often have their own institutions to administer the relevant
rules" 280 and usually fall under one of three types: (1) one where
"a violation of a particular group of (primary) rules is accompanied
by a special set of (secondary) rules concerning breach and
reactions to breach"; (2) one formed by "a set of special rules,
including rights and obligations, relating to a special subject
matter"; or (3) one where "all the rules and principles that regulate
a certain problem area are collected together."2M  The U.S.-
Argentina BIT fits within the first two types of special regimes. It
is specifically intended by the parties to promote greater economic
cooperation and investment between them, based on fair and
equitable treatment and under a stable legal framework that
encourages reciprocal protection of investment.282  It contains
special rules governing rights and obligations of the host State and
investors from the treaty parties in relation to their respective
investments. More importantly, it provides various anticipatory
and remedial mechanisms for breach of substantive obligations: (1)
reservation of the right to deny advantages of the treaty in third-
party control situations; 283 (2) the right to make exceptions to
national treatment, subject to duties of notification;284 (3) dispute
resolution mechanisms, along with the duty to promptly consult
and discuss matters relating to interpretation or application of the
treaty;285 (4) in case of direct or indirect expropriation or
nationalization, the duty to pay prompt, adequate, and effective
compensation (specifically defined as the "fair market value of the
expropriated investment immediately before the expropriatory
action was taken or became known, whichever is earlier...
includ[ing] interest at a commercially reasonable rate from the date
of expropriation"; 286 (5) for nationals or companies of either party
whose investment has been partly or wholly expropriated, the
right to prompt review by appropriate judicial or administrative
280 Id. § 2(11).
281 Id § 2(12).
282 U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 14, pmbl.
283 Id. art. 1(2) (relating to art. IH(9).
284 Id. art. 11(1) (relating to the Protocol to the U.S.-Argentina BIT).
285 Id. arts. VI-VIII.
286 Id. art. IV(1).
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authorities; 2 7 and (6) the right to terminate the treaty after written
notice to the other party.288
Thus, when the Continental Tribunal interpreted Article XI to
mean that none of the substantive obligations of the U.S.-Argentina
BIT would ever apply when a State act or measure is covered by
Article XI, the Tribunal made an interpretive choice automatically
rejecting the entire lex specialis that is the U.S.-Argentina BIT. As
previously discussed in Section 1.4, the Tribunal did not cite
authorities supporting this interpretation other than the Ad Hoc
Committee Decision in CMS Gas (which, likewise, did not cite any
legal authority for this position). To reiterate, the text of Article XI
does not favor giving this drastic effect of suspension,
modification, or termination of obligations under the U.S.-
Argentina BIT. Nowhere in the Tribunal's reasoning in the
Continental Award were there legal reasons furnished for the
sweeping rejection of lex specialis substantive obligations.
As discussed in Section 2.4, the more cogent approach to
interpreting Article XI as the lex specialis lies mainly with the tenets
of harmonization that the ILC has already explicated in its 2006
Report. Accordingly, treaty appliers should look to the ordinary
meaning of the text of Article XI in relation to the other substantive
provisions of the U.S.-Argentina BIT. (As discussed in Section 2.4,
suspension of substantive obligations does not appear to have
textual support from Article XI in relation to the rest of the
provisions of the U.S.-Argentina BIT). They should likewise be
mindful of the object and purpose of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, which
is to provide a stable framework for investment that encourages
reciprocal protection among parties and their respective investors.
A textually-unsupported, blanket and indefinite exclusion of a
State act or measure under Article XI from the substantive
obligations of the U.S.-Argentina BIT does not advance, and
instead defeats, this object and purpose. To reiterate, the
interpretation that better harmonizes Article XI within the
overriding framework and structural design of lex specialis
obligations in the U.S.-Argentina BIT is to treat Article XI as a
defense pleaded by a host State, when its BIT counterpart State
Party raises separate claims of international responsibility arising
287 Id. art. IV(2).
288 Id. art. XIV(2).
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from the continuum of operative acts that gave rise to breaches of
BIT obligations.
That said, it is difficult to offer an immutable a priori
interpretation of the one-sentence formulation of Article XI without
considering actual factual circumstances giving rise to the legal
standards contained in Article XI. Determining whether a State act
or measure is "necessary" under Article XI for being one that
involves the "maintenance of public order," "the fulfilment of
obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of
international peace or security," or the "protection of essential
interests," involves the treaty applier's appreciation of the factual
circumstances that approximate these legal standards. Factual
phenomena must be carefully calibrated with legal norms.289 In
this process of normative conflict-resolution and interpretation, the
treaty applier should openly justify his or her interpretive
methodology within the governing dynamics of Articles 31 and 32
of the VCLT. This justification is clearly lacking from the decisions
in Sempra, LG&E, CMS Gas, and Continental, and largely accounts
for the conceptually-problematic transposition of meaning and
legal effect from the customary doctrine of "necessity" under
Article 25 to Article XI.
It is only by treating the entirety of the U.S.-Argentina BIT as
the governing lex specialis that the treaty applier could reach the
"more equitable result" to rationalize interpretation. This means
that even with the applicability of Article XI, the U.S.-Argentina
BIT remains in force, and the host State retains its duties both to
the investor and its counterpart State Party in the U.S.-Argentina
BIT. If there are breaches of substantive obligations under the U.S.-
Argentina BIT arising from the State's act or measure under Article
XI, it is for the treaty applier to distinguish modalities of
responsibility to the investor and the counterpart State Party.
Article XI can only be used by the treaty applier to adjudicate state
responsibility, and accordingly calibrate the reasonability of the
State's (non)compliance with other substantive duties, such as the
injured State's rights under general international law to
compensation and to exact performance of treaty obligations. On
the other hand, Article XI cannot be used to deny liability to an
9 See generally JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS:
CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg
trans., MIT Press 1998) (providing a sociologically informed conceptualization of
law and basic rights).
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investor for compensation for direct or indirect expropriations
under the U.S.-Argentina BIT, or even for damages in the case of
"unlawful expropriations." 290
As the Sempra, LG&E, CMS Gas and Continental cases show, a
State's invocation of Article XI does not escape review under the
same dispute resolution mechanisms provided for in the U.S.-
Argentina BIT.291 This balancing role of adjudication, under a
setting of methodological openness, is precisely what makes treaty
interpretation "to some extent an art, not an exact science." 292
3.2. Possible Guideposts for Consideration in Article XI Interpretation
Without the facts of actual cases or controversies, it is difficult
to definitively interpret Article XI (and similarly-worded treaty
provisions on non-precluded measures). As discussed in the
previous subsection, the treaty applier assumes the task of
calibrating Article XI alongside the rest of the provisions of the
U.S.-Argentina BIT in determining the qualitative level of
compliance to be observed by the host State invoking Article XI,
only as against its counterpart State Party.
The choice of the lex specialis (Article XI) as the exclusive
operative norm (and devoid of the infusion of substantive content
from the customary doctrine of "necessity" under Article 25),
however, raises several preliminary considerations for the treaty
applier in future interpretive applications of Article XI. At the very
least, the treaty applier's choice of the lex specialis should affect the
complexion of other interrelated aspects of adjudication when a
State undertakes an Article XI-type act or measure.
The first aspect involves the treaty applier's perspective on the
duties of the host State, both at the time the investment was
entered into, and at the time the State implements an act or
measure under the rubric of the "necessity" defense. As seen in
the Sempra, LG&E, CMS Gas, and Continental awards, Argentina
invoked the customary defense of "necessity" in relation to Article
290 Reisman, supra note 211, at 61. See ADC Affiliate Ltd. v. Hungary, Final
Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16, paras. 480-85 (Oct. 2, 2006) (laying out the
applicable standard for assessing damages).
291 The fact that ICSID Tribunals chose to accept jurisdiction and exercise
their respective competencies over the disputes in these cases only underscores
that the U.S.-Argentina BIT was not suspended, modified, or terminated by
Argentina's invocation of Article XI.
292 ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, supra note 7, at 218.
[Vol. 31:3
NON-PRECLUDED MEASURES IN BITs
XI in order to plead release from its BIT obligations to observe fair
and equitable treatment, full protection or security of investment,
and the most favored nation clause, as well as to pay compensation
for acts of expropriation.
However, Article 55 of the Draft Articles on State
Responsibility clearly states that the lex specialis alone controls
"where the conditions for the existence of an internationally
wrongful act or the content or implementation of the international
responsibility of a State are governed by special rules of
international law." 293 Since the various provisions of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT themselves contain the conditions for determining
the existence of a breach, and subsequently, the content of the
State's international responsibility, the treaty applier's
determination of the duties of the host State should be relatively
straightforward. Thus, at the time that the investment is entered
into, the host State has positive duties, among others, to: (1)
"permit and treat investment, and activities associated therewith,
on a basis no less favorable than that accorded in like situations to
investment or associated activities of its own nationals or
companies" (national treatment);294 (2) "at all times accord [the
investment] fair and equitable treatment," where the investment
shall "enjoy full protection and security and shall in no case be
accorded treatment less than that required by international law"
(fair and equitable treatment);295 (3) "observe any obligation it may
have entered into with regard to investments" (umbrella clause);296
(4) permit nationals of either party to "enter and remain in the
territory of the other Party for the purpose of establishing,
developing, administering or advising on the operation of an
investment" (entry into territory);297 (5) permit companies making
the investment "to engage top managerial personnel of their
choice, regardless of nationality" (choice of management);298 and
(6) provide an open regulatory framework that does "not impair
the substance of any of the rights set forth in this Treaty," with
293 ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 215, at 140 (Draft
art. 55).
294 U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 14, art. H(1).
295 Id. arts. II(2)(a), XII(1).
296 Id. art. II(2)(c).
297 Id. art. 11(3).
298 Id. art. 11(4).
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access to effective means of remedial redress and enforcement of
investor rights (assertion of claims and enforcement of rights).299
Subsequent to the entry of the investment, the U.S.-Argentina
BIT stipulates negative duties, among others, for host States
designed to ensure investor protection: (1) non-impairment of the
management, operation, maintenance, use, enjoyment, acquisition,
expansion, or disposal of investments through arbitrary or
discriminatory measures (non-impairment through arbitrary or
discriminatory measures);300 (2) prohibition against direct or
indirect expropriation or nationalization, except for a public
purpose, in a non-discriminatory manner, upon payment of
prompt, adequate and effective compensation, and in accordance
with due process of law and the general principles of treatment
provided for in Article 11(2) (expropriation);301 and (3) prohibition
against delay or obstruction of transfers related to an investment
(transfers).30 2 Finally, the U.S.-Argentina BIT expressly provides for
resort to consultation, negotiation, and failing these procedures,
binding arbitration, in the event that an investment dispute arises.
Considering the totality of all of positive and negative duties of the
host State in the lex specialis regime of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, the
treaty applier should be able to weigh the host State's factual
compliance with these duties alongside the "permissive" language
of measures under Article XI. To a lesser extent, this was
undertaken by the ICSID Tribunals in the Sempra, LG&E, and CMS
Gas cases, where the Tribunals commonly accorded considerable
weight to Argentina's specific guarantees in the Licenses to the oil
distribution/utilities sectors to characterize Argentina's heavier
duties as a host State in relation to these sectors, as against
Argentina's permissive authority under Article XI to implement
general emergency measures during the Argentine financial crisis.
This can be distinguished from the facts in Continental, which did
not contain similar industry-specific guarantees at the time the
investment was made.
Precisely because the body of lex specialis alone under the U.S.-
Argentina BIT controls the treaty applier's perspective on the
duties of the host State, the treaty applier can undertake an
informed process of balancing qualitative compliance with such
299 Id. arts. 11(6), 11(7), Il.
300 Id. art. II(2)(b).
301 Id. art. IV(1).
302 Id. art. V.
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duties alongside the "permissive" conduct of non-precluded
measures contemplated in Article XI. It is only when the treaty
applier arbitrarily infuses the customary doctrine of "necessity"
under Article 25 (which, as previously discussed, is conceptually
and methodologically incompatible with Article XI) to provide
substantive content that the topography of host State duties
becomes inconsistent and incoherent. As shown in Part 2 the
treaty applier's balancing task becomes complicated with this
needless merger of different (and clearly incompatible) normative
legal regimes.303
The second aspect involves the question of evidence. When the
treaty applier focuses on lex specialis alone (e.g. the U.S.-Argentina
BIT, since, as previously shown, the customary defense of
"necessity" cannot be treated as an applicable rule of international
law) 304, what quantum of evidence will suffice to show that a host
State's act or measure is properly encompassed within any of the
three classes of "necessary" measures under Article XI? To what
extent, if at all, will the treaty applier defer to the host State's
discretion in determining that a measure serves the "maintenance
of public order," "fulfilment of obligations with respect to the
maintenance of international peace or security," or "the protection
of essential security interests"? Again, a deeper consideration of
303 See Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire's New Clothes: Political
Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law, 60 STAN. L. REV. 595 (2007);
International Law Commission, supra note 215, at 140 (Draft Art. 55).
It will depend on the special rule to establish the extent to which the
more general rules on State responsibility set out in the present articles
are displaced by that rule. In some cases, it will be clear from the
language of a treaty or other text that only the consequences specified are
to flow. Where that is so, the consequence will be "determined" by the
special rule and the principle embodied in article 55 will apply. In other
cases, one aspect of the general law may be modified, leaving other
aspects still applicable....
For the lex specialis principle to apply it is not enough that the same
subject matter is dealt with by two provisions; there must be some actual
inconsistency between them, or else a discernible intention that one
provision is to exclude the other.
Id. (emphasis added).
304 See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States
and Nationals of Other States art. 42(1), Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S.
159 ("The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may
be agreed by the parties...") (emphasis added).
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lex specialis as a whole should guide the treaty applier's evidentiary
considerations.
It may be recalled that in Sempra, LG & E, CMS Gas, as well as
Continental, the ICSID Tribunals were careful to assert that they
were not substituting their own judgment for the economic policy
and financial judgment of the Argentine government. However, it
is clear that the burden of proof for proving the applicability of
Article XI to its Capital Control Regime measures lay with
Argentina, who had invoked this treaty provision. This initial
assignment of probative burden is consistent with the broad
general rule in international tribunals that "the burden of proof
rests upon him who asserts the affirmative of a proposition that if
not substantiated will result in a decision adverse to his
contention." 305
The quantum of evidence exacted by the ICSID Tribunals in
Sempra, LG&E, CMS Gas, and Continental cases inevitably
depended on the Tribunals' respective qualitative appreciation of
the legal standards306 "maintenance of public order," "fulfilment of
obligations with respect to the maintenance of international peace
or security," or "the protection of essential security interests,"
juxtaposed with the overall design and structure of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT. In Sempra, the Tribunal restated the object and
purpose of the U.S.-Argentina BIT before accepting economic
emergencies as reasonably within the standard of "essential
security interests."307 Similar reasoning was employed by the
Tribunal in LG&E, although it held that Argentina was liable for
compensation "once the state of necessity was over."30 8 The CMS
305 DURWARD V. SANDIFER, EVIDENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 127
(Univ. of Virginia Press, revised ed., 1975); See MOJTABA KAZAZI, BURDEN OF PROOF
AND RELATED ISSUES: A STUDY ON EVIDENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 369
(1996) (explaining that the party who makes allegations regarding a disputed fact
or issue bears the burden of proving such fact or issue).
306 Notably, the Tribunals made varying degrees of comparative legal
analysis, particularly in explaining the content of "public order" in relation to the
Spanish orden publico and the French ordre publique. This method of comparative
law reference has been observed as a common methodological phenomenon in
international arbitration. See Frederic Gilles Sourgens, Comparative Law as Rhetoric:
An Analysis of the Use of Comparative Law in International Arbitration, 8 PEPP. DisP.
RESOL. L.J. 1 (2007) (noting the frequent use of comparative law in arbitral
rhetoric).
307 Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16,
para. 139 (Sept. 28, 2007).
30 LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on
Liability para. 265 (Oct. 3, 2006).
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Gas Tribunal followed the same broad interpretation of "essential
security interests" and found the existence of a state of necessity,
but held that Argentina had a duty to compensate that was
analogous to the material loss liability provision in Article 27 of the
Articles on State Responsibility. 3 9 Finally, as previously discussed,
the Continental Tribunal determined the existence of "essential
security interests" triggering Article XI under a different (and
lower) threshold driven by GATT and WTO jurisprudence in
relation to Article XX of GATT 1947.310
As has been argued throughout this Article, however, the
qualitative appreciation of legal standards in Article XI cannot be
divorced from a holistic consideration of the text, design, and
structure of the U.S.-Argentina BIT. While the factual
circumstances of the Argentine economic crisis considered by the
ICSID Tribunals in Sempra, LG&E, CMS Gas, and Continental
appear to be reasonably embraced within the concept of "essential
security interests," what remains in dispute is the legal effect
attached by each of these Tribunals to "non-preclusion" under
Article XI. In this case, Argentina ought to have been assigned the
heavier burden of proof to show that the legal effect of non-
preclusion was (as it indeed claimed) outright exculpation from
liability under the rest of the substantive obligations of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT. Considering that the text of Article XI nowhere
provided for this asserted legal effect, the Continental Tribunal (and
likewise, the Ad Hoc Committee in CMS Gas) should have required
evidence from Argentina, who was stating the affirmative
proposition on Article XI's supposed legal effect. Otherwise, the
reasonable inference drawn from the text of Article XI, as well as
the object and purpose of the parties in entering into the U.S.-
Argentina BIT, would be to ensure that the substantive obligations
of the treaty would remain binding and in force. Exceptions to
substantive coverage ought not to be lightly assumed.311
To a considerable extent, the Tribunals in Sempra, LG& E, CMS
Gas, and Continental observed this method of allocation of the
39 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8,
Award, paras. 383-94 (May 12, 2005).
310 Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award,
para. 192 (Sept. 5, 2008).
311 See Charles N. Brower, Evidence Before International Tribunals: The Need for
Some Standard Rules, 28 INT'L LAW. 47 (1994) (arguing that international tribunals
are poorly equipped for the fact-finding task).
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burden of proof for a different, but related matter-ascertaining
the nature of Article XI as "self-judging" or "non-self-judging."
Since Argentina and the respective claimant-investors advanced
their own affirmative views on this subject, both parties were
called upon to present evidence to show that the parties to the
U.S.-Argentina BIT intended that the Article would be self-judging.
Owing to their observance of the allocative method on the burden
of proof in this matter, it is unsurprising that the Tribunals in
Sempra, LG&E, CMS Gas and Continental separately reached the
unanimous and well-considered conclusion that Article XI is not a
"self-judging" clause.
The last aspect that should affect the treaty applier's choice of
the lex specialis is the issue of damages and/or compensation.
Viewing the U.S.-Argentina BIT as the lex specialis should not be
taken as inhibitive to using the general rules on state responsibility
in a residual manner,312 particularly on the issue of damages where
the text of the U.S.-Argentina BIT is entirely silent. (The issue of
compensation under Article IV(1) of the U.S.-Argentina BIT is
directed towards the legality of an expropriation, and not as a
means of reparation for breaches of the substantive obligations
contained throughout the entire U.S.-Argentina BIT). This is
utterly different from the situation where Article XI already
contains a specific normative formulation, and a treaty applier
erroneously attempts to infuse substantive content to this
formulation from a separate legal regime such as the customary
doctrine of "necessity." As previously discussed in Section 3.1 in
relation to Section 2, given the abject incompatibilities between
both norms, the customary doctrine of "necessity" bears a
"relationship of conflict" with Article XI.
In the case of damages, however, the general rules of
international law, specifically customary doctrines on reparation as
codified in the Articles on State Responsibility, can be viewed as a
312 See Bruno Simma & Dirk Pulkowski, Of Planets and the Universe: Self-
contained Regimes in International Law, 17 EuR. J. INT'L L. 483, 500-01 (2006).
First, the rules of the special regime, ordinarily codified in a treaty
instrument, must be interpreted according to Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties in order to establish whether the
states parties intended the regime's secondary rules to be exhaustive and
complete. Second, resort must be had to general international law to
verify whether the latter permits such derogation.
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"relevant rule of international law" within the interpretive
framework of Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties. Awarding damages in case of treaty breaches is entirely
consistent with the U.S.-Argentina BIT's objects of "maintaining a
stable framework for investment" and encouraging "reciprocal
protection of investment." Considering that the U.S.-Argentina
BIT's dispute resolution mechanisms in Articles VI and VII
contemplates resort to binding arbitration before the International
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID"), it is
reasonable to conclude that parties foresaw the application of
Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention (which entitles ICSID
Tribunals to decide a dispute in accordance with "applicable rules
of international law.") The law on reparations, specifically as
codified in Articles 31 and 34 of the Articles on State
Responsibility, inimitably comprise part of the corpus of such
applicable international legal rules in investment adjudication.313
In summary, interpreting Article XI against the context of the
entire U.S.-Argentina BIT makes the exclusive choice of the lex
specialis inevitable. The glaring conceptual-methodological
incompatibilities between the customary defense of "necessity"
under Article 25 and non-precluded measures under Article XI
sufficiently disposes of any interpretive function of the former
towards the latter. Where the text of the non-precluded measures
clause in a treaty specifically provides for resort to such other types
of normative regimes under international law, however, such
norms could be admitted to establish a "relationship of
interpretation" between the treaty standard and the non-treaty
standard. This is perfectly consistent with the framework of the
unitary system of interpretation under Article 31 of the VCLT and
supplementary means of interpretation under Article 32 of the
VCLT.
313 In the cases so far published, ICSID tribunals have framed the obligations
imposed by their awards in pecuniary terms. This not due to a belief that they
lack the power to proceed otherwise. Rather, the cases involve situations in which
the investment relationship had broken down and the claimants had defined their
demands in pecuniary terms. It is entirely possible that future cases will involve
disputes arising from ongoing relationships in which awards providing for
specific performance or injunctions become relevant. Tribunals imposing such
non-pecuniary obligations should provide for a pecuniary alternative in case of
non-performance such as liquidated damages, penalties, or another obligation to
pay a certain sum of money. CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A
COMMENTARY 1124-26 (2001).
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4. CONCLUSION
Financial downturns, economic recessions, and other economic
emergencies have been "associated with the peaks of business
cycles," 314 the trends of which appear almost as historically
inevitable as death and taxes.315 Even as of this writing, the 2008
global financial crisis has yet to fully unravel, and governments
throughout the world are besieged by calls for recovery and
reform.316  Under a persistent climate of high risk, market
uncertainty, and capital volatility, it is not unlikely that more
governments will find inspiration from Argentina's triumphant
use of the defense of necessity or economic emergency in the
Continental Award to defeat investor claims. At the very least, the
Continental Tribunal's interpretation of non-precluded measures
under Article XI could spur similar assertions with respect to other
bilateral investment treaties throughout the world that contain
clauses akin to Article XI. Independent of the interpretation of
Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, the quandary about the
interpretation of treaty clauses involving non-precluded measures
is far from over.
There is an urgent need to address the lack of transparency and
coherence in treaty appliers' interpretive methodologies. As this
Article shows, the recurring problem of how to interpret Article XI
of the U.S.-Argentina BIT exposes divergences in methodologies
even among the various ICSID Tribunals in Sempra, LG&E, CMS
Gas, and most recently, Continental. Deficiencies in Continental, the
most recent of these Awards, do little to inspire confidence in the
stability of the international legal investment regime. When treaty
appliers appear to enjoy almost unfettered discretion in cherry-
314 CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF
FINANCIAL CRISES 3 (4th ed. 2000).
315 See JEAN TIROLE, FINANCIAL CRISES, LIQUIDITY AND THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY SYSTEM (2002) (focusing on market failure, crisis prevention, and
institutional design); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS
(2002) (discussing how globalization has influenced economic development); THE
ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS: LESSONS FOR A RESILIENT ASIA (Wing Thye Woo, Jeffrey D.
Sachs, & Klaus Schwab eds. 2000) (analyzing the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-
1999).
316 ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE SU1PRIME SOLUTION: How TODAY'S GLOBAL
FINANCIAL CRISIS HAPPENED, AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT (2008). See Global Economy
in 'Major Downturn' from Financial Crisis: IMF, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Oct. 8,
2008, available at http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5gaPha4zcGAle5SzeYw
ZW6EWKBMDQ (reporting that the global economy is in a major downturn while
entering 2009 after a shock in financial markets).
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picking extrinsic sources from which to cull the supposed
substantive content and legal effects of a bilateral treaty provision,
without showing the justifications for its interpretive methodology
within the canonical rules of interpretation in the law of treaties,
there are obvious red flags to the practice and development of
international investment law.
The logical response to stem this groundswell of instability lies
with restoring fealty to interpretive rules under Articles 31 and 32
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. This Article re-
examined the infusion of the customary defense of "necessity" into
the interpretation of Article XI against the components of the
unitary system of interpretation in Article 31 of the VCLT, and
showed that neither text, context, subsequent agreement or
practice of the parties to the U.S.-Argentina BIT support the use of
the customary norm as an interpretive tool. Conceptual and
methodological incompatibilities between the customary defense
of "necessity" (as codified under Article 25 of the Articles on State
Responsibility) and Article XI also militate against the treaty
applier's reference to Article 25 as a "relevant rule of international
law" under Article 31(3) of the VCLT. Neither can the customary
defense of "necessity" be used as a supplementary means of
interpretation within the framework of Article 32 of the VCLT,
since the fundamental requirements for using such supplementary
means (whether in the confirmatory or determinative sense) to derive
meaning are all wanting in the particular case of Article XI of the
U.S.-Argentina BIT. Teleological scrutiny of the full compass of
investment protections and treaty objectives in the U.S.-Argentina
BIT also yields an additional argument against the use of the
customary defense of "necessity" to interpret Article XI of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT.
The consequences to forcing the customary defense of
"necessity" into Article XI interpretation are not only legal. Policy
and governance issues both pose countervailing considerations to
this form of interpretation. Uncertainty in ICSID Tribunals'
interpretations of the same treaty provision undermines investor
and host State confidence in the reliability of the dispute settlement
procedures available in the international investment regime, and
could likely deter recourse to binding arbitration when there is a
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higher perception of unpredictability of legal outcomes. 317
Investors undertaking cost-benefit analyses could be incentivized
by this perception of poor recovery from litigation to precipitately
pull out (capital or financial) investments altogether at the first
signs of economic or financial crisis in the host State, instead of
agreeing to alternative forms of restructuring (such as writing off
distressed debt, corporate reorganizations, among others).318
Increased volumes of capital flight, in turn, could plunge a host
State into an even deeper and longer economic crisis than initially
projected. 319
At the same time, attaching an Article 25-type meaning
(customary defense of "necessity") to Article XI-type non-
precluded measures (and coupled with a Continental-like
interpretation that non-preclusion would mean that no breach
would ever arise from the bilateral investment treaty), itself creates
a moral hazard for the conduct of host States in relation to
investment treatment and protection. If permissively-worded BIT
clauses on non-precluded measures (e.g. "This Treaty shall not
preclude the application by either Party of measures
necessary. . . .") could suffice to cavalierly dispose of a host State's
substantive obligations under the BIT, host States might
conceivably relax the necessary diligence in corporate governance
and investment protection at its own timeline, or for so long as the
host State deems that its economy is in a "state of economic
emergency" (or at the very least, presents macroeconomic
indicators to reasonably support its economic judgment).
Can the customary defense of "necessity" ever transform the
content of the conventional law on non-precluded measures?
Additionally, given the contemporary legal regime governing
international investment, is there still room for host States to plead
"essential security interests"?
317 See Barnali Choudhury, Evolution or Devolution? Defining Fair and Equitable
Treatment in International Investment Law, 6 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 297,
302-16 (2005).
318 See Molly Zohn, Filling the Void: International Legal Structures and Political
Risk in Investment, 31 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 230, 282-83 (2007) (concluding that
factors external to host countries greatly affect political risk within host countries,
and thus investors have incentives to foster new mthods of host country control).
319 See CAPITAL FLIGHT AND CAPITAL CONTROLS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
(Gerald A. Epstein ed., 2005) (presenting case studies of capital flight in countries
including South Africa, Turkey, and Brazil).
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Answering both questions still requires adherence to the
unitary system of interpretation under the VCLT. While the
restrictive minority view on treaties states that the meanings of
treaty norms could progressively incorporate subsequent
"evolutionary" customary law development on the same subject
matter,320 it is difficult to draw this inference given the specific
textual formulation of Article XI alongside the entire structural
design of the U.S.-Argentina BIT. Thus, insofar as host State
obligations to investors are concerned, the U.S.-Argentina BIT itself
provided for delimitations that already contemplated and factored
in political risk, and expressly segregated instances when
substantive protections would not apply. This rationale
powerfully dovetails with the sole arbitrator's conclusions in the
May 4, 1999 Final Award in Himpurna California Energy Ltd. v.
Republic of Indonesia, where a host State's liability for compensating
a foreign investor was upheld notwithstanding the pleaded
defense of deleterious consequences from the 1997 Asian financial
crisis:
Parties entering into international contracts cannot claim
unawareness of the risks of minacro-economic adversities.
Their effects may be extreme, but are nonetheless within
the contemplation of the signatories. Moreover they are in
the contemplation of financiers who evaluate the reliability
of borrowers on the strength of contractual undertakings;
and as they are in the contemplation of insurers who assess
their willingness to provide cover to investors who also rely
on such undertakings. 321
The same rationale, however, may not be said to apply for the
use of Article XI as between States Parties to the U.S.-Argentina
BIT. With respect to legal obligations (whether arising from treaty,
customary international law, or general principles of international
law) under the structure of state responsibility in general
international law, States cannot be reasonably expected to hedge
against political risks in the way investors and host States do. At
best, States Parties to bilateral investment treaties could only
320 NANcY KONTOu, THE TERMINATION AND REVISION OF TREATIES IN THE LIGHT
OF NEW CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 17 (1995).
321 Himpurna California Energy Ltd. v. PT (Persero) Perusahaan Listruik
Negara (Berm. v. Indon.), Award, 14 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. A-i, 411-13
(May 4, 1999).
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expect adjustments in their relative claims and mutual expectations
in relation to responsibilities to each other if they foresaw that
either could, at a point in time, apply such "necessary measures."
This is all the "comfort" that Article XI could provide to States
Parties to the U.S.-Argentina BIT, without doing violence to the
VCLT's unitary system of interpretation as was done in the
Continental Award.
In this sense, "necessity" can be conceptually disaggregated -
there is "necessity" which a government employs within its
domestic legal order (as in legislative exercises which justify
measures in relation to domestic constituents on the grounds of the
ordre publique or orden publico); "necessity" which a government
applies to condition and adjust citizens' expectations in relation to
how the state apparatus is deployed to affect individual or
constitutional rights in emergency cases; and there is "necessity"
which is res inter alios acta for investors enjoying contractual rights,
but is permissibly raised among and between States in the
international legal order. The treaty-applier's task of making these
distinctions is imperative to avoid the kind of confusion seen from
the stream of Article XI cases from Sempra to Continental.
Certainly, future bilateral investment treaties could stipulate
further detail on the legal effects of non-precluded measures, and
countries are well within their rights if they decide to include a
Continental-like interpretation of non-preclusion into the treaty
text. However, unless it is clear from the treaty's text, context,
subsequent agreement or practice, or relevant rules of international
law as specified in the treaty or intended by the parties to the
treaty, the radical interpretation undertaken by the Continental
Tribunal should not be read into existing bilateral investment
treaty regimes. It is for parties to bilateral investment treaties to
negotiate and provide for these specific legal consequences to non-
precluded measures, and not for vacillating tribunals with opaque
interpretive methodologies.
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